PRINCE BISMARCK AND THE POSITION OF ENGLAND.
UNDER the heading, "Prince Bismarck and the Position of England," the Berlin correspondent of the Standard telegraphs to Tuesday's paper the chief portions of an article printed in Monday's Hamburger Noe/aid:1m Whether it is not going too far to describe this somewhat sensational print as " Prince Bismarck's paper," as the Standard does, is perhaps an open question. There is no doubt, however, that the paper is often used by the ex-Chancellor to express his views, and it is unlikely that ,Nu article like that to which we are referring would have been published if it were calculated to give offence to its patron. The article, therefore, is well worth consideration, even if it is not as directly inspired as is believed on the Continent. According to the writer in the Hamburger Nachrichten, England's policy le at the present moment governed by anxiety about the conflict UNDER the heading, "Prince Bismarck and the Position of England," the Berlin correspondent of the Standard telegraphs to Tuesday's paper the chief portions of an article printed in Monday's Hamburger Noe/aid:1m Whether it is not going too far to describe this somewhat sensational print as " Prince Bismarck's paper," as the Standard does, is perhaps an open question. There is no doubt, however, that the paper is often used by the ex-Chancellor to express his views, and it is unlikely that ,Nu article like that to which we are referring would have been published if it were calculated to give offence to its patron. The article, therefore, is well worth consideration, even if it is not as directly inspired as is believed on the Continent. According to the writer in the Hamburger Nachrichten, England's policy le at the present moment governed by anxiety about the conflict which she realises that she must sooner or later fight out with Russia and France. France is striving for the Soudan, and Russia for India, and England opposes these aspirations. Therefore France and Russia are allies even without a treaty. This anxiety has lately come to a head because of Russia's recent attitude towards the Egyptian question. " England will not give up Egypt, but does not feel herself a match for Russia and France, and is therefore casting about for help,—hitherto, and, let us hope, in future, in vain, so far as Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, are concerned." In other words, England is in a fix, and is putting out signals of distress to the Triple Alliance. That is a very natural statement to make in an article headed " English Anxieties,"—the title chosen by the Hamburger Nachrichten. Curiously enough, however, the sentences that follow those we have just quoted have a very different com- plexion, and show that in reality " German anxieties " were very much more in the writer's mind than the anxieties which he has chosen as a label for his remarks. Harking back to the thought of a previous article in the Hamburger Nachrichten, in regard to the need for keeping Italy in the Triple Alliance, which was noticed by us last week, the writer admits that Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance could not be a matter of indifference to her allies, " and it may be assumed that an Italy completely under the influence of England might threaten such with- drawal in order to effect secret alterations in the Triple Alliance Treaty, extending the casus foederis to all viola- tions of her Mediterranean interests which are identical with those of England." All such attempts, then, must be rigorously repelled, for otherwise a situation would be created which would bring the Triple Alliance into collision with France and Russia. " England would be in a position to exult over that, for she would once more have found the big, stupid, strong fellow who fights her enemies in her stead. This would be bad for us. History teaches that England, being safe from war in virtue of her insular position, would once more utilise the mutual conflict of the fatally bleeding Continental States for a piece of Europe as an opportunity of developing her commerce and in- dustry, annexing whole countries in other Continents, and finally robbing her exhausted allies of the fruits of their victories by calmly going over to the enemy." As we have said, it is pretty clear from this that the writer in " Prince Bismarck's paper" is in a very great state of anxiety lest England should be able either to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance or induce Italy to get the pact altered in such a way as to maintain the status quo in the Mediter- ranean. As we pointed out last week, we always have it in our power, should Germany prove essentially hostile, to offer Italy terms which would make it worth her while to leave the Triple Alliance. The Triple Alliance is a terrible burden on Italy, and is only endured by her because it secures her coasts from attack by France. Supposing, however, we were to offer to do all, and indeed more, than Germany and Austria can do in the way of protecting Italy from attack, she would in all probability be content to drop out of the Alliance. That would in• itself at once relieve her from all dread of France. France is only hostile to Italy because she belongs to the Triple Alliance. Were that partnership dissolved, France and Italy would have little to quarrel about, and we should revert to the situation when the cry of Italia irridenta was held to be an important factor in Italian politics. Again, it would not make France more but less hostile to us to know that we had done Germany so great a. disservice,—and that a great disservice it would be to induce Italy to leave the Triple Alliance the Hamburger Nachrichten has fully admitted. The Italian army may not be very strong, it admits, but if Italy were not in the Alliance, Austria must, during the war with two fronts, keep half her army along the Italian frontier instead of massing the whole of it to meet the Russian advance. For " English anxieties," then, read German. The Germans, who look ahead in foreign politics, are, in a word, seriously perturbed at the notion of Italy dropping out of the Alliance, and of Germany and Austria being left alone to wage the war with two fronts. But can Germany even feel sure that under these circum- stances Austria-Hungary might not (" very reluctantly," of course), feel compelled to stand neutral ? Probably she would not, and ought not, to take such a course, how- ever great the temptation. Still, Hungary does not love the Germans, even though abe hates the Russians. Cir- cumstances, then, are conceivable which would make the German anxieties very real. In truth, the position of Germany is essentially a most anxious one. It is on her that the terrible pressure of Russia and France falls. By skilful arrangement she has hitherto been able to stand the strain and to look as if she did not much mind it.
One foot is wedged against Austria and the other against Italy. But if Italy were to give way, she might find it almost impossible to keep her balance, and her political equilibrium would be visibly affected. But the moment Germany shows any plain sign of weakness the temptation to France and Russia to seize the lucky moment for com- bining against her will be almost irresistible. Hence Germany dreads the notion of Italy withdrawing from the Alliance, because she feels that such a withdrawal might be taken as the sign for beginning the war which she dreads so much, even though she is well prepared for it. In view of these anxieties it is natural for Germany to try to distract the attention of the world from her inherent weakness, to assert that England is the doomed Power, and to declare that a conflict must inevitably arise between England and France and Russia. Germany's policy must, therefore, be to " hold aloof from England's conflict with France and Russia, which will not seek war with us, when fighting England in three Continents, and that we should reserve our strength in order to be able to throw it into the scale when things come to be rearranged." That is frank. Germany is to hold back till her enemies are exhausted and then to carry off the prizes. An excellent game to play if one can only manage it ; but has it never occurred to Prince Bismarck's organ that France and Russia will be fully alive to the meaning of this waiting policy, and will consider it before they enter upon their war with England ? Is it not possible that they will argue This war with England may go badly with us after all. In that case Germany will pick up all our commerce, and will very probably at the end be bribed into attacking us by land by the offer of the conquered colonies of France. Under these circumstances might it not at the last moment be better to attack Germany than England ? England has naturally been angered by Germany's refusal to help her. If then at the eleventh hour we turn 'way from England and attack Germany we shall do so witi.Jut fear of molesta- tion by sea.' France and Russia are not going to destroy the commerce and maritime supremacy of England in order that Germany may benefit gratis. But this must be the case if Germany is to keep quiet during the war, and only tome in at the end to demand her share. Depend upon it, England, if she is attacked, will only be attacked by all the Powers together. That is the danger, if there is one— and no doubt it is a very great danger—but, fortunately, the mutual jealousies of the Powers make any such coalition almost impossible. France and Germany, come what may, will not fight shoulder to shoulder.
There is another English anxiety touched on by the Hamburger Nachrichten. It is our supposed dread of in- vasion. The Power or Powers, says the writer, which pre- ponderat where the conflict must be decided, that is, in the Channel and in the North Sea, will be victorious. " But the French Channel Fleet alone is already a match for the English, and its junction with the Russian Baltic Fleet would put an end to England's superiority in the waters in which the conflict must be decided." But apparently we are to be invaded even if and while we remain mistress of the sea. " If she maintain her superiority at sea, her antagonists must try to convert the sea war as quickly as possible into a land war, and to seek a decision where all the nerves of the World-Empire meet,—that is, in London." The essay entitled "Attempts to Invade England," by Baron Liittwii z, a Prussian officer of the General Staff, expresses the opinion that the question of the possibility of such an invasion must be answered in the affirmative. " The attempt to invade England," concludes the Hamburger No citric/den, "is still, indeed, a risky, but no longer an impossible, enterprise." Nevertheless, we cannot profess to be alarmed. We admit that it is essential to keep the command of the sea, and we will admit also that we are tr; ing to do it on too few ships, but the danger of invasion is, we believe, entirely remote. The German General Staff have a beautiful plan in a pigeon-hole for invading Russia, and laugh at the notion of being beaten by the obstacles which overcame Napoleon. But for all that the Germans will never occupy St. Petersburg and Moscow, and hold them for a whole winter. London, again, will never be seized by a coup de main. To be of any use when they are landed the invaders must have one hundred thousand men, carrying with them all their guns, horses, and stores. But to transport such an army by sea suddenly and under " surprise " conditions is utterly impossible. We may take it then that the writer in the German newspaper is in reality a great deal more anxious to make us anxious than convinced of our anxiety. It may do good to get up a belief on the Continent that England is trembling with terror. It may help to make the Italians doggedly loyal to the Triple Alliance, and it might even incite France and Russia to begin to make an end of the "moribund Power" that every one envies. At the same time we doubt the results of the manceuvre. There is a sort of tremour in the voice of the Hamburger Nachrichten which shows who really is the anxious person. These are, no doubt, troublous times for the whole of Europe, and we, like the rest of the Powers, have our difficulties ; but if the anxiety is to be fairly apportioned, we assuredly shall not be awarded the biggest share. That belongs to Germany. She stands bravely, it is true, between her two great enemies, but her power of resistance does not grow stronger, while theirs is increasing. France is, after all, the richest country in the world, and Russia has inexhaustible resources in men, and that is a combination hard to beat. Meantime the animosity felt by the Slav and the Frenchman to the Teuton is always burning. The struggle must come, and before very long. Very possibly it will end in favour of Germany, but no man can tell. In any case, the anxiety must be great and grievous. No man can think of the war with two fronts without a shudder. Four million armed Frenchmen, and more than four million armed Slays, squeezing Germany between them. Even the heart of Frederick the Great might have quailed before such a prospect.
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