THE ADVANCE ON KHARTOUM.
, t, and that instead it has been organised with the utmost economy, but this is not against, but in its favour as a fighting force. It is an immense mistake to suppose that ■ lavishness and efficiency go together in war. In truth, ; the exact opposite is the case. A thrifty and careful use ' of money makes, not mars, an army. The Prussian army at So.dowa was the product of a starved exchequer. But that apart, the whole Egyptian force and half the nglish division have been trained and organised or the special purpose for which they are being niployed by the man who commands them in chief. The trdar has had the bulk of his force under his own hand nd in the Soudan for many months. British armies in the eld are too often obliged to be a fortuitous concourse of tary atoms brought together suddenly for a great emergency, and as suddenly dispersed. Here is an army which is a real unit, and has been trained to act as a unit. Our army in the Peninsula, to compare great things with small, was an army of this kind,—i.e., one trained and organised under its own General, and we know the use he made of it. We do not, of course, wish to suggest that the present campaign can for a moment be compared to that of the Peninsula, or the Khalifa to Soult and his great colleagues. It is, from the military point of view, a relatively small operation, though one of great interest, and one which, in our belief, has already shown that the Sirdar, if he ever has the opportunity, will show himself equal to any command, however high and responsible. Sir Herbert Kitchener has not yet proved himself to be a Wellington, but we have personally very little doubt that if the need ever arises he will be able to acquit himself so as not to make the comparison seem ridiculous,—will, that is, be able to conduct great operations against Commanders worthy of his steel in a way worthy of the best traditions of our Army. For desert warfare he can already be pronounced one of the greatest Generals that we have yet produced. In that field he has nothing to learn.
But perhaps it will be said that though the army is, as far as it goes, most efficient, and the Sirdar a most able General, there is not enough of it to make success absolutely secure. In other words, it will be alleged that if the estimate that the Khalifa has seventy thousand fighting men and fifty pieces of artillery is correct, the Sirdar's force may prove inadequate. We entirely disagree. We believe that the comparative smallness of the Sirdar's force is the best pledge we could possibly have of its success. We shall not win by numbers, but by being able to keep a small and thoroughly efficient force supplied with food and water. To put more men in the field—especially in a desert—than you can easily handle and easily supply is madness. If the Indian Government had not choked the passes with men in the late Frontier War they would have done far better than they did. The Sirdar could very possibly have done with fewer men. Certainly he needs no more. After all, Sir Arthur Wellesley conquered at Assaye, and Lord Lake at Allygurh and Laswaree, with far smaller armies and against an enemy— the Mahrattas—quite as numerous and quite as for- midable as the Dervishes. From every point of view, then, the Sirdar will meet the Dervishes in good fighting trim. He has splendid infantry regiments, black and white, he has a small but most efficient cavalry force, he has batteries of artillery which fire high ex- plosives of terrible power, he has plenty of Maxims and machine-guns, he has the best Camel Corps ever organised, and he has a flotilla of well-armed gunboats. That he will be able either to first shell and then storm the Dervish position, or, still better, drive and keep the Dervishes from the water till they are obliged to attack him, we do not doubt for a moment. Our only fear is lest the Dervishes should not wait to be attacked. If that were to happen, and the Dervishes were to retreat towards Kordofan, the position of the Sirdar would be a very dis- agreeable one. He must either (1) follow the Dervishes through the desert, a most dangerous, difficult, and heart-breaking operation ; (2) establish himself at Khar- toum in force till he is sure that they have been so much weakened that they cannot return ; or (3) send back the bulk of his forces to Cairo without being able to feel that he had really done what he intended to do,—i.e., smash the Khalifa. Will the Khalifa and his soldiers stand ? In all probability they will, but to determine the problem accurately it is necessary to apply the maxim of Ch,erchez la femme. The Soudanese blacks are the bravest, but also the most uxorious, of men. If their wives get into a panic and fly, they will go after them and leave Omdurman deserted. This was what happened at Berber. It will be remembered that we found Berber practically empty, for the mass of the black garrison had bolted. The wives would not await the advance of the British, and the husbands would not wait alone. Most likely this feminine stampede will not take place from Omdur- man, but it is a possibility worth considering. If, then, we assume that the Dervishes will await us at Omdurman, what form may we expect the final battle to take ? In our belief, we shall find the Dervishes awaiting us in strong entrenchments armed with Krupp guns, which, if not very well served, will at any rate present a formidable obstacle to an infantry rush. If the entrenchments are heid down to the river the Dervishes will be able to get water, and our gunboats may be hit, but, on the other hand, they will be able to use their guns. If, which is more likely, the Dervish force is kept away from fire from the river, the situation will be very like that of the Atbara. The Sirdar will doubtless in that case use the same tactics. He will not, that is, attack immediately, but will wait, and allow famine, and thirst, and sickness, aed waiting to do their demoralising work. When the Dervishes are demoralised, and the pear ready to drop, he will probably try the effect of Lyddite shells, and order a general bombardment of the posi- tion. When the artillery fire has had its turn the infantry will carry the works by assault, the cavalry and Camel Corps working round outside and cutting off the retreat of the Dervishes. The end will be a complete rout and a host of prisoners, and then, strangest thing of all, the addition of some thousand potential recruits to the Soudanese regiments of the Egyptian army. That seems the most likely course of events on the military side. As to what is to happen after, how far we are to go at once up the Nile Valley, and whether we are to confine our- selves to the main stream or to penetrate up the Bahr- el-Ghazel—and if so, how far—we can to-day pronounce no opinion. These are questions of great importance and interest, and demand far closer attention than can be given them at the end of an article. We shall, however, soon return to them, and shall attempt to deal in detail with the future of the Egyptian Soudan. It is, in truth, the next item on that Imperial agenda paper which the weary Titan is for ever attacking, never clearing off.
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