of two races, speaking two languages, and believing two widely
separated and usually hostile creeds, were compelled in their weakness to build up a State by the side of the mightiest Repub- lic in the world,—a Republic ambitious, aggressive, and at the moment emerging victorious from a war of unprecedented mag- nitude and duration. This people, moreover, was by historical circumstance inexperienced in the arts of statecraft, by law compelled to submit to the policy of another State three thousand miles away, and by temperament precluded from establishing the iron organization which has so often in the history of the world enabled a petty people to defy apparently irresistible assaults. Canada could not be to North America what the Prussia of Frederick was to Europe. Above this people, thus weakened by social differences and vast mate- rial distances, was a Legislature framed by provincial delegates, whose first care was thatParliament should not be too strong, and guided by men who seemed to the statesmen of the Old World big children playing at legislation, by a Cabinet in which the leaders were an acute Scotch-Protestant Premier, with a ten- dency to reckless joviality ; and a light-hearted, easy-going French Catholic Minister at War, raised to his position through the implicit confidence felt in his fidelity by the Catholic priest- hood. Our philosopher certainly would have predicted that such a Government, even if it succeeded in legislation, would break down in military organization, would lack the feeling of nationality and the impulse of self-defence,—that what with English control and want of experience and social circumstances, the Dominion must be a nearly powerless State. Yet it is precisely at this point that the Canadian Government has succeeded beyond all hope or precedent. The grand merits of the contrivance—that the people are attached to it, that they are free and happy under it, that they elect the rulers in whom, efficient or inefficient, they confide ; that it is left to them to stand by the State or to desert it ; and that all this liberty in excess is consistent with citizenship in an Empire of vast resources and a history of a thousand years—have made up for every other deficiency, and the new State born only yesterday is as strong for battle as many a monarchy of the Old World. The Home Government contributed officers, expe- rience, a few regiments as instructors, a military tradition, and about half a million's worth of military stores, and the Dominion itself provided all else that was required. With a courage deserving all praise, her statesmen proposed and her Parliament accepted an Act placing every male between 18 and 60 at the disposal of the Crown for service in the event of invasion ; and this principle once established, the rest was left to the Executive. Mr. Macdonald, the Scotch Protestant, found the means ; Sir Etienne Cartier, the French Catholic, devised the system, and in less than 20 months a true though cheap armYof 600,000 militia had been organized, and in Lord Monck's opinion could be actually called into the field, with its permanent staff in complete order, and with no less than 5,300 officers regularly educated in military schools. Out of these men, again, an advance guard, so to speak, of 40,000 Volunteers has been organized, ready for active service on any emergency, and so real is their willingness, so thorough their discipline, that when the last Fenian raid but one tested the strength of the Canadian Government, 1,095 officers, 12,394 men, 863 horses, and 18 guns were within forty-eight hours on active service in motion against the enemy, and the number could have been doubled without a delay of hours. The Dominion, in fact, has an effective and moveable army of 40,000 men, just as well-disciplined as any army likely to oppose it, and a reserve almost as great, and likely to be as efficient, as the army which its mighty neighbour could summon into the field. It is no longer a mere congeries of provinces lying open to invasion, but an armed State, which it would take time, and generalship, and treasure, and bloodshed to conquer, which could maintain a struggle almost as formidable as that sup- ported by the South, which in the very worst event could give the Empire time to bring up its forces to the struggle which even the Colonial Office admits it would be dishonourable to avoid.
• No result of a policy could be more satisfactory ; but then, what is that result / Surely this,—first of all, that we have in Canada an ally worth having, a friend who gives as well as takes, a child who, so far from burdening, is greatly increasing the resources of the household. Common justice, not to speak of statecraft, would seem to require that such an ally should be treated with every consideration, that the wishes of such a relative should have some weight in the family affairs, that he should be treated with the respect due to independent and most successful exertion on the common behalf, that he should be regarded as a favoured ally, rather than a burdensome con- nection whom it would be well to shake off. That, however,. is not, so far as we can gather from Lord Northbrook's speech: and the comments of their supporters in the Press, theidea of the Colonial Office. The "Department" thinks that because Canada. has done so much, its own policy in diminishing aid and refusing courtesy is amply justified, inasmuch as those un- pleasantnesses have created self-reliance in the Colonies, which will be further developed if the mother country declines to. garrison the fortress of Quebec, and indeed if it withdraws its troops from Canada altogether. We entirely agree with the- Colonial Office if the Dominion wishes the troops withdrawn, but this existence or non-existence of a wish on the matter is precisely the one point which the Office declines to consider. It. may be very wise to concentrate force athome—though we doubt it, suspecting that concentration is a mere preliminary to reduc- tion—but then in politics, as in private affairs, one has to consider the disadvantages as well as advantages of any course of action ; and it seems to us that the Office makes a mistake in the cal- culation. We obtain a slight advantage in money and a greater• possible advantage in the concentration of power, at the cost. of compelling a most valuable ally to consider whether a- friendship so grudgingly bestowed, a friendship which gives nothing, not even honour, is worth the having, whether self- reliance had not better develop itself into isolation. We can, say the advocates of economy, defend Canada from attack more easily when our troops are withdrawn than when they are locked up in Quebec. Very likely ; but shall we ?—that the Canadian doubt—and is defence from attack all that Canada desires If it be, she can obtain her desire much more completely and much more easily by joining the Union ;. but as we understand her people, they desire not only a pro- tection to which they now contribute at least their share, but a place in the Empire, a recognition that they are not only to be defended, but are worthy of defence,—a visible- proof that they are still Britons, subjects of the Queen, mem- bers of an Imperial organization, men who are to share in the good and ill fortune of this little island with its unique. history. That proof they say they obtain from the presence- of a few men who may not be of very great value in a cam- paign, but who are only present in lands regarded as. integral portions of the Empire, who are to friends and foes a visible symbol that Britain is pledged to perish before the land they " protect " can be surrendered to- violent assault. While the redcoats remain, every Cana- dian is for all that interests the imagination also some- thing more,—a man entitled to boast of the triumphs and share the reverses of the first, or at all events the most world- wide, of existing Powers. It is merely a sentiment, no doubt, but then so is patriotism, and nobody has ever discovered ark, emotion which could supersede patriotism in giving vitality to States and Empires. It may take ten thousand men and a million sterling a year to keep the flag flying in the English- speaking Colonies,—that is, to keep up the moral unity of the- Empire, to secure the unshakable alliance of a ring of States, of which one only has within five years made itself the second power upon the American Continent. It is for the people of England, and not for the Colonial Office, to judge whether that result is worth the money invested in securing it.
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