24 MARCH 1928, Page 12

The League of Nations

Switzerland and Disarmament

(Our readers already know M. William Martin, the distinguished editor of the Journal de Gerave. In this article he deals with the particular position of his own country within the League.—ED.

Spectator.]

Duaniu the discussions at Geneva on the subject of disarma- ment, it is a notable fact that the Swiss delegates have gene- rally been conspicuous by their absence or by their silence. This is surprising—the more so because Switzerland is an absolutely peaceful country—which her military system necessarily makes her. As regards disarmament she is an example and a model for other countries. This apparent

anomaly is explained by the fact that the position of Switzer- land is not—from this point of view—the same as that of the anomaly is explained by the fact that the position of Switzer- land is not—from this point of view—the same as that of the

other countries. The latter, by the Treaty of Versailles, have undertaken to disarm, and have only made this engagement on one condition—the degree of their security. Switzerland, which is not a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles, has made no such engagement. On the other hand, an extensive section of her public opinion believes that she has done so and that she would not be free to reduce her armaments even if she so desired.

It should be remembered that Switzerland was declared perpetually neutral by the Treaty of Vienna of 1815—a neu- trality which was continued during the whole of the nine- teenth century and throughout the World War. The Swiss people have come to regard this as the symbol of their inde- pendence, and they are deeply interested in it. Moreover, when in 1919 the question of her joining the League of Nations was raised, the Swiss Government took steps to make sure whether such membership would be compatible with the maintenance of perpetual neutrality.

At that time Germany was not a member of the League, which appeared in the eyes of a great many Swiss people as an alliance of the conquerors against the conquered. Public feeling was not too favourable to it. What could the League of Nations give to Switzerland which she did not already possess ? By perpetual neutrality Switzerland could, in case of attack, rely upon the help of the guarantors. All that the Covenant promised Switzerland was a number of greater guarantees with the uncertainty of a system yet in the expe- rimental stage. Public feeling in Switzerland was almost unanimous ; they must not abandon the substance for the shadow and sacrifice neutrality for a pact the durability of which no one could foresee, and which could only be tested by practice.

TIIE SPECIAL POSITION OF SWITZERLAND.

It was on these conditions that the Federal Government demanded the recognition of Swiss neutrality at the Peace

Conference. President Wilson and Lord Cecil, fearing that the least weakness in the plan of the pact would destroy the whole, refused absolutely, and the Supreme Council referred back the Swiss question to the Council of the League of Nations. When the Swiss delegates arrived in London in February, 1922, the situation was modified in their favour. President Wilson had himself introduced into the Treaty of

Versailles an article declaring that international engagements concluded with a view to the maintenance of peace—such as the Monroe Doctrine—were not contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the other hand, in Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, the signatories to this Treaty had recognized that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland aimed at the maintenance of peace. The juxtaposition of these two texts seemed to permit an assimilation of Swiss neutrality with the Monroe Doctrine, and its maintenance inside the League.

The Council of the League of Nations was not particularly favourable to this argument, but as it was clear that Switzer- land would not enter the League of Nations if its perpetual neutrality were not confirmed, the Council on February 13th, 1920, came to a decision in London which- accorded to Switzer land a special status in the League. By this decision Switzer- land was exempt from participating in the military sanctions outside its frontiers, At the same time, it expressly provided that Switzerland is not exempt from participation in the economic sanctions which the League of Nations prescribe, nor from the defence of her own territory. It is upon these words that a section of our public opinion upholds the argument that Switzerland should herself defend her own territory in all circumstances, which would deprive her of the freedom to reduce her armaments. This argument played a great part in the local discussions between the Socialists—who demand

a reduction of the military budget—and the Bourgeois party,

who resist it. It would appear inadvisable to seek for more in the Declaration of London than it actually contains. Its object has been to state precisely, from the moment the Swiss

people were relieved of certain obligations of the Covenant, that this exception must not be extended in a wider sense (un seas extensif) and that Switzerland was not exempt from certain other obligations, among which may be included the defence of her own territory. On this point the position of Switzerland does not differ from that of other members of the League, but is similar, and this is precisely its intention. MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY.

It could not be otherwise. If the Swiss people had under- taken to defend themselves alone against all aggression they would have assumed an obligation at variance with their perpetual neutrality. A nation of less than 4,000,000 people might have been obliged to resist alone any adversary in no matter what circumstances. That supposition is untenable. Further, the Declaration of London is not an International Treaty, but a simple decision of the League of Nations Council with which Switzerland has had no formal concern, and it is unthinkable that it might result for that country in a limitation of sovereignty so considerable as would be the prohibition to disarm. The Swiss Confederation is a sovereign and independent nation, which has the right to extend its armaments if it wishes to do so, which implies the right to reduce them.

Can we, then, suppress our Army ? I do not think so. No member of the League of Nations can deprive himself of all means of defence. The Covenant imposes on all the States the duty of being in a position to participate in the sanctions which the Council prescribes : consequently, no State may deprive itself in advance of the possibility of carrying out this engagement. When the Danish Socialist Government considered the suppression of the Army and of the Fleet, voices were at once raised to point out that such a measure would be incompatible with the position of a member of the League of Nations. Although Switzerland may have not participated in the sanctions outside her territory, she is not, in this connexion, in an exceptional situation ; and she must, be prepared to co-operate in the matter of her own defence. She cannot, therefore, deprive herself of every kind of military strength.

SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT.

To sum up, I believe—contrary to a large section of Swiss public opinion—that this country is in the same position as the other members of the League, in that we cannot com- pletely suppress our Army, but that we are free to determine for ourselves the basis of our own security and the limit of the armaments which we need.

It is incontestable that the security of the Swiss people is now greater than it was before the War. Two considerable Armies—those of Germany and Austria-Hungary—which hitherto were a menace to our frontiers, have disappeared. The Armies of two other countries—France and Italy—have been slightly reduced. As to guarantees of Law—the only refuge upon which small countries may count for their defence —these are considerably strengthened. Swiss neutrality was hitherto guaranteed by various great Powers. It is to-day assured by all the States-members of the League, for it is inconceivable that Switzerland could be involved in a war which was not for her a war of aggression, and which did not put into force, in her favour, all the sanctions of the Covenant.

- Waxiest MARTIN.