The Occupation of the Rhineland
ONCE again there is one of those political clashes between French and British which are caused more by differences of temperament and instinct than by anything else. It has been announced that the negcitiations between London and Paris which have been going on in regard to the occupation of the Rhine- land are " cordial." We can well believe it, and sincerely hope that they may remain so ; but we also hope for something much more. There is very little sign so far that M. Poincare intends to surrender his conviction that a considerable French army is still required in the Rhineland. TO a man of his habit of mind the whole thing is like a mathematical problem ; France must have security, and security must be obtained by material means ; a French Prime Minister would be false to his trust who exposed his country to the smallest avoidable risk. SO runs the hard, accurate argument. An Englishman would be ready to admit the existence of a risk " on paper " if there should be an immediate withdrawal from the Rhineland; but that risk would not trouble him in the least if he thought that it would be swallowed up by psychological reasons telling heavily in the contrary direction. He would say that every frontier problem is a nice balancing of one risk against another, and that, on the whole, by far the most valuable guarantee of safety is a satisfied Germany without a pretext for opening up further troubles with her neighbours. These different points of view, the French and the British, are, of course, not mentioned in the negotiations, but they are implicit in everything that is done and said.
The Treaty of Locarno and the subsequent acceptance of Germany as a member of the Council of the League would seem to have removed all reason for continuing the occupation. Of two things one—either the Allies continue to mistrust Germany, and as a token of their mistrust keep a large occupying force to watch Germany closely and prevent -a reorganization- of the Army ; or the Allies trust Germany and act on the principle that there is danger rather than safety in keeping a com- paratively small number of soldiers in Germany, who provocatively suggest to Germany that in spite of the League she is still an inferior. The only :valid reason for prolonging the occupation that we know of is not really military at all ; it is a guarantee that the Repara- tions will be paid.
At the end of 1925 the Conference of Ambassadors promised Germany that as a result of the Locarno Treaty there should be " an appreciable reduction " of the troops in the Rhineland. No figure was mentioned, and British and French ideas differ widely as to what an appreciable reduction means. There are now in the Rhineland about 56,000 French soldiers, 7,000 British and 6,000 Belgians. Certainly, since the Locarno Treaty there has been a reduction of the total number of Allied troops _ in Germany, because there has been the withdrawal from Cologne. But it seems' that the • number of troops • in the other zones, Coblenz and Wiesbaden, is larger than before. France. :apparently. feels that she would not be safe if the total force was reduced below about 54,060 ; 'but, '''as she refuses the plan proposed by Great B-ritain for reducing: the "total force on the percentage principle, the reduction to 54,000 could be accomplished only by leaving Great Britain and Belgium with virtually no occupying troops at all.
It may be asked " Weil, why not ? ". A good many people in this country would_ no doubt be quite ready to withdraw all our troops immediately on the ground that we should thus be setting an excellent example, and that France would be bound to follow our example in due course. We have a great deal of sympathy with that argument, and should accept it bodily if we felt sure that it would work out in practice. It does seem to us, however, that it would not be wise to leave France alone in the Rhineland in a kind of undisputed possession. The Treaty expressly contem, plated an Allied occupation, not an occupation by a single Power. We have memories of the arbitrary occupation of the Ruhr by the French alone which, are too unpleasant for us to wish to see the experiment. repeated. And there are other considerations. What' would be the feelings of Germany herself ? We under- take to say that, unless all the tributes which were paid by the Germans to the British soldiers at Cologne were insincere, the average German would vastly prefer to have some British troops in Germany so long as an occupied force remains there at all.
Possibly, however, it would be enough to have a mere form of British occupation—a Staff of responsible officers without any troops. The idea is at least worth con- sideration. But on the whole, the argument which we have already used about the importance of part of any occupying force being British, seems to us to require that the private soldier and the junior officer should be there as well as the officer at the top. Napier in his history of the Peninsular War called the attention of his readers to the " majesty " with which the British soldier fought, and an historian of to-day might with equal justice call attention to the majesty of the terms on which British private soldiers, non-commissioned officers and subalterns are capable of living with a beaten enemy. These terms are simple, natural and friendly ; they are majestic in the simplicity with which they instinctively avoid continuing an humiliation.
Altogether, we can understand. the reluctance of the British Government to act on the French percentage proposal, but we sincerely hope that they will urge upon M. Poincare, with greater force than we can assume has been used so far, the enormous importance of considering the psychological element of the problem and quickly reducing the number of French troops in the Rhineland almost to vanishing. point. At present we are all treading a vicious circle. The Germans regard the presence of foreign troops as a provocation ; the militaristic die-hards,- who • are only a minority in Germany of to-day, make as much, clamour as the grasshoppers in the field described by Burke, and the French take the clamour as a proof that their own fears are well justified. The French accordingly hint at something like indefinite occupation, and the clamour in Germany, of course, redoubles. So the foolish and lamentable process goes on: We do not in the least suggest that Germany has been guiltless. The Nationalist' plans for reorganizing the Reichswehr and such, speeches as those of: Herr von Kardorff are an offence against both the Treaty and .- an _honest European spirit. Fear is at the bottom of : all. the French -policy in regard to., Germany, and there . is, of course, an obvious historical- cause for it. But our Government will not at- any point fall into exaggera- tion if they _point out to France that, as the Locarno Treaty was to give her the security for which she yearns, if that Treaty is not handsomely fulfilled the reality of security will fade away into the remote background.-
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