Retvisan' had her armoured deck continued downwards so as to
constitute an extra defence against torpedoes. But it is not so much the simple blowing of a hole as the extensive jarring, and consequent loosening of rivets and plates, that does the mischief. The gradual sinking of the Hatsuse' from apparently miscellaneous leakage seemed to prove this. Other lessons have been taught by the war. It has been observed by two. Admirals writing in the Press that all the Japanese destroyer& kept the sea, notwithstanding severe fighting, whereas they declared that there were never less than 10 per cent, of the English destroyers in dock. Again, in the Naval Manceuvres three of Admiral Walker's cruisers broke down, obviously, as Mr. Thurafield makes out, because they were newly commissioned. This is nothing new in naval warfare ; it applies even more cer- tainly to ships driven by engines than ships driven by sails. Mr. Thursfield's analysis of the Mano3uvres is most suggestive, and makes it doubtful if even naval experts, such as we may presume the umpires to have been, really grasp what is meant by com- mand of the sea. Local and temporary command of the sea cannot count. Nevertheless, the 1904 Manceuvres taught us more with regard to strategy and the work of cruisers than the last half-dozen years have. The arguments as to casemates and central batteries for protection of the secondary armaments are discussed by Sir William White, who mentions that the
Mikasa ' has longitudinal as well as transverse steel bulkheads. This is an attempt to turn a central battery into a sort of com- posite casemate. The question is more fully discussed in a later chapter. A central battery means a certain economy in the weight of main-deck armour; and any legitimate economy in this respect is doubly important. The Admiralty have made out a sufficiently good case for the Swiftsure ' and the Triumph.' They surely rank as line-of-battle ships. They may not be as heavily armoured and as heavily armed as a Saffron ' or a Tsarevitch,' but the weight is in the right place, protecting the gun positions, and their speed is superior to either. One writer in the Naval Annual declares that the Swiftsure ' and the 'Triumph' could fight the five battleships of the 'Royal Sovereign' type in the Home Fleet. We know that the 'Royal Sovereign' type is regarded with con- tempt, though her vitals are properly protected, which is more than can be said of even the King Edward VII.' class. We must congratulate the writers of chaps. 2 and 3 in Part IV. on their very able analysis and suggestive criticism of the relative position of guns and armour. The King Edward VII.' comes in for some very severe criticism. One of the most serious defects is the incomplete casemating of the guns in the secondary battery. The Japanese, taught by the terrible effects of the gas from a 12 in. shell, have, as already stated, protected their gun crews in the Mikasa.' In conclusion, we may once again congratulate the editor and publishers of the Naval Annual on its enhanced value and interest. We would ask, however, for transverse diagrams ea. plaining the protection of the decks in every case; the few instances given only reveal their necessity. Among the important features discussed this year are the new quick-firing guns (7.5 in. and 92 in), the prize-firing, the steaming capacity of cruisers, the reduction in the protection of the ship's vitals, and the reorganisation of the personnel. The various authors do not always agree ; one declares the Retvisan ' as being specially protected against torpedoes, another as being defended in the ordinary manner. It matters little now, it is true, nor ever will; the torpedo that strikes has done its work.
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