THE WAR SURVEYED: NORWAY, THE THIRD PHAS1,
By STRATEGICUS
WITH the junction between the Allied troops and the Norwegians the campaign enters upon its third phase. In the first, the Germans by securing a foothold in the most important centres of the country achieved a success. It was not complete, and it was not won without grave loss in material and in men. But it was certainly a success. The second phase began with the reaction of the Allies, and this was a complete success. On April t5th, six days after the German invasion, it was possible to announce that British forces had landed at several points. Apparently landings at other places have since been accomplished—the Norwegian coast seems almost to have been designed for such secret movements—and the Allied troops, thoroughly equipped in every way for the climate and the terrain, have entered Norway without any loss. That is an extraordinarily fine achievement, and it marks the completeness of the Allied command of the sea.
It is inevitable that one should wonder at the bad timing of the German invasion. Why was not this operation carried out months ago when Hitler still possessed a suffi- cient number of submarines to make at least some show of interfering with the long and perilous passage across the North Sea? When we are tempted to criticise our own movements for being always too late, it is a relief to note that Germany seems to be a little unfortunate in the use of her initiative. We are quite rightly proud of the exploits of our submarines in the Skagerrak and Kattegat ; but it seems hardly possible that our transports would have escaped scatheless if the Germans had used the full force of their submarine attack against them instead of turning it against merchantmen. Every transport sunk, moreover, would not only have had an immediate moral effect but would have tended to restrict the dimensions of the expeditionary force, and would also have secured precious hours of immunity from Allied attack. Fortunately, the Germans waited until we had sunk the bulk of their submarines, and to this, very largely, we owe the fullness of our success in the second phase of the campaign and the favourable opening of the third.
At the moment we appear to be in contact with the Norwegians in several areas ; and this fact must have immense, probably a decisive, influence on the campaign. Some part at least of the responsibility for the rapidity of the collapse of the Poles must be attributed to the convic- tion that the Allies who had promised help seemed to have forsaken them. If the Norwegians were not to break down, every day counted ; and happily we were able to reassure them in the best way conceivable. We have been in contact with them in the Narvik area for some days, and the German force appears to be no longer an organised body. It may take some little time yet to round up the scattered detachments and to crush the last vestiges of opposition ; but the Germans must have written off that sector already. Its fate depended upon the command of the sea, which we hold more securely than at any time since the outbreak of the war. It might have been reinforced from the south, if it had been possible to bring more men and material from Germany. But as the situation lies at present, it is doomed and the end is merely a matter of time.
About Trondheim the position is not so simple. Neither Trondheim nor any of these southern ports can be main- tained against the Allied attack, if it is compelled to stand alone. The centre of gravity of the German force lies in the Oslo area, and the enemy commander has been making violent attempts to join up his scattered remnants. At present he is exerting his full pressure somewhere in the parallelogram defined by the towns Lillehammer, Aamot, Hamar and Elverum. The last two have now been abandoned by the Norwegians ; but it is instructive to note that they were first attacked on the xoth. While Lillehamn - and Aamot are held the Germans cannot reinforce the tro, at Trondheim except by air, and that reduces the reinfor, - ment to a precarious trickle, without artillery or tanks. 1 former is the more important, since it commands the line 0. Andalsnes, and apparently we have already used this line -o join the Norwegians who are holding up the German advan,.:•.
The mere fact that the Allies are taking part in d struggle means a reinforcement out of all proportion to the actual number involved. The Norwegians are splend:2 fighting material ; and, now that they are fighting side by side with the Allies, they will give of their best. The Germans seem to be held on that front at present, and this means that the battle which is gathering about Trondheim will be self-contained. The Allies threaten it from the sown as well as from the north, and although the Germans, making skilful use of their liberty of action in the fjord, are counter- attacking against the northern thrust, it seems inevitable that they will be compelled to fall back by the Allied advance from the south. The German force in this area cannot be very strong, but it will certainly fight as stubbornly as it is already fighting skilfully. The two main centres of tension are these. There is as yet no direct threat to Bergen ; and, apart from the repeated attacks on the aerodrome, Stavanger is at present outside the zone of operations. Its fate will depend upon the struggle north of Oslo, and it has been so thoroughly bombed and battered that it need not cause us any serious distraction at present.
We have done very well so far, much better than many expected and almost as well as most of us hoped. But some definite needs are now beginning to appear. It was obvious from the first that the German objective in Norway was to cause a diversion. By securing nearer bases for his air and submarine attack upon Britain he hoped to compel us to disperse our naval and air forces. Since our superiority on the sea is very great indeed he could hardly hope to affect the disposition of our ships materially, short of some lucky chance. In the matter of the air, however, he is on more debatable ground. It is now obvious that one of the first things we must do is to establish advanced air-bases in Norway. We cannot keep the German bombers controlled by merely bombing the aerodromes, though the Air Force's vigour and initiative in this respect have been as welcome as they are important. To keep the bombers in check, still more to cope with enemy fighters, we must have fighters of our own within easy reach. They cannot be expected to fly 400 miles, engage the enemy effectively, and then return to bases in England.
The enemy has therefore imposed on us this dispersion. We must lay out aerodromes in Norway and base numbers of our fighters on them. That is quite logical ; and it seems simple and not gravely disadvantageous. The German calculation is, however, that, fighting on interior lines, he can the more easily turn his air-force in any selected direc- tion, and since successful attack involves the co-operation of bombing and fighting aeroplanes, he hopes thereby to assure his victory. It is unwise to treat this argument too lightly. Fundamentally, it is as sound as any military manoeuvre can be. If we could be compelled to such a grave weakening of our available striking-force that there was a profound disparity between the number of aeroplanes ready on the front selected for attack, the plan might achieve success. • But it is obvious that there are certain weaknesses in the plan. Clearly, Germany counts on Norway as a secondary theatre ; and it is not at all certain that it will remain secondary. Secondly, it is obvious that there must be some proportion between the threat and the Allied reply. At present the Germans are losing out of proportion to their strength relative to the Allies. Once more they may have applied the diversion too late. And finally, is it certain that the Germans dare leave a powerful air-force un- challenged on their northern flank? This is the most interest- ing factor in the situation. They have sedulously fostered in the minds of their people the notion of German invincibility. There may have been some slight strains recently, but the situation is still firm. Dare Hitler risk the awaken- ing that would come if the Allied air force were to be allowed to fly over Stettin, the Baltic coast and the Kid canal unmolested. It seems inconceivable. Of course, once a blow has been decided upon the Germans will put every ounce of strength into it. They are not so much the disciples as the slaves of theory. But they are the prisoners of the system they have created, and they must stand or fall by the illusion of invincibility they have created. He has created the legend of invincibility, and he dare not risk an exposure while engaged in critical operations in the field. His plan was subtle, but it has not allowed sufficient margin for safety.
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