The London Naval Treaty
IT is a great pleasure, after having written so often about the Naval Conference, to be able at last to write about the results of the COnference—" The London Naval Treaty of 100." It is only too easy for those who have pitched their hopes very high to -drop into despondency when the achievement- has fallen short of their hopes. This frame of mind, however, though very natural, is by no means a proof that the achievement is in any way despicable. The new Naval Treaty is indeed a most substantial gain, and the Prime Minister deserves hearty congratulations on having presided in such a way as to send away all the foreign delegates in a general state of friendship though not of agreement.
There is no more familiar objection to a large inter- national conference, summoned to discuss extremely delicate and speculative matters, than that " the risk is too great "—that if there should be failure the world will be worse off than ever as all sleeping enmities will be awakened and all unexpressed suspicions will be disclosed. - It is due to the Prime Minister to say explicitly that he fully appreciated this danger and that by a skilful frankness he avoided it. Of course, even as it is there is danger of a - sort. All that those who are fairly well satisfied - with the situation can say in justification of their -;satisfaition is that if the Conference had been handled -differently the outcome could not have been nearly so reassuring as it is. For example, some people are • regretting that France and Italy were called into the Conference at all. " It was obvious from the pre- liminaries," they say, " that there was no hope of getting them to agree to a really dramatic reduction of naval strength, and it would have been much better to let the United States, Great Britain and Japan, who were not less obviously intent upon a real reduction, draw up - a - Treaty between themselves. - These three -Powers set a much needed example to the whole world."
- At first sight that seems very attractive reasoning, but reflection will show that the sequel must have been an outburst of jealousy and misgiving in France and probably also in Italy. Nor could either Frenchmen or Italians have been blamed if they had given way to such feelings. The French do not, even now, forget that the United States, after pouring contempt on the Anglo- French Naval compromise, proceeded with enthusiasm to strike a bargain about naval building with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. It is true that the two sets of circumstances were not strictly comparable, but what sticks in the French Mind is that Great Britain could agree with .the 'United States bat not with France. • • All that Great Britain, the United States and Japan can do in these circumstances to allay doubt is to prove by everything they say and do that a naval- hegemony never entered into their thoughts and that they are bent upon nothing more and nothing less than a gradual but steady reduction of armaments in order that the Peace Pact may become a reality and war as an instru- ment of policy may be permanently prohibited. Let the Continental logicians who cannot conceive of peace as possible unless it is guaranteed by treaties promising the mobilization of so many ships, so many army corps, so many air squadrons, speak of the British act of entering into a Treaty with the United States as " anti-European " or, at all- events, as " non-European " ; still the fact remains that France and Italy have been most carefully and successfully taught by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's methods that they can at any time become most welcome partners in the Three-Power section of the Treaty. The door is left open. The Conference is only adjourned. In the meantime Great Britain by virtue of this potential or prospective partnership with France and Italy- has a recognized basis for reasoning with them which she woald-not otherwise have had.
It is not at all necessary to condemn the French argument as perverie in order to reach the conclusion that it is highly dangerous. We have over and over again admitted the grounds of French alarm, and when we applauded the Prime Minister's attempt to achieve a universal Treaty we did so knowing exactly what the French felt about the true nature of security. The business of the Conference was, nevertheless, to confer —to try, if that might be possible, to reconcile various points of view known in advance to be extremely dis- cordant. Because there has been failure so far in this respect there is no reason for discontinuing the effort. It is possible that a new school of thought will still arise in France and Italy which will perceive, after all, that the Continental idea of security can be realized only by perpetuating the very danger which we all wish to remove.
If France does not yet see that real security comes to-day from public opinion—public opinion which is so intense now that it would probably be impossible to mobilize the nations for another great war—she may yet be convinced by the reduction of her own reasoning to an absurdity. In the pivotal year, 1935, Germany will be at least morally relieved from her obligation to disarm herself. She was told in the Peace Treaty that her practical disarmament must last for fifteen years and that within that time the Allies would reduce their own armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. Germany will no doubt have a good deal to say about this promise. If the customary fears in France grow into alarm within the next five years there may well be a tendency to detect an organic absurdity in a policy which can develop alarm at such a rate in times of profound peace. The absurdity will be intensified if side, by side with the chronic fear of Germany there should also be—as seems not unlikely— a chronic fear of Italy. France has recovered from the War. She is prospering ; she is more sensitively con- scious of her nationality than ever. But exactly the same things are true of Italy. She also has recovered from the War. In a lesser degree she is prospering and she is more acutely conscious of her nationality than ever. before. Are these two racial units, animated .by corresponding motives which are praiseworthy in them- selves, seriously to allow themselves to celebrate their triumphs by coming into deadly conflict with each other ? We _cannot believe it. It seems too mad. Unhappily, five years are a short time for discovering the real nature of security—the confidence which depends upon international conference, law, and arbitration, all -deriving their strength -from public opinion.
As for the United States and Japan and ourselves, we have assumed that the Treaty will be ratified by the American Senate—the signs .are increasingly favourable —and that the naval holiday with the great saving of expenditure for which the Treaty provides is as good as achieved. This, however, is only one step on the road. The Treaty of its essence may be said to imply that the three nations are still thinking in terms of war. Much clearly remains to do. But the vast improvement in' Anglo-American relations, which are much better now than they have been for a hundred years, makes everything possible,
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