THE SULTAN.
THE English public just now exaggerates the effect of Ministerial changes in Turkey. They sometimes mean much, but just at this moment the power of the Sultan, always enormous, has been so exaggerated, and is employed for such objects, that they mean almost nothing at all. It is fifteen years since we pointed out in the Spectator that nothing could save Turkey except the appearance in the House of Othman of a "riding Sultan," a monarch competent to govern, who would visit his own dominions, select able agents, and punish corrupt or incompetent Pashas with death. Such a Sultan would be supported by the soldiery, whom he would• pay with comparative regularity ; and by the Mussulman mob, which, like every other mob, has a traditional ideal, and which retains a religious reverence for the Prophet's viceregent ; but no other man, not even a Grand Vizier, could possess the necessary ascendancy over the dominant caste. Turkey has seen many changes since then, but our statement of the position is, if possible, more true than ever. The result of defeat, bankruptcy, and revolution has been to concentrate all authority, and especially all initiative, more completely than ever in the hands of the Sultan. All other powers in Tarkey are dead. The soldiery are powerless, for their only reason for obeying is their faith, and their faith, as they understand it, binds them to be loyal, not, indeed, to any Khalif, but to the Khalifate. All provincial powers have disappeared. The Mussulman mob of the capital is distracted with fear of Christian interference. The Pashas. are divided by party feeling, political conviction, and individual jealousy, till they can hardly form a clique, not to mention an opposi- tion; and the Ulema, though still strong within their sphere, are compelled by the law, which is their only strength, to declare that the Khalif cannot be restrained. The result is that the Sultan is more absolute than ever, that no- thing can be attempted without his consent, that no Ministry can live a month without his favour; that his order overthrows in an instant the strongest Grand Vizier. Midhat, sup- ported by all Europe, was on one and the same day master of Turkey, and a powerless exile flying for his life. Khaireddin Pasha dictated terms to his master in the morning, and at noon, dismissed by a message, was forgotten. Airifi Pasha, a mere name raised to the supreme position, on a change in his master's mood, became a name again. So absolute is the Monarch, that he abolishes, revives, again abolishes, and again revives the Grand Vizierate at his will, abolishing it when hold by a strong man, reviving it when he thinks lie has found an instrument in whom he can confide. The autocracy is perfect, and yet Abdul Hamid is not content with it, but is resolved that even the Ministers dependent upon his flat shall be but expressions of himself, his per- sonal favourites, his household officers, ready to sur- render even the privilege of independent suggestion. That, by universal consent, is the meaning of his latest change of Ministry. Said Pasha is his personal favourite, the man to whom he talks, the man who can say things to him, clever,
astute, and well informed, but as dependent on his favonvas ever was Olivier le Dain on the favour of Louis XI. Mahm:oud Nedim, once a great administrator, and dreaded for his Russian sympathies, has raised himself this time with his Sovereign solely by seeking his favour, and advising him to be Monarch ; and the remainder are cyphers, who may be retained or dismissed without remark, exactly as the Sovereign may please. The "Porte," the last remaining power, or ap- pearance of power, in Turkey, has been merged in the Palace, and the Sultan is all in all, the only free politician.in his own dominions.
We repeat these statements, which most of our readers and of those who know Turkey will consider trite, because it is in the great fact which they embody, that the hopelessness of the situat tion at Constantinople consists. The talk about this or the- Minister, and his plans, and his ideas, and his proclivities for this or that Power, and his friendship for Prince Lobanoff, or M. Fournier, or Sir Henry Layard, is very interesting, possibly very amusing gossip, but it has no influence over the situation. If Midhat is English, he is English, and the Sultan may keep him a month. If Mahmoud Nedim is Russian, he is Russian, and the Sultan may keep him a week. His views and plans and ideas matter nothing, unless the Sultan accepts them ; and the Sultan, whether he accepts them or not, will not necessarily or pro- bably retain him. There is, at present, nothing but the Sultan, and the Sultan accepts nobody. No Minister has really swayed him for more than a few weeks. No favourite even has been able to retain power, when once sufficient power was placed in his hands. Sir Henry Layard, who is astute, and comprehends, if not Constantinople, at least the intrigues of Constantinople, saw accurately enough where power lay, and applied himself, with great adroitness, to win the Sultan himself ; and did win him, as he thought, and having won him, as the "Eastern Statesman" has pointed out, found himself far more powerless than before. The Sultan was not going to be ruled by an Ambassador any more than by a Minister or a favourite, and Sir Henry Layard, though he could not be dismissed, or set aside, or even treated with discourtesy, found himself disregarded ; and the man against whom he has protested most earnestly, Mahmoud Nedim, is Minister of the Interior, and will almost imme- diately become, for a certain number of weeks, Grand Vizier. There is no one but the Sultan, 'and the specula- tions about his Ministries, about his favourites, about his friends among Ambassadors, are all exhibitions of ingenuity, as much wasted as speculations as to the form of water uncon- fined. It must have a form from moment to moment, but permanent form it has none, and while unconfined never will have, though it has flow and force, either of which may increase or diminish abruptly, without form being any the less momently evanescent.
All authority, all initiative, all life, so to speak, in Turkey is concentrated in the Sultan, and the Sultan is a man who uses all for two objects,—one to get the necessary monies for his Palace; the other to defend the attributes which he possesses, but which he thinks are slipping from his hands. The demand of the Palace for money is now, as it was in the Constantinople sketched by Finlay, the first source of embarrassment to Turkish admin- istration. The positive amount taken in any one year does not matter, though it is excessive, quite a sixth of the cash receipts, for the demand covers whatever of cash there is remaining to do anything with. Some claims in Turkey are always paid. The great Pashas are paid. The Fleet is usually paid. The Trea- sury itself is paid. The contractors for war maWriel are paid. The bankers who give short loans are paid. The troops are paid, not indeed their pay, but their allowances of pay on account. But after these unavoidable expenditures, the Sultan steps in, with orders which have virtually no limit, except the amount remaining, and sometimes stretch so far beyond that, that trumpery loans must be taken up—loans that an English noble would hardly think of—at 2 per cent. per mensem, the bill renewable, with the interest added as principal, every month. The official who resists these orders suffers exile, or worse. No excuse is admitted, save an empty chest, and that very often is equivalent to dismissal, on the ground of incompetence or presumable peculation, for how else could money fail to the Sultan To do Abdul Hamid justice, he is not wholly responsible for these orders. • He did not create and he cannot abolish the "Palace," with its "city full of depredators," quite 6,000 persons, each in some way an individuality, and he does not know what ruin his signature brings. He never in his life added up the drafts of any one year, and if he did,
would .not understand the proportion of the total to hit means. He "requisitions " money because he is told it is wanted, and he ought to have it, and its amount is to him a matter of no importance at all. The other day he proposed in full Council that "Europe" should have l per cent, on its bonds as a measure of conciliation, for which "Europe" would feel grati- tudee--the amount of the draft on his Treasury, or the possibility of: ittbeing paid, being treated as matters of no account. To enforce this right of drawing'cheques at discretion, Ministers are dismissed without. scruple ; but this is only an incidental object.with the Sultan. His real object is to preserve his power, his prerogative, his unquestioned absolutism ; and this, with his, temperament, is fatal to every Minister. The Sultan, as we read his character, every account agreeing on this point, is oneof those men, rare among statesmen, common in private life, who, cannot get rid of the notion that power derived from himself is power gone from himself, who dreads in his own agents dangerous rivals. If a Minister seems strong, he is courte- ously edged out. If he declares himself strong, as Midhat and Kliaireddin did; he is abruptly dismissed. If an Ambassador interests himself in a man, that man is quietly sentenced in the Sultan's mind. If a policy is proposed, the Sultan thinks he-is losing his initiative. Even if money is offered, as has happened now three times, it is only needful to hint to the Sultan that the securities will involve European interference or control; and the negotiation silently drops through. The whole power of the autocracy, which no one attacks, is used to keep the autocracy unfettered ; and when it is unfettered the autocrat will not use-it, lest a fetter should be prepared. Our readers may judge whether in. such a situation changes of Ministry matter much, and note how long Mahmoud Nedim when he has, reached the Grand Vizierate will stop there. If he proves strong,. and really governs, he must resist the Sultan's incessant interference with details, and the day he resists it htwill disappear. Nothing like it has been, seen except the condition- of the Spanish monarchy under Charles IL, when the monarch, equally absolute, occupied life in a vain en- deavour to meet the gloomy fears self-engendered in his own mind, and the organisation of the State silently rotted down.
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