The Treaty With Iraq
An Experiment in Advisory Dominion
[The text of the new Treaty between Great Britain and Iraq was published last week. Sir Edward Hilton Young, who hue just returned from a special financial mission to Iraq, appraises here the position of Iraq iu the British constellation.] THE British Empire has a wonderful constitution, - which it owes to its wonderful digestion. It can digest anything. Self-governing Dominions, colonies, protectorates, mandated territories, other Empires such as British India, other monarchies such as the Indian States, all find their places without difficulty within the organization. Its elasticity is exemplified afresh in the growth of a new series of relations, the relations between the Empire and certain States that are not part of the Empire, but arc specially allied to it, and accept its leadership on the international scene. As regards the Empire these States are not, as it were, tires : they are foederati. Egypt is the leading. example. Since the signature of the recent treaty Iraq is another.
The relations between the Empire and Iraq are a conspicuous example or the admirable elasticity of Imperial institutions. Iraq was founded as a fulfilment of our promises to the Arabs during the War. Since time Turkish Empire had broken up, there were other good reasons for founding it. Mesopotamia is the key of the Middle East. Syria, Palestine, Turkey, Persia, and Arabia, of these none could sec with indifference another establish itself in this commanding position, which lies across the air routes to India and the future world- thoroughfares to Central and Southern Asia. The 13rit Empire, on the other hand, could not afford to let it fall once more into the possession of a potential enemy.
The welfare of the Arab, Kurd, and Assyrian p The first status of Iraq was that of is mandated terri- tory, with the mandate in our hands. We gave it a highly efficient all-British administration on the Indian model. The inhabitants found that altogether too much of a good thing ; and they rose in rebellion. It was necessary to meet their wishes. We did so by substituting for our direct administration an Arab Government with British advisers under the supervision of a British High Com- missioner. For direct dominion we substituted what may he called by an oxymoron an advisory dominion. That is the present state of affairs. The Arab ministers are responsible for the Government to King Feisal and an elected legislature. The British advisers, who are servants of the Iraq Government, have as a rule no executive authority. They tender advice centrally to the Arab ministers and locally to the Arab administrative officers, but their advice nerd not he accepted. The advice of the High Commissioner, on the other hand, who is a servant of the British Government—that the Iraq Government agrees to accept. It is, of course, tendered only on policy of importance. This advisory dominion was an experiment, and on the whole it has served its purpose well. The politicians and Civil servants of Iraq have been introduced to the burden of responsibility with the gradualness necessary in the ease of a State so new. Naturally enough ministers have at times strained at the leash, and advisers have at• times been irked by what must needs be the most irksome of conditions to able and devoted administrators of our race, lack of executive authority themselves to carry out in the best and quickest way their own plans. But tact and forbearance have not been wanting. Nationalist aspirations have no doubt had their inevitably troubling effect. Successive Iraq Governments have, however, recognized the fundamental fact that the help of Great Britain is still necessary to the State, and will be so for some time to come. The advisory relation has thus served a useful purpose. The Iraq Government has entered increasingly into its responsibilities. There has been no breakdown ; and Great Britain and Iraq remain friends. Nationalist propaganda has been directed rather against the remains of direct dominion, as expressed by the functions of the High Commissioner, than against the advisory dominion exemplified by the functions of the advisers. Under the new treaty, the advisory dominion is to come to an end in 1932. The High Commissioner will then become an ambassador. Iraq will become wholly self-governing, and we shall support its application to be admitted to the League of Nations. There will be no more dominion, but nevertheless there may be advice. It is most improbable that the Government will find itself able to do without the help of British advisers for essential services. There is, for instance, the difficult matter of the administration of the Kurdish and Assyrian populations of the northern mountains. The British element supplies the link, otherwise lacking, between that population and the Arab population of the plain. It is unlikely that the Arab Government will for many years to conic be willing to do without the link. The coming change does not mean and cannot mean that Great Britain will cease to interest itself in Iraq. No one in Iraq or elsewhere thinks that we can step out and leave Iraq to fend wholly for itself in its difficult domestic problems and its still more difficult relations with its neighbours. We must still ensure the con- tinuance of the State in the face of internal and external dangers, and we must still safeguard our Imperial communications by air, and our oil supply. Iraq recognizes the necessity of that by this treaty, and recognizes it as a permanent factor in our mutual rela- tions. The Treaty provides accordingly that our Air Force shall stay in Iraq, at aerodromes leased from the Iraq Government and protected by local troops paid by us. The Empire remains on the spot, but more in the capacity of a spectator than in that of a direct participant in government. Thus our relations will enter upon a still more experi- mental phase, in which special alliance will replace advisory dominion. In Iraq, as in Egypt, time will have to show whether this relation is a workable one. Can the Empire remain as a benevolent spectator in an independent territory ; and, without executive authority of any sort, efficiently support the state and protect Imperial interests ? It would seem that there are two chief conditions for success. The first is the good will of the local Government. In Iraq that should be secure. The second is adequate opportunities on the part of the representatives of the Empire to keep themselves in- formed about what is going on in the country, and to make representations to the Government as to measures necessary for the maintenance of order and peace. The Air Force in Iraq, for instance—were it isolated from all relation with the local Government, would be helpless. If there were troubles threatening the security of the state, all that it could then do would be to set to work and bomb everybody indiscriminately until things became quieter. There must be proper channels of information, close liaison, and full opportunities for timely representation, or the system will be unworkable. As to these, however, the spirit in which the Treaty is worked will matter more than its terms. In this treaty the Empire has gone at least fast enough in its recognition of nationalist aspirations. A cautious spirit, considering the hard work that has yet to be done in building up the Iraqi state, might question whether the formal assumption that the state can be wholly self-supporting in 1932 may not be precipitate. Were Iraquis and Britons in a frame of mind to push that assumption to its full consequences a state of affairs might well result that yould have too little relation with the facts to be stable. But that is not the frame of mind of either. The form of independence once recognized, there is good hope that the forces of good will in Iraq will be fortified, and big and little ally will continue, when 1982 comes, to work together in a sensible way, underpinning the forms of self-government with the facts
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