TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA AND JAPAN.
WE scarcely see, if the accounts now pouring in from Tokio and the European capitals are even moderately correct, how war between Russia and Japan is to be avoided. The Czar no doubt wishes for peace; but he is not in strong health, he has lost some of his absolute control over the bureaucracy, and he cannot in the sullen condition of Russian public opinion venture on an open quarrel with the party of action. Pride in Holy Russia, the belief that she is irresistible and is always rolling forward to the sea, is one at least of the pedestals on which the autocracy reposes. To recede before Japan would inflict a grave wound upon that pride, all the more because Russian publicists, like the Chinese Ministry before the war, take pleasure in describing Japan as a " little" Power eaten up with vanity, and incapable of resisting " the Colossus " without first-class foreign aid. And to submit to Japanese terms would be to recede, for the statesmen of Tokio, rather, we admit, to our surprise, have not offered to abandon Manchuria on condition of receiving the protectorate of Korea up to the Yalu, but demand, besides Korea, the partial evacuation of Man- churia, and permission for the whole world to trade there, which means in Russian eyes that the whole " profit " of the new acquisition shall go to Englishmen and Americans. It is this idea, which has no doubt a basis of truth, that produced the recent outburst in the Russian Press in favour of direct annexation, and it has probably helped, the Treasury being a great power in Russia, to sharpen Count Lamsdorff's pen. The Russians could, and, we think, would, postpone their hope of absorbing Korea—glaciers are slow—but they cannot give up their claim to Man- churia, nor, we greatly fear, their desire for Masampho, the great harbour in South Korea which looks directly and menacingly across the strait at the island Empire. Our countrymen, naturally enough, regard the demand for this port as a piece of impudent aggression ; but one should be fair even to Russians, and we venture to say that if Great Britain occupied in the Far East the position of Russia, the Press would be choked with letters from Admirals on the impossibility of making the Pacific Squadron safe without possession of Masampho. It is the Bizerta of the Far East, and its owner, if possessed of a fighting fleet, could prohibit transit by sea from Vla,divostock to Port Arthur. That is no reason why Russians should have it; but it is a reason why Russians should wish for it, and think it almost worth a war. They mean to be great and free in the North Pacific, as we are in the Mediterranean, and no more consider whether they are right in their aspirations than we consider whether we are in our right when we forbid any maritime Power to annex Tangier.
On the other hand, the Japanese are much more pro- voked than they were. They consider that in suggesting a partition of Korea, which seems. to have been done, whether formally or informally, and in claiming Masampho, the Russians have shown their hand ; that they intend, not in future ages, but almost immediately, to menace the independence of Japan. There must therefore, they think, be war one day ; and had it not better come at once ? No doubt the stake would be frightfully great, nothing less than the life of the Empire ; but then the Japanese, or at any rate the ruling caste of Japan, do not want to live as the " dwarfish citizens of a little State," bound by its position to follow the Russian lead. Their great qualities—patriotism, intelligence, ambition—and their giext foibles—vanity and self-absorption—all push them in the same direction. They want to be somebodies in the great world ; and as they have long suspected Russia of wishing them to be nobodies, so now they are sure of it, and are as irritated as any Continental duellist when a glove is flicked in his face. They will, we think, fight unless Russia recedes ; and how Russia is to recede we confess we scarcely see. The Czar is already talking of his •' honour," and " honour" in military Empires pro- hibits the passive reception of any kind of challenge. It cannot be denied that the demand to evacuate Manchuria is a kind of challenge, for unless there is a menace behind it, it is meaningless. It is said that Japan would do better to wait till China is more ready to help her ; but Japan understands the Chinese position better than we do, and is not longing to give Russia an excuse for calling upon her allies, France, and perhaps Germany. It is said, too, that Japan will be paralysed by want of money, but we doubt if that is one of her embarrassments ; in any case the experience of modern mankind is that taxation during a war is never resisted, that armies will go without any- thing except food and munitions, and that these two in- dispensa.bles can be purchased with inconvertible paper money. If Russia does not recoil, the war, we think, will come.
How it will end it is impossible to predict. It must at first be a naval war; and for the conduct of. an Asiatic Power in a naval war there are very few precedents indeed. The idea which lies at the basis of European speculation on the subject, that Asiatics grow timid on the water, is contradicted by many facts of history, by the feats of the Barbary corsairs and the Malay pirates, and of many of the Chinese and Japanese vessels in the late war ; but of their capacity to manage the huge yet delicate machines which we now describe as fighting ships the evidence is imperfect. So is the evidence for Russian management of a great fleet in war-time ; and so, above all, is the evidence as to the comparative condition of the rival squadrons. There are rumours that corruption has been rampant in the supply departments of the Russian Navy, and that the most experienced Admirals are most annoyed by the con- dition of their ships ; but these are only rumours. Nor is it yet known with any certainty whether the naval war will be a duel, or whether the European nations may not by mischance be drawn in as parties to the combat. If more than one Power attacks Russia, France is bound. to aid her ally; while if more than one Power attacks Japan, we are bound to steam to the assistance of the Japanese. The probable action of Germany is unknown, and so is that of America; and, in short, the world must wait a little to see how the forces present on the scene, or capable of reaching it, will arrange themselves. We should say our- selves that the great maritime Powers would all be very glad to keep out of the struggle ; but their conduct is hampered both by treaties, and by the distrust which Russia, by her needlessly tortuous diplomacy when dealing with Asiatic affairs, often contrives to inspire. If war is declared, the situation will clear itself very soon; and meanwhile observers will do well to be patient and a little reserved. There is nothing to be gained by shaking fists, and still less by threats of demanding "compensations ". for any advantages either combatant may acquire. To demand the valley of the Yangtse for ourselves if Russia acquires Manchuria or Japan Korea is, in plain English, to demand another burden just when we are most loaded down by those we have. Where in the world are we to find garrisons, or, for that matter, governing Services, for another hundred millions of men, who all detest foreigners, and are all capable of secret combinations ? Such dreams should be laid aside, and we should confine ourselves to earnest watchfulness, and complete preparation to inter- vene should vital interests or clear pledges compel us to abandon the neutrality of which the state of opinion—. which is no doubt favourable to Japan—may make us unwisely impatient.
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