LORD CAWDOR AND MR. .MULLINER'S CHARGES.
[To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."' Sln,—In a recent speech at Leeds Lord Cawdor gave pro- minence to charges against the Admiralty made by Mr. Mulliner ; and, as a consequence, these charges can no longer be treated as arising from mere personal grievance on the part of an individual who considers himself to have been un- justly treated by public officials in relation to contracts for naval armaments. Lord Cawdor held the post of First Lord of the Admiralty in the last Conservative Administration, and may be expected to occupy an important place in any future Unionist Ministry ; consequently his views on naval matters must carry weight. When such a man uses words like those employed at Leeds, even though he guards himself by the statement that he " had no knowledge of the
details of the Mulliner correspondence," it becomes necessary in the public interest to endeavour to ascertain the truth. Lord Cawdor hinted at possible "impeachment " of persons on whose shoulders " a very heavy burden of respon- sibility lay " for neglecting warnings given by Mr. Mulliner three years ago as to the "strides the German Government were making" [in manufacturing resources for guns, mount- ings, and armour], and the danger that "unless something was done, and done at once, we should be caught up and passed." Mr. Mulliner asserts that because of his action the Admiralty " deliberately forced his co-directors to ask him to resign his position as managing director of the Coventry
Ordnance Works by refusing contracts to those works until he resigned." He considers this assertion to be supported by the circumstance that a few days after his resignation a contract was made by the Admiralty with the Coventry Company ; and it is a matter of public knowledge that the vacancy created by Mr. Mulliner's retirement has since been filled by the appointment of Rear-Admiral Bacon, who had occupied the post of Director of Naval Ordnance in the Admiralty. Lord Cawdor expressed no opinion on the refusal to give orders for gun-mountings to Coventry, but considered that " Mr. Mulliner deserved the Order of Merit " for his information and warnings ; and concluded his remarks by the assertion that "the people of England were entitled to an answer from those who had the responsibility in these matters." At the moment of writing no direct answer has been given, but from the correspondence and speeches of Mr. Mulliner, as well as from the records of the Parliamentary and public discussion on the naval situation in April last, certain definite conclusions may be drawn, and it may be well to summarise them.
First, it is undoubted that Germany has greatly increased her warship-building capabilities in recent years ; she was compelled to do so in order to carry out the great programmes of new construction embodied in successive Navy Acts approved by the Reichstag. When the decision was reached, at the end of 1905, to embark on the construction of German rivals to our' Dreadnoughts,' the requirements for heavy guns and gun-mountings were largely increased. Messrs. Krupp have a practical monopoly of this class of work, and upon that firm fell the necessity for large and costly extensions of premises and plant needed to meet the enlarged demands for heavy guns, gun-mountings, and armour. There was no secrecy in this matter ; the increase in capital was well known and noted in the financial Press ; the object of the outlay was thoroughly understood. Having business relations with Germany, Mr. Mulliner may have had early information, and did well to let the Admiralty know at once what was passing ; but the claim that he was the sole source of knowledge on the subject is one that cannot be justified. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that the Naval Intelligence Department of the Admiralty could have been ignorant of what was well known in technical and financial circles. If they were, such ignorance was inexcusable.
The responsibility for taking action necessary to maintain British naval supremacy when Germany made this new departure rested primarily upon the Government, acting on the advice of the Admiralty. Mr. Mulliner suggests that his warnings were disregarded by the Admiralty for two and a half years ; that the Cabinet were left in ignorance of the German advance in warship-building resources until Novem- ber, 1908; and that the " scare " of March last was a proof that this view was correct. His suggestion involves a con- fusion of two related but really distinct matters. An; one who reads the debates of last spring in the House of Commons on the subject will see that the Government then rested their plea for increased naval expenditure on the statement that the German programme of construction had been accelerated, ships having been laid down or ordered in advance of the dates contemplated in the Navy Acts, and that no authentic information as to this acceleration had been obtained by the Government until November, 1908. It is true, of course, that unless the warship-building resources of Germany had been greatly increased previous to November, 1908, there could have been no such accelera- tion; on the other hand, it by no means follows that because of the enlargement of manufacturing resources there must and will be earlier completion of ships than was contemplated in the Navy Bill. Responsible German authorities have denied that there will be any earlier completion, or that any such advances in dates are contemplated. These denials may be and are treated as worthless in some quarters, but the facts up to date are in favour of their truthfulness. At the present time Germany has no vessel of the Dreadnought' type fully completed and commissioned for actual service, while the Royal Navy has in full commission four Dreadnoughts ' and three Invincibles.' Two German battleships which should have been completed early this year have been commissioned for, and have successfully passed through, their trials, but have yet to have their final works finished; as against these we have three battleships in the final stage.
Broadly speaking, therefore, the facts in regard to the present situation do not support the allegation that there has been any neglect of suitable action on the part of our naval administrators, or that our position relatively to Germany in Dreadnoughts' and super-' Dreadnoughts' will be unsatis- factory three years hence, now that the four " contingent " armoured vessels of the 1909-10 programme have been ordered, and the end of March, 1912, fixed as the date of their com- pletion. The erratic action of the present Government in regard to past naval administration is a fair subject for criticism; but all true citizens must deplore the tendency to make political capital out of naval questions, which have long been, and should always be, kept outside party debate, even in the stress of a bard-fought General Election. All who desire to see the calm dignity of the nation maintained in association with action which shall secure undoubted naval supremacy must regret the tendency in recent times to exaggerate the dangers of German naval development and to minimise British naval strength. Into these matters of high policy also personal and private differences must never be permitted
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