ITALY AND ABYSSINIA [To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] SIR,—In
your note on the Abyssinian frontier dispute (The Spectator, April 19th) you state that " conciliation would have a much better prospect of success if all such movements (of Italian tr000ps) were suspended," and that " Signor Mussolini can have no serious apprehension about the safety of his forces in the neighbourhood of the Abyssinian frontier." This statement, I venture tO.suggest, iknores certain essential geographical and military factors of the situation. The total Italian permanent garrisons of the two colonies only amount to 8,000 men, the reinforcements sent out bring them up to 40,000 or 50,000 at the outside, whereas Abyssinia has some 400,000 to 500,000 troops immediately available. The distance from Italy to Eritrea can only be covered in eight days, to Somaliland in ten to fifteen. It is therefore natural that Italy should be anxious about the safety of those colonies, in view of the rabid xenophobia now obtaining in Abyssinia in spite of the presumably pacific intentions of the Emperor. Nor should it be forgotten that Abyssinia has for a long time been placing large orders for war material, including tanks, artillery and aeroplanes, in Germany; Czechoslovakia and other countries, and that she has already secured supplies of ,poison gas and material for poisoning the wells.
For all these reasons it is important for Italy to see to it that her colonies are adequately secured against a coup de main on the part of the semi-independent feudal chieftains on the frontiers even if not ordered by the Government of Addis Ababa.—I am, Sir, yours faithfully,
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