BOOKS.
OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS.*
TEE fault of this thoughtful book is that it covers much too, wide a space to give anything like an adequate discussion to any one of the subjects of which it treats. It devotes an essay to Utilitarianism and the author's own counter-theory of 'natural rights,' another to the so-called scientific or sociological view of history, a third to David Hume as a metaphysician, a fourth to Professor Huxley's view of the relation of materialism to spiritualism, a fifth to the recent phases of scientific Atheism,' and a sixth to the 'limits of demonstrable Theism.' On all or almost all these subjects Mr. Thornton has thoughtful remarks to- make, which he clothes in a very lucid and attractive style, but on almost all we are annoyed to find him passing by views of his subject which seem positively to require considera- tion, and omitting to justify his own position against the most obvious and sometimes the most serious objections. Of course. this was inevitable if he were to discuss six such subjects as we have named within 300 pages, but why not have de- voted all the book to one of them,—the first, for example,—and so have made that something like a complete reSUML: of his own position? In a journal like ours, any criticism we pass on any of Mr. Thornton's essays must be even more liable to the charge of inadequacy than the essay itself,—and this, too, even if we take only • Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: with some of their Applica- tions. By William Thomas Thornton. London: Macmillan.
one of them. But in order not to commit this fault in a glaring form, we will limit our special criticism to what seems to us the excellence and the defect of Mr. Thornton's philosophy of ethics.
Mr. Thornton uses three very convincing arguments against the utilitarian ethics, when he insists on the absurdity of classify- ing actions as right or wrong without relation to their motives; when he shows the impossibility of weighing the consequences of an individual action against those of the type of actions it repre- sents, and in cases where these clash, as they often do, the im- possibility of deciding which of them are entitled to the greater respect ; and again, when he inquires how, without a special ethical sanction—which Utilitarians disown—any man can be called upon to sacrifice his own happiness for the sake of conferring an equal, or even a greater quantity on any one else. On all these three ob- jections to Utilitarianism,-Mr. Thornton descants with great force and lucidity, though he hardly gives its full share of weight to the last, which seems to us to go more to the root of the matter than any of the three. Bentham's and Mill's claim that actions are good or bad independently of their motives, is one of those traditional boasts of Utilitarians which we are persuaded that abler and subtler Utilitarians will one day disown ; they will not only be compelled to distinguish between actions right for the agent, and actions right in themselves, but in conformity with the whole drift of modern thought, they will before long be compelled to admit that it is all but absurd to separate any action whatever from the agent who does it, and say what the absolutely right action would be. If the meaning of 'right' and wrong' is to depend purely upon foresight of consequences, then it would become im- possible to lay down any permanent moral code at all; for what can be foreseen at one age of the world cannot be foreseen at another, and the action which has been pronounced absolutely right in one generation may be pronounced absolutely wrong in another. And these changes in foresight often occur so gradually that actions, considered as apart from motives, must be passing from the category of good into the category of bad, daring the lifetime of each individual,—to say nothing of the change which the enlargement of children's knowledge into that of men must necessarily bring. It seems to us clear that the empty ambition of classifying actions independently of motives is quite separable from the utilitarian philosophy, and may well be surrendered even by those who cling very tenaciously to the utilitarian test of motive itself. And so, too, of the objection, very good in itself, which Mr. Thornton brings, that the difficulty of comparing the effect of the individual action with the effect of the type, is almost insuperable, —that you cannot weigh the mischief you may do if others follow your example, against the gool,you may do by the individual act itself. That is true, but it is comparatively an objection of detail. Utilitarians will reply that as it is the very principle of ethics to reduce actions to rule, to keep a good rule inviolable is infinitely more important than to perceive, and make others perceive, the exceptional circumstances which make the rule inapplicable. It is a bad reply, because, as every scientific man knows, to discern and make others discern a true exception to a law and its reason, is of almost as high scientific importance in extending our know- ledge, as to discern the law itself. But then so much depends on the number of admissible exceptions to general moral rules, -that the discussion is certain to descend from the question of principle into one of complex detail. It is different with the third of Mr. Thornton's criticisms, which, as we have said, goes to the very root of the utilitarian philosophy. We can see but nne attempt at an answer to the following objection :—
"Now, undoubtedly social happiness is of more importance than individual happiness—the happiness of many than that of one or a few; neither can there be auy worthier object of pursuit than the greatest happiness of the greatest number. All this is seen without being said, but what is by no means so easily seen is how it can be incumbent on any one to pursue that object to his own detriment—how it can be imperative on one or on a few to sacrifice his or their happi- ness in order to promote that of the many. Plainly such self-devotion cannot be for their personal advantage, and Utilitarianism does not even attempt to show how it can have become their duty. Meritorious, magnanimous, heroic in the high.st degree it would certainly be, but does not that very circumstance prove conclusively that it cannot be due, inasmuch as there is nothing meritorious in merely doing one's duty and paying one's debts ? But of that which is not due, how can payment be rightfully insisted upon ? What the few are under no -obligation to yield, how can the many be entitled to extort, or how can the worthiness of the latter's object excuse their doing that which they have no right to do ? Is any object, however worthy, to be pur- sued regardless of all collateral considerations? To these objections Utilitarians have no answer to make. All they can do is tacitly to take for granted the disputed duty and right. That the less ought to give way to the greater, and the few to the many, and that the many may rightfully therefore, if need be, use force to compel the less or the few to give way—these are treated by them as incontestable proposi- tions, even as 'doctrines a priori, claiming assent by their own light, I evident by simple intuition.' And although thus from their own inner y I consciousness evolving the very first principles of their own philosophy, I the premisses of their deduction that social happiness is the proper sin; 1 in life and that conduciveness such happiness is the test of morality- ; 'Intuilionists,' strange to say, to appellation which they j propose to affix to all those who hesitate s t as ethical foundation- ; stones the results of their intuitional evoluotiaocnc.e"P I To this, Bentham would probably have answered, and apparently Mr. Fitzjaines Stephen (see the note on Utilitarianism at the end of his new book on "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity ") would still answer, that there is and can be no obligation at all, for anyone who does not already prefer the happiness of the many to his own, to sacrifice his own happiness for that of the many ; but that it is one of the tendencies of social life, and of the praise which society bestows on actions which benefit it, to make men appre- ciate highly, even in their own secret minds, the pleasure of bene- fitting society, though it be at their own expense, and that the only 'obligation' to sacrifice yourself to society must spring from the individual preference for so acting. In short, in the language of the truly consistent members of this school, ' obligation ' means an overpowering motive ; and there is, and can be, no obligation without an overpowering motive. Clearly if a man is without any strong desire to benefit society even at his own expense, then society will be very likely to have an overpowering motive for getting rid of him, or at least making him feel the disadvantage of caring so much less for it than for himself.
The objection to this philosophy is that it is not ethical at all. It does not tell a man what he ought to be, but only what he ought to have been. It admits that he must act from the only motives in him, and does not pretend that there are any true alternatives before him. It says to him," Utilitarians would have approved of you, if you had had the desire to do so and so, but as you have not, you have no choice but to act on your own view of your own happiness, greatly as that is to be lamented ; all we can do is to point out to you that your view of happiness, though it may not bring you into collision with society at once, is very likely to do so in the long run, a consideration which may perhaps modify to some extent your future wishes." That is logical and consistent utilitarianism, but it is not ethics, for it does not assume that to any one individual more than one course is open, nor therefore that for any one, at the same moment, more than one course can be right.
But does not Mr. Thornton in his second essay lay himself open to the same criticism ? He appears to give up entirely (pp. 103-5) any real moral freedom or moral alternative between different classes of motives, and though he does not make happiness the test of right, yet if it be true, as he subsequently tells us, that the law of causation applies as much to determining the whole series of moral causes and effects of any man's moral life, as to any series of physical events, we cannot see so wide a difference as we should wish between the philosophy that makes personal happiness the principle of moral obligation, and that which sets up natural rights above all considerations of personal happiness. Still so far as the difference goes, it is greatly in Mr. Thornton's favour. But unfortunately his theory of natural rights covers a very small part indeed of the whole theory of virtue and vice, and with the remaining portion he does not deal at all in this volume. His view is that justice is the only 'obligatory' virtue,—and because obligatory, hardly a virtue, virtue carrying the idea of merit with it, which justice does not ; and with all the rest of the virtues Mr. Thornton does not deal at all. He does not even tell us how they arise, whether, unlike justice, from utility, or from an intui-
tive ethical principle (which he seems generally to reject), or from an lesthetic principle, or how. Even with regard to justice itself,
we find his analysis highly unsatisfactory. He deduces it from natural rights, and tells us that the only natural rights of which he knows are two :—
" They are but two in number, and they are these:—(l) Absolute right, except in so far as the same may have been forfeited by mis- conduct or modified by consent, to deal in any way one pleases, not noxious to other people, with one's own self or person; (2) right equally absolute to dispose similarly of the produce either of one's own honest industry, or of that of others whose rights in connection with it have been honestly acquired by oneself. I call these 'rights,' because there cannot possibly anywhere exist either the right to prevent their being exercised, or any rights with which they can clash, and because, therefore, by their freest exercise, no one can possibly be wronged, while to interfere with their exercise would be to wrong their possessor. And I call them 'natural,' because they are not artificially created, and have no need of external ratification."
And elsewhere he says of justice, which is the practical respect of these natural rights,—
4, We may perceive that in mere justice there can be nothing praise- worthy. Justice is nothing more than abstinence from injustice, and no commendation can be due for not doing that the doing of which would deserve censure. Justice, if entitled to be ranked 'among the virtues at all, is at best only a negative virtue, as being the reverse of a vice. It is distinguished from all other moral qualities, as being the single and solitary one, compliance with whose behests is a duty which we owe to others. Of meekness, patience, temperance, fortitude, cohrtesy, whatever display it may for any reason be our duty to make, precisely that display justice requires us to make. Whatever of any one of these qualities justice does not exact from us, we may, without wronging any one, omit. We must not, indeed, incapacitate ourselves by tippling for our proper work, nor offend the eyes or ears of decenter folk by reeling obstreperously through the streets ; but, if we take the precaution of retiring during an interval of leisure to our privy chamber, our making beasts of ourselves then and there to our heart's content, is our own concern, and nobody else's. No doubt, in doing this we should be doing very wrong, but still there is no contradiction in saying that we should have perfect right to do it, inasmuch as we should thereby be wronging no one but ourselves. Of another class of virtues—of all those which admit of being directly contrasted with justice, and which may for shortness' sake be without much inaccuracy comprehended under the general designation of generosity [we cannot follow Mr. Thornton here at all]—it may, with literal truth, be said that the practice of them is no part of our duty to our neighbour. Provided we are careful to let every one have what, between him and us, are his bare dues, we may be selfish, mean, sordid to excess, without infringing any one else's rights, without the smallest dereliction of our duty to others."
Now, with regard to the first of these natural rights, bow does Mr. Thornton deal with the case of children ? The right has not in their case been" modified by consent ;" yet if a child elects to leave his home in search of adventure, Mr. Thornton would hardly, we presume, deny the parent all power of controlling him. And waiv- ing the difficulty as to children, we should like to know as to the second natural right, whether he contends that all laws of taxation, in countries where every grown-up man and woman has not got a vote, are violations of it. It is a very hard doctrine that every man in England even at the present day can be said to have indirectly consented to all laws that Parliament has passed, seeing that in the rural districts there is a majority of householders who have no political rights, and even in the boroughs a majority of the adult population is still without them. It is surely the next thing to a refutation of an absolute natural right, to be compelled to modify it by so many exceedingly doubtful assumptions of an indirect concession of it, as Mr. Thornton must do, unless he is prepared to say that our whole political system is based on ethical wrong. We confess we do not believe in the broad distinction Mr. Thornton draws between duties of obligation and duties of—we hardly know what he calls them—of merit, we suppose. All that it is wrong to do at all, is warranted to our minds as wrong by the same kind of inward judgment. No doubt it may be wise to let society enforce some duties and leave others to the individual conscience ; but there is no distinction in ethical origin between what my fellow- creatures have a right to demand of me, and what I know I ought to do, whether they can demand it of me or not. Ethically it seems to us impossible to assert that if I know an action is wrong, I can know it by the light of a totally different function of the mind in the case of an unjust action, from that by which I know it in the case of a self-degrading action. But as Mr. Thornton leaves the whole moral field untouched except in the case of justice, we do not know to what sort of moral principle he refers the judgment on actions which are not just or unjust. We would have given up a good deal even of his very acute criticism on Hume to have heard him on this head.
Of Mr. Thornton's other essays, we will only add that we think that on Hume the best. It contains some very subtle nod re- markable passages,—like that, for example, on the distinction between the association of ideas and the association of volitions. (p. 124.) As regards the essay on Professor Huxley and his ideal- ism, Mr. Thornton seems to us to make a very fatal admission when he concedes that we know nothing at all of the qualities of the ex- ternal world, except the sensations they cause in ourselves. Are geometric truths and the laws of motion nothing but subjective truths and laws of our own sensations? And if so, how is it that we assume that they convey to us absolute knowledge of things going on, say, in cc Centauri, or any other world beyond our own ken? Or does Mr. Thornton hold that a Centauri is only the name for one of our subjective sensations ? Mr. Thornton seems to us in giving up Sir William Hamilton's sound distinction between perception and sensation, to have given up a most valu- able help to his own metaphysical principles, as well as to have lost sight of a very important truth. The whole volume, however, is well worth careful study.
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