26 JULY 1997, Page 8

POLITICS

The peace process is worthwhile, despite Mr Adams's schizophrenia

BRUCE ANDERSON

Ten days later, we learn that Mr Adams of Sinn Fein has spoken to Mr Adams of the IRA, who has assured him that he has no current plans to murder anyone. Mr Adams of Sinn Fein has hailed this as one of the noblest humanitarian gestures in human history, worthy of a Nobel peace prize, not to mention an endless supply of American visas. But Mr Adams of the IRA has also made it clear that he proposes to retain both his arsenal and his right to resume homicide whenever he feels like it. Were he to do so, Mr Adams of Sinn Fein, while regretting the cruel necessity for the other Mr Adams's decision, would of course blame the British government.

So is it any wonder that the Ulster Union- ists should lack enthusiasm for talks with Sinn Fein; that their response to talk of ceasefires and changes is 'Changed, changed utterly: a stinking hypocrisy is born'? The Unionists' distaste for the whole business is only intensified when both the London and Dublin governments appear to be rewriting history. When the Downing Street Declaration was signed, both govern- ments made it unequivocally clear that Sinn Fein would have to meet two conditions before it could take part in talks: a perma- nent IRA cease-fire and a substantial mea- sure of decommissioning. But in recent days Mo Mowlam has reacted indignantly when that point was put to her. Either she has not been properly briefed or she is in denial.

Both conditions now appear to have been dropped. Attempts to persuade the Union- ists otherwise naturally arouse anger. When they are offered a falsification of the record and then a substitute whose tawdry inade- quacy is so manifest, their response is pre- dictable. Lie to us and betray us if you must, they say — but please do not insult our intelligence.

Until the last 48 hours, the Unionists feared another betrayal. When Mr Major circulated the draft Framework Document to his Cabinet ministers, one or two of them felt that it did not take nearly enough account of Unionist sensitivities. Lord Cran- borne insisted on a concession: the 'triple lock', by which any deal emerging from the peace process would have to complete three stages before it could be ratified. The two governments would have to agree; the two peoples of Ireland would have to agree, in separate referendums — but the main polit- ical parties in Northern Ireland would also have to agree. There were some officials in the Northern Ireland Office who had mused aloud as to the possibility of appealing directly to the voters of the Province, in the hope that war-weariness would peel off enough Unionist voters to supplement a solid Catholic bloc and ensure that the ref- erendum carried, even if narrowly. There are elements in the MO which would like to marginalise Unionist politics; the triple lock frustrated their knavish tricks.

But was the Labour government commit- ted to it? During her first, confused weeks, Dr Mowlam seemed to imply that they were not. Then Downing Street intervened. It is not clear whether they were realigning the Northern Ireland Secretary or whether it was a cunning exercise in tough cop/soft cop. Whatever the explanation, between Monday evening and Wednesday morning Dr Mowlam grew increasingly lyrical about the triple lock, probably just in time to pre- vent the Unionists from walking out of the talks, even if there is short-term disruption.

David Trimble understands that 'Union- ists wreck hopes of peace' would not be a helpful headline. Moreover, though the Unionists are right to beware of war-weari- ness, it can take a variety of forms. The recent diplomatic history of Northern Ire- land is vastly complex — anyone who sim- plifies it is likely to falsify it. From the out- set the whole peace process was beset by moral hazard, with John Major using lan- guage to mislead as often as to clarify, and with a deliberate search for ambiguity on the part of the drafters.

Many Unionists find this offensive. They hate the language of the Framework Agree- ment, especially the infamous statement that Britain has 'no selfish strategic or eco- nomic interest' in Ulster. Their reactions were of course coloured by the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in which Margaret Thatcher, who had appeared to be the most Unionist leader of the Conservative party since Bonar Law, committed an act of betrayal. This explains the Unionists' willingness to believe that the Downing Street Proclama- tion and the Framework Agreement were further stations in a Calvary of treason.

This was never true. John Major, whose private opinion of the Anglo-Irish Agree- ment was hardly more favourable than David Trimble's, was engaged in an infinite- ly subtle, indeed devious, attempt to strengthen the Union. At the Corfu EU summit in June 1994 he had a bilateral meeting with the then Irish prime minister, Albert Reynolds, in which he 'pinned the Irish PM to the wall', in the words of one official, on the question of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, which include a ter- ritorial claim to Northern Ireland and which are a source of abiding Unionist resentment. `Albert,' John Major finally said, 'do you accept British sovereignty in Northern Ire- land?"Yes, I do,' came the reply.

John Major was no more interested in abrogating British sovereignty than — to be fair — was Margaret Thatcher. The differ- ence is that Mr Major's means were conso- nant with his ends. Unlike the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the peace process has involved no constitutional concessions. There have been rhetorical concessions, certainly, but the Union has never rested on selfishness, strategy or economics. It has always rested on blood and marrow, heart and soul; on shared loyalty and allegiance.

There is a further point. Because of the peace process, at least 250 people are now alive who would otherwise be dead. That is not a conclusive argument; it cost 250 lives to regain the Falklands, and if it were pro- posed to sell out Northern Ireland, the question of lives saved ought to be dis- missed contemptuously. Those who wish to be free have always had to pay their butch- er's bill. But it is not proposed to sell out Northern Ireland; no unacceptable price has been paid for those saved lives. All that is proposed is a crab-crawl through a thick- et of uncertainty towards a goal which may still prove unattainable. But Mr Trimble is right to try, even if it means enduring the loathsome spectacle of Mr Adams's schizophrenia.