if, becoming coloured by the views of the people among
whom he lives and whose welfare he is charged to promote. Up to a certain point, of course, this is just what the Government wishes.- It is to ascertain these views that it has sent out a representative instead of trusting to its own knowledge. But if the people of the dependency happen to be greatly divided among themselves, there is a very grave danger that the repre- sentative of the Home Government will insensibly take sides in the local controversies. He will come, for example, to attach more importance to the views of those who are well disposed to the Home Govern- ment than to the views of those who criticise or attack that Government. It is almost inevitable that he should make this distinction; and yet to make it may be to deprive his reports of their value. The disaffected —or the less well affected—section of the community state their views, perhaps, with an entire absence of courtesy, and even of loyalty. Naturally, therefore, they make a bad impression on the Commissioner, and he allows this bad impression to determine the tone of his despatches. By degrees his chiefs begin to suspect that he is less impartial than he once was. Starting from this point, they gradually come to the conclusion that though the complaints of the disloyal party may have been very ill expressed, and may be the outcome of feelings not easily distinguished from positive disaffection, they have still some solid foundation. In coming to see this they necessarily go a step further. They can no longer feel the same confidence in the accuracy of their representative's reports. He was directed to understand and differentiate the various currents of local opinion, and he has faithfully carried out his instructions. But he has done something more than this. He has learned to like and to dislike as well as to inquire and record, and in so far as he has done this his conclusions have lost the impartiality which at first characterised them. It implies no censure on their representative if at this point the Government recall him, or supplement his reports by sending out another Commissioner to undertake an independent inquiry. Their first choice has not been discredited ; the official on whom it fell has only turned out not to be proof against unconscious influences which hardly any man can resist 'for ever. His recall or the sending out of a colleague needs no other explanation than the fact that he is not wholly exempt from one of the most universal of human frailties. His employers have simply recognised a fact which they could not refuse to recognise without incurring just blame. They are in office to see justice done and affairs well administered, not to spare the feelings of subordinates, however able they may be and however good may have been their service.
Lord Rosebery's distinction is capable of a very much wider application. He is dealing with the case of men quite worthy of confidence in the first instance, and only ceasing to be so under the action of circumstances. But politicians are constantly asked to trust this or that Government as a whole because so many good men are included in it, or to trust a particular Minister because he is so good that he will communicate his virtues to his colleagues. From this one of two consequences often follows. In some cases the disregard of the appeal, made as it is in perfect good faith, excites great indignation. Those who refuse to trust a statesman whose private virtues they are quite willing to admire are blamed for setting political above moral considerations. You know,' it is said, ' how good the Prime Minister is, how little he regards his own advance- ment, how unreserved is his devotion to the public 'interest, how forward he is in all good works, what a firm supporter of the Church he is, or how completely free from all sectarian prejudice—and yet, with all these merits freely admitted by yourself, you let them count for nothing with you by the side of some measure or group of measures on whidli you set a probably excessive value. You are not ashamed to put politics above morals. You refuse to 'recognise how infinitely superior goodness is to cleverness.'
The temper of mind which suggests this remonstrance is more often found among women than among men ; but in so far as men set a high value upon moral excellence, they too will sometimes resort to it. The converse temper, however, is far commoner. Men will admit that good men may be bad politicians, but it goes against them to admit that bad politicians may be good men. Few People, Perhaps, would now say with Bishop Phillpotts in Liddon's story that there is only one word which expresses what they feel when they think of Mr. Gladstone, " and that is Rascal." But there are a good many who in their hearts think something not very unlike this. They find it hard to believe that the Minister who disestablished the Irish Church and would have given Ireland Home-rule could have been a good man Their idea of trusting a man is to trust him all in all, or not at all. According as they think well or ill of one side of his character, all sides must share in the sentence passed on him. This is the explanation of the seemingly rapid changes in the rank-and-file of a party which sometimes follow on a change in the initiative of a leader. The acceptance of Disraeli's Reform Bill was a case of this kind. The trust of the party in the man was strong enough to carry the change of policy. The action of the Protectionists after Peel's adoption of Free-trade was an example of the opposite kind. The demand he made on the party was too great, and they set him down as a traitor ever after.
The plain fact is that morals and politics belong to different compartments of the mind. They cannot, it is true, be wholly and permanently separated, because morality belongs to a higher order than politics, and will occasionally pass judgment upon political issues. But ordinarily they demand the exercise of different faculties, and excellence in one is no guarantee of excellence in the other. When we are bidden to trust Mr. Balfour or Mr. Chamberlain we want some better reason for our faith than their possession of this or that conspicuous virtue. Mr. Balfour may have all the detachment that belongs to the saint, Mr. Chamber- lain may have all the resolution which characterises the martyr. But when we ask whether it is well to leave or place the affairs of the country in their hands we must look for a great part of the answer in a region outside morals. Confidence in public men implies, no doubt, a conviction that they are honestly working for what they believe to be the good of somebody other than themselves. It may be their country, or their party, or a particular section of their party, but it must not be solely their desire to get into office or to stay there. But this preliminary fraction of morality is pretty widely distributed. The purely selfish politician is rare,—partly, perhaps, because before he can gam his object he must be clever enough to disguise beyond fear of recognition the fact that he is selfish. And for everything else what matters is not a man's wishes, but his power of giving effect to them. We do not doubt that the present Government are honestly of opinion that England benefits by their continuance in office. But if we are asked to trust them on this ground, we can only reply that their entire inability to give effect to their intentions, except in two departments, and those the departments least likely to be affected by a change of Ministry, deprives those intentions of all their value. We concede that Mr. Balfour believes that the country gains by the Unionists staying in office ; . that Mr.. Arnold- Forster believes that the Army he hopes one day to create will he able to hold its own against the world ; that Mr. Austen Chamberlain believes that the ultiniate triumph of Tariff Reform will result in an unexampled outburst of national prosperity. But before we can trust the authors of these several policies we must think well of their wisdom as well as of their good faith. This is the demand which we find it impossible to meet. No amount of good intentions can make up for uniform failure in their execution, least of all when the intentions themselves are so wrong-headed that it is better they should fail than that they should succeed.
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