TOPICS OF THE DAY.
ENGLAND AND THE CLAYTON-BITLWER TREATY.
AS we write a Joint Commission is sitting in Canada, and is endeavouring, under favourable auspices, to arrive at a thorough and complete understanding in regard to the whole of the outstanding questions that affect the good relations of England and the United States on the North American Continent. That is as it should be, and we devoutly trust that the Commission over which Lord Herschell is presiding will meet with complete success. While it is sitting, however, and before the settlement is completed, we are most anxious that the British public should consider a matter of policy which, though it has hitherto been dormant, is likely before long to enter the field of practical politics. This is the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. At present the mass of people on both sides of the Atlantic know nothing, and think they care less, about the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but un- less we are greatly mistaken, a movement must soon take place in America which will inevitably cause the people of the States to trip up against that Treaty and make a vehement demand for its abrogation. That demand, unless it were properly understood and explained before- hand, might seem here to be unfair and unfriendly. Hence the need for considering in cool blood the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, what are our rights and interests under it, and whether we ought or ought not to allow its abrogation. The question is eminently one to be settled calmly and dispassionately, one where looking ahead is needed, and therefore we shall make no further apology for dealing with the matter, though to the majority of our readers it may seem at first sight of purely abstract interest and devoid of anything practical or real.
The Americans, whether they keep only a part or the whole of the Philippines, have acquired a great territorial interest in the Far East. To maintain and develop that interest they will want to keep a large fleet in the Pacific. They will also now need a large fleet in the Atlantic. The next need will be to render the concentra- tion and junction of those fleets easy and rapid. The Americans, that is, will want to be able to feel that they can, if need be, reinforce their Pacific fleet with- out making the long and difficult voyage round Cape Horn, as did one of their battleships, though in the reverse direction, at the beginning of the late war. The plain English of this is that the new American naval needs will call for the making of a canal across the Isthmus, either in Nicaragua or at Panama. But when American public opinion begins, as it soon will, to declare that the canal must be made, it will find itself face to face with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Now, by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, England and America agree that neither Power shall, by itself, make or exercise an exclusive controlling influence over any canal to be made across the Isthmus. It is, in fact, a self-denying ordinance. A private company was expected to make the canal, but neither England or America was to obtain exclu- sive control either directly or indirectly. That is excellent on paper, for it seems to leave plenty of opening to private enterprise, and contemplates friendly joint-action of a kind almost amounting to an alliance. We find, in fact, Lord Palmerston in 1850 talking quite enthusiastically of "the union of two Great Powers for the accomplishment of an object of such general utility," and Mr. Lawrence, the American Minister, declaring the canal would "do more to perpetuate peace between Great Britain and the United States, and in fact the whole world, than any work yet achieved," and rejoicing over "the fit- ness in our union" for so noble a purpose. Yet, in reality, the Treaty has proved a complete veto on the making of the canal. No company can or will make the Nicaragua Canal—the project which has most to be said in its favour from the engineering point of view—unless it secures the help and patronage of some rich and powerful G-overnment,—unless, in fact, it is made or partly made by the United States or some other Great Power. But America cannot reasonably be expected to let Germany or France make the canal, and England cer- tainly would not make it, jointly or severally, even if she were assured that the United States would not object. ,Therefore the Clay ton-Bulwer Treaty in effect pro- hibits the making of the Nicaragua Canal, or the completion of the Panama Canal, by the only possible means,—a direct grant on the part of Congress. If, then, we refuse to give up our rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, we prevent the making of an inter-oceanic canal. We do not in the least say this as if it settled the question off-hand. It is, of course, quite conceivable that it may be to our interests to prevent the making of the canal. We merely want to put the question in its simplest and most essential form. What we have to consider is,—" Is it to our interests or against them to have the canal F'" If the answer is "Clearly against our interests," then let us stand, on our rights. If the answer, on the other hand, is, "Not against our interests," then let us do the sensible thing, and allow the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to be abrogated after the usual diplomatic formalities, and, if advisable, with the usual amount of give and take. Let us first take the arguments in favour of the canal being made. We are the greatest of maritime Powers, and every addition to the waterways of the world must help us and our commerce. The Suez Canal has increased our trade, and so would a canal con- necting the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. Draw a straight line between England and what will be our great Australasian Empire, and the line passes through the Isthmus of Panama. Commercially we must benefit by the canal, for we are not so effete that we cannot benefit by new trade routes. The canal would increase the wealth of the world, and we should get our share, and very likely more than our share. This, however, does not settle the question. The real point to be considered is,— Would an inter-oceanic canal in American hands give a strategic disadvantage to England so great that it cannot be allowed ? Unquestionably, if we were at war with America the strategic disadvantage would be enormous. She could use the canal and we could not. Hence she could effect a junction between her Pacific and Atlantic fleets while our reinforcements were wearily steaming, round Cape Horn or going by the Indian Ocean. But then need we contemplate a war with the United States ? And if we do contemplate it, must it not really be a war decided by Canada's power to resist invasion, rather than a war in the Pacific or Atlantic ? However, this strategic possibility is to be set down and taken into account, I though personally we prefer to consider war with America exactly as civil war,—a possibility, but not one which can be provided against. Next let us consider the strategic situation if we were at war not with America, but with some other Power,—Russia, or France, or Germany. In that case, America would be neutral, and the canal being American, would be part of the neutral waters of the States. Our ships of war could then pass through the canal at any moment, and could not be molested either leaving or entering the canal. Here would be an enormous strategic advantage to England. It would enable us to reinforce our Pacific fleet with far greater quickness than now. Consider, too, for a moment the advantage under such circumstances of having the canal in American hands, and so in those of a Power capable of enforcing strict neutrality. If the canal were nominally part of the Republic of Nicaragua or of the Republic of Columbia, Russia or France might by a coup de main manage to get possession of the canal. That would be impossible if it belonged to America. Clearly, then, if any canal is to be made it had much better be in the hands of America than in those of a weak State. It is, in fact, a case of vetoing the canal altogether or of insisting that America, and America alone, shall make it. Remember, also, that if the canal were nominally made in the territories of a South American State, and we were at war with America, the Americans, who would be nearer than we, could by influencing Mexico and the Central American Republics always reach the canal by land, and so become in fact the owners of the canal. Everything points, then, to the fact that if the canal is to be made, America will, and in our interests ought to, control it.
It is clear, then, that commercially it would be a good thing for us if the canal were made, and that strategically it would also be a benefit, except only in the case of a war with the States. What we have to ask finally is, then, "Are the chances of war with the United States great enough to make us refuse the benefits which the making of the canal would certainly confer on us ?" For ourselves, we do not hesitate to say that, on the whole, England had better not worry about these possible risks, and that we should abandon our veto of the canal. We believe that, on reflection, this is the view that the British public will ultimately Lake. But that being the case, let us treat the matter in a broad and statesmanlike way. Do not let us adopt the formula so dear to the official mind, and repeat : The Americans have never officially asked us to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. It will be time, and the proper time, to consider the matter when they do." In truth, that will not be the proper time, for the Americans, being our children, and inheriting to the full our offensive and disagreeable ways in diplomacy, are quite certain, when they ask for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to do it in what will seem to us a thoroughly offensive and disagreeable way. Our statesmen ought to con- sider the matter coolly and in isolation, and if they come, as we believe they must, to the conclusions we have, they ought themselves to propose to the Americans the abro- gation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the substitution for it of another treaty by which England and America shall mutually bind themselves to allow no Power except the United States of America to make or control any canal across the Isthmus, and to declare that if and when the United States shall make such canal, it shall be open on equal terms to the ships of all nations at peace with the United States. That is a treaty which might be the beginning of a distinct understanding between the United States and England. We are not in favour of a formal alliance, but such a treaty as we have described plus a treaty binding both Powers to refer all their disputes to arbitration, would soon grow into an understanding far more secure than a hastily formed alliance. Depend upon it, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is worth considering, and depend upon it also, the more clearly it is considered the more evident it will become that the sensible thing is to allow America to make the canal either by the Nicaraguan Lake, or by buying out and finishing the Panama Canal. Personally, we would rather ask no quid pro quo for the abrogation of the Treaty, for England's friendship for America is not in reality based upon mutual advantage, but on something far deeper. If, however, the diplomatists must have a quid pro quo for fear of feeling that they have somehow been "done," we have no doubt that the State Department at Washington will be able to afford them a good official excuse for allowing the abrogation of the Treaty of 1850. There are a dozen points in regard to Canada which might be set against the tearing up of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty.
Previous page
