The British-German Naval Competition Great Britain and the German Navy.
By E. L. Woodward. (Oxford University Press. 21s.) MR. Woonwian's careful and comprehensive study of the British-German Naval competition is one of those specialised contributions to historical research which have more often in recent years been undertaken by American than by English students. Many of the American studies are of great value, but the Englishman who writes of what he knows and feels has considerable advantages over any foreign researcher who reconstructs his period from documents. Mr. Woodward's book is heavily and admirably documented, but he is able to interpret his documents in the light of feelings and opinions which he knows or remembers.
The general effect of Mr. Woodward's narrative is to bring home to us that the British-German naval contention was not, as was so often supposed at the time, a side-issue concerning only the two Powers, but one of the fundamental factors in the European struggle for power. • Involved in it was ultimately the question whether Great Britain could afford to see a rival Power heavily armed at sea dominating Europe and quite possibly in possession of the Channel ports and in a position to add other fleets to her own. The famous risk paragraph m the German naval law of 1900 raised this issue from the beginning, for if the German fleet was to be so strong that the supreme British fleet could not attack it without risking the loss of its supremacy, it might easily make itself strong enough, in the event of a German victory over Frei-tee and Russia, to wipe out the British margin. It was this consideration more than any other which compelled somewhat reluctant British Goyernments to link their fortunes more and more intimately with those of France and Russia. Each successive German naval law, and every German refusal to abate the naval competition, was a new rivet in the Entente.
But the same factor powerfully influenced the relations of Germany and Austria as well aS those of Britain, France and Russia. A remarkable sequence of events is disclosed in the German and Austrian documents covering the last half of the year 1908. On August 11th, in an agitated interview with Sir Charles Hardinge on the occasion of King Edward's visit to him at Cronberg, the Kaiser, according to his own account, took a very high line on the naval question, flatly refusing to listen to the idea of slowing down, and declaring that he would fight rather than submit to it. - To " show him your teeth " lie said in a telegram to Billow the same day was " the way to treat an Englishman." A week later Austro- Hungarian Ministers met in Vienna to consider the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and when asked about the attitude of Germany, Aehrenthal replied that they could be " absolutely sure about that, since Germany was -now 'dependent • on Austria alone, especially after Kaiser Wilhelm's. rejection at , Cronbe,rg of King Edward's proposal to limit the legally establighed naval. programme." So sure, indeed, was Aehrenthal that he did not even think it necessary to inform the Kaiser before announcing the annexation in the news- papers, much to the latter's indignation. There was no more decisive moment in the drift of events which compelled Germany to follow the Austrian lead.
" This is the way , to treat an Englishman. Put. your fist in his,face and he comes, to heel." The Kaiser and Tirpitz kept repeating it to the last moment before the War. , They actually believed that the civility shown to Germany in the Colonial negotiations. of 1914. was the. result of the fear instilled into the English by the rising German ,fleet. In their view it was only necessary to get through the " danger Zone " when the British fleet might demolish the . infant German fleet and fear would do the rest. Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, was in despair at 'this- mis- reading of the British character, and no man ever, fought more conrageously against, folly in high places than he dining these years. The .contrOversy between him and his superiors summed up in the minutes (published• in the German doeuments) of a Conference held in Berlin in June, 1909, to which he was summoned, and I always think of this occasion as one of the great scenes of pre-War history. lIfIetternieh insisted that it was German naval policy far more than anything else which had spoilt the ,previously friendly, relations between Germany and Britain. TirPit* knew' better. tic knew that trade jealousy and not the navy was the cause of the estrangement. He was certain that relations would improve as soon as the British had . learnt to respect the German fleet. But what, in the Mean- time ? asked Billow. What if the "black cloud which brooded . over the North Sea" were to burst? The dialogue which followed has all the irony of history in a few lines Tirpitz : " In my opinion the danger zone in our 'relations with England will be passed in from five to six Years, say in 1915, after the widening of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal arid the completion of the fortifications of Heligoland. Even in two years the danger will be considerably less." Billow : " That is all very fine, but the question is still, how are we to get over the dangers of that period ?,'" Tirpitz's answer is not recorded. So long as Great Britain maintained her lead, there would be no escape from the "danger zone" for Germany. It was Fisher's doctrine constantly repeated that nothing short of the supreme fleet served any purpose for any PoWer. It was certainly true for Great Britain. For her the command of the sea was all or nothing. If she lost it she was finished as a great Power, and in a very precarious position:Oen as an island. But few Continentals were able to understand' this inevitable British point of view, and to the Germans it seemed Unspeakable arrogance that we should claim to ",command the sea " ill a sense in .which no European pountry, „would claim to command the land., The idea that they were, colonis- ing or trading on British sufferance rankled deeply, and Tirpitz , offering release from this servitude appealed to ,ya4 numbers. The lessons of this period are by no means ex- hausted, andhow to make British sea-power acceptable to other nations may still again be one of the major problem s of the world, unless in the meantime sea-power has been superseded by air-power. , .
Mr. Weodward's study is skilful and accurate, and, to me personally, abounding in vivid memories—memories of qabinet crises on naval estimates, of the heated, debates of 1909, of " Jackie " Fisher and his incurable habit of .1.1Outing aloud of what lie would do if a timid Government would only let him, of endless calculatiOns about German aeeelerationi and the respective strengths of the two fleets x Years hence. This was the na.clianical side, but behind it always was the struggle on policy. Even Tirpitz would have, made' some concessions for a " eqaivalent," but that equivalent Was always, as Mr, Woodward shows, the breaking, of the Entente and a pledge to remain neutral, in any war between Germany and France. Against that we stolid, and the most pacifist members of the British Cabinet agreed that we
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