HITLER'S DILEMMA
As its eighth month approaches completion the war has woken up. It is being fought today in Norway in three elements. In one of them the Allies' superiority is incontestable ; in the second they are superior in efficiency but handicapped in opportunity ; in the third their mettle is being tested for the first time since war broke out. The possibilities of the Norwegian campaign are unlimited. It will not in itself decide the issue of the war, but it may well be the turning-point, if it has not become that already. It has quite obviously deranged the whole of Herr Hitler's plans. The seizure of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia took about twelve hours each. The seizure of Denmark took less. The seizure of Norway was expected to take as little, and thanks to trickery and treachery the expectation might have been fulfilled.
Norwegian resistance changed the outlook. The resis- tance had to be crushed, as Poland's resistance was. It took three weeks to subdue Poland. The Norwegian campaign has so far lasted two and a half, and the position of the invaders grows worse every day. It is no longer a question of how far they can advance but of how soon they will be driven out, and we may not have to wait long for the beginning of an answer to that.
Norway has presented the German High Command with a disastrous balance-sheet aRd a baffling problem. The only interpretation worth putting on Dr. Goebbels' otherwise completely negligible fictions regarding British naval losses during the Norwegian operations is as a demonstration of the figures he finds it necessary to fabricate in order that Britain's alleged loss may exceed Germany's real loss. We have paid our price for what we have achieved in Norway. We regret the loss of three or four destroyers and a submarine, and we mourn the brave men who perished in them, but they leave the efficiency of the navy virtually unaffected ; the German navy in the same operations has lost a third of its strength. We cannot hope to remain unscathed for ever. Mr. Churchill is right in warning us con- tinually that disasters are part of the inevitable fortune of war. But though they must come it can hardly be imagined that anything is in store which will seriously disturb the Allies' immense superiority at sea. In the air German losses in the fight for Norway greatly exceed our own. British machines, operating far from their bases, and with no aerodromes they can make use of so far in Norway itself, have bombed the aerodromes in German occupation in Norway and Denmark, and with trifling loss to themselves have thereby destroyed large numbers of German machines. Air-warfare will have a great effect on the course of the Norwegian campaign. Aerodromes for British fighters which cannot make the double journey from Scotland and back are essential, and it will not be easy to provide them. By land we are certainly equal, and by sea much more than equal, to the enemy. In the air geography gives him an advantage and must cause us some anxiety.
But the military problem is the least of the perplexities with which Herr Hitler has presented himself in Norway. He has created an unexpected situation and is obviously uncertain how to deal with it. All hope of a rapid victory, or any victory, in Scandinavia, has vanished. There will be bitter fighting. Norway might even develop into a major theatre of war. But all the indications are that the Allies will find it much easie to pour in reinforcements than the Germans, and fight- ing in singularly difficult country in conjunction with th Norwegians, who know every inch of the terrain, the. should be able within reasonable time to expel th. Germans from the west coast ports and push them bac' gradually towards Oslo. The magnitude of that tasl, is not to be under-estimated, but it is considerably les than the magnitude of the task with which Herr Hide_ is confronted. In such circumstances what is to b: Hitler's strategy? From the military point of view hi soundest course might be to cut his losses and leav,: Norway to the Norwegians after all ; that would involve permanent loss of iron-ore by the Narvik route, but there is no chance that another ton will get through to Germany that way now in any case. But to withdraw would be an acknowledgement of defeat, and with IL the end of the Hitler legend. That has to be avoided, or postponed, at any cost. Shall he then invade Sweden? That would bring in against him a not negligible army and air force, and cut off the ore-supply by the Lulea route as well. But it would open an easy road into Norway, and that may decide him on invasion.
The alternative seems fairly clear. If Herr Hitler can neither disengage himself from Norway nor achieve victory there he must reduce the Norwegian campaign to a subordinate place by creating a major diversion elsewhere to restore his prestige. That opens up various possibilities. One obviously is an attack in the West.
That, if it comes, will almost certainly take the form of an offensive through the Low Countries, .whose neutrality will weigh with Germany precisely as much as the neutrality of Denmark and Norway did. That would be a formidable move, and the acquisition of air-bases in Holland would be a prize worth trampling Dutchmen in the mud for. But the defences of Holland have been enormously strengthened since the first threat of danger last November, and however sudden the blow there is no reason to believe the Germans could smash through as they smashed through Poland in September. An attack on Holland or Belgium would once more result in the addition of a tough and well- armed people to Germany's enemies. That does not mean that the attack will not come. It offers better prospects for Germany than a frontal assault on the Maginot Line, and turning movements are a traditional feature of German strategy. The diversion of their troops to Norway will not, as might be suggested, leave the Allies at a disadvantage in France, for German troops are being diverted to Norway equally, and men count more in attack than in defence on the Western Front as everywhere else. We must 4ot and need not starve Norway out of solicitude for Flanders.
But Herr Hitler no doubt has other hopes. Italy, German spokesmen have announced, is about to enter the war as Germany's ally; that will change the whole outlook; the Balkans will be involved; a new theatre of war will be created; Russia may conceivably take a hand and help herself to Bessarabia, at Rumania's expense. All that is possible. If it happens the situation can be faced with equanimity. Thanks to the blows dealt to the German navy in the past fortnight the British and French fleets would enjoy an overwhelming superiority over any possible enemy or enemies in the Mediter- rattan. Our five new 35,000-ton battleships of the King George V class, with their 14-inch guns, are just ready for service. All of them will be available to reinforce the already powerful Anglo-French forces in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile Italian journalists, by railing at the British hold on the western and eastern cutlets of the Mediterranean, are very usefully reminding their readers of what the effect of that hold would be on Italy as a belligerent. More responsible Italian spokesmen are declaring that the only factor deter- mining Italy's decision regarding entry into the war will be Italy's own interests. That is a reasonable and intelli- gible attitude, but it is hard to think that reasonable and intelligent Italians will believe that Italy has much to gain by challenging Britain and France today. Signor Mussolini no doubt has his eyes on Norway. So have all neutrals, particularly in the Balkans. If the Allies failed there new problems would face them in South- East Europe. If Hitler fails there he will have failed in Rome and Budapest and Sofia and Belgrade.
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