TOPICS OF THE DAY.

STOPPING THE SUPPLIES.

"Ire in this country," said Lord JOHN RUSSNLL, in introducing

his measure for Canada, "you were to refuse the supplies for a single year, you would produce the most disastrous consequences. Refuse the supplies, and you disorganize the army; refuse the supplies, and you shake public credit to its centre; refuse the supplies, and you dissolve the constitution. What then was to be done, when the same refusal was made by a Provincial Parlia- ment ?"—The soundness and honesty of this logic are on a parity

with Sir ROBERT Palm's comparison of the Isle of Wight with a great colony three thousand miles off and on the opposite shore of the Atlantic Ocean. Its utter want of candour is deserving of the severest reprehension; and it shall be our business here to expose its dirty dishonesty.

The great prerogative of the Representatives of the People in this country, and consequently of the Representatives of the People in the colonial constitutions which are formed on the model of the metropolitan government, is their complete com- mand over the public revenue. They can grant or refuse the whole or a part of the supplies. " Whenever," says DeLoosic, a

pet authority of the Whigs, " abuses of power had taken place, which they (the Commons) were seriously determined to correct, they made, in the words of Sir Thomas Wentworth, grievances and supplies to go hand in hand together ;" which always pro- duced the desired redress. And, in general, when a bill, in conse- quence of being judged by the Commons essential to the public welfare, has been joined by them to a money-bill, " it has seldom failed to pass in that agreeable company." DsLoLstz compares the King in our constitution to a matt-of-war, and the power of the Commons over the supplies to the water which floats it. Take the water away, and the gallant ship lies high and dry, helpless and useless : restore it, and she is afloat—fit to be employed for good or evil as may be. Was the power of stopping the supplies, then, substantially exercised at any period of the history of the Constitution ? It un- doubtedly was, and in the most boasted period of its purity, imme- diately after the Revolution so often called " glorious" by Whig and Tory. In 1692, but four years after that event, King W IL• LIAM refused the Royal assent to a bill for limiting the duration of Parliaments to three years. Two years later, the Commons prepared a similar bill, to which a money-bill was tacked. It passed the Lords, who were then in harmony with the Commons ; and the Triennial Bill, coming in " agreeable company," of course received the Royal assent. The truth is, that during the reign of WILLIAM, the British Constitution was not only a theory, but a reality. WILLIAM, during his short reign, refused the Royal assent three times—that assent which has never been refused since. Parliament voted his Dutch Guards a nuisance; and he was obliged to pack them off. They voted a standing army of seven thousand men adequate for England, and one of twelve thousand sufficient for Ireland, although in a state of rebellion. WILLIAM pouted, and even threatened to abdicate ; but, consulting his discretion, finally yielded.

Seventy years of consecutive and uncontrolled Whig rule, and as many of Tory rule of the same description, have turned the British Constitution of 1688 upside down. At the Revolution, the public revenue was two millions, and the interest of the public debt 40,0001.; the Army and Navy were comparatively insignificant; and much of the Civil establish- ment was paid from the hereditary revenues of the Crown, then not subject to the control of Parliament. Under these circum- stances, the stopping even of the whole supplies would present comparatively little inconvenience : and substantially stopped they were, until grievances were redressed. Among such redressed griev- ances, as already mentioned, was the limitation of the duration of Parliaments to three years,—an organic change just as much as making the obstructive Chamber of Canada elective. There would, then, be some show of reason in comparing the stopping of the supplies by the Commons of Canada, with their stoppage by the Commons of the reign of WILLIAM the Third,—although the instance of the Canadians, as we shall presently show, is by far the more unexceptionable of' the two. There is neither justice, reason, nor decency. in comparing the stopping of the supplies by the Canadian House of Assembly with their stoppage by a modern House of Commons. The national faith is now plighted to nearly 60 parts out of 100 of our annual income; whereas at the Revolution there was hardly any lien at all of this nature on the revenue. The personal expenses of the Sovereign are now almost wholly defrayed from the revenue under the control of Parliament ; at the Revolution they were defrayed wholly from the hereditary revenue. The Civil charges are wholly so; and the expense of our Military and Naval establishments now amounts to more than six times as much as the whole national revenue when WILLIAM ascended the throne, not to say that one half of them are employed beyond the limits of the kingdom. We have no hesitation, then, in saying, that to refuse the supplies in our case, if not impracti- cable, is difficult.* But we do not say, with Lord JOHN RUSSMLL, • If ever the British House of Commons should contain &majority of Liberals equal to that of the Assembly of Lower Canada. or about 9 to I, the supplies would be stopped without the least doubt, and also without the least inconve- nience; for the reform of the Peers, the abolition of the Coro laws, and similar measures which would asesswitate such a step, would promptly follow.

that refusing the supplies would " dissolve the Constitution ;" for the Constitution, if by that word is meant the government esta- blished at the Revolution in 1688, has long ceased to exist—is in fact in reference to our present situation a pure phantom. The 'loyal assent has not been refused to any bill for nearly one hundred and fifty years; the Lords, instead of being allied to the People, are allied to the Crown, and have learnt to reject every bill to which a money-bill is tacked ; and neither Peers nor Com- mons ever think of reducing the Military Establishment proposed by the Executive. In such matters, the Three Estates are in nerfeet harmony ; and all we have of the " glorious Constitution" snnsists in dissertations on its theory by a Judge of the Common Pleas, an Advocate of Geneva, or a Secretary of State for the Home Department. It is a mere theme for a school exercise. In modern times, one attempt, and one only, has been made to stop the supplies : and by whom, or for what purpose, can the

reader fancy ? Why, by the god of Whig idolatry, CHARLES JAMES Fox, and with the express object of restoring himself to

power—to that power which he had acquired by a coalition with the men that lie had first served under for eight years and

then denounced for nine as the worst enemies of their country— se wit, Lord NORTH and his friends. A young Minister and

!nrofeesing Reformer had got the ear of the King, and even the confidence of the nation. The Coalition party had

she confidence of the existing House of Commons only : their persons were hateful to the King, and the union, from the unprincipled character on which it was formed, was odious to the people. The party stirred heaven and earth, how- ever, to get back into office ; and among the measures to which they had recourse, was stopping the supplies, as far as lay in their power. All the supplies had been regularly voted by Fox's own Administration ; but when it was turned out of power, the money, with the exception of the produce of the Land and Malt Taxes, had not been appropriated to specific services. On the 12th of January 1784, Fox therefore moved, " that for any person or persons in his Majesty's Treasury, or in the Exchequer, or in the Bank of England, or for any person or persons whatsoever em- ployed in the payment of public money, to pay, or direct, or cause to be paid, any sum or sums of money, for or towards the sup- port of services voted in the present session of Parliament, after the Parliament shall have prorogued or dissolved, if it be prorogued or dissolved before any Act of Parliament shall have passed appropriating the supplies to such services, will be a high crime and misdemeanour, a daring breach of a public trust, derogatory to the fundamental principles of Parliament, and subversive of the Con- stitution of this country." This resolution was passed by a con- iideruble majority. Not satisfied with it, Fox moved a resolution to postpone the Mutiny Bill; which was passed also : and as long as the Commons were subservient to the purposes of the Coalition party, addresses on addresses were voted to the Crown to remove Ministers and to prevent the dissolution of Parlia- ment. PITT paid money although it "subverted the Constitution," dissolved the Parliament against every threat, and kept Fox out of office nearly a quarter of a century. It is clear that had Fox's own party not already voted the supplies, the Commons, on his suggestion, would have refused them altogether. As it was, the resolution, had it been carried into effect, would have prevented not only all disbursements of jud cial and civil salaries, but the pay of the Army and Navy, and the dividends of the public cre- ditor. The Whigs, it would appear, then, had no apprehension that they would " disorganize the Army," " shake public credit to its centre," or "dissolve the Constitution," when they did all they could to stop the supplies RS a means of getting back to place. When a provincial House of Commons does the same thing, in order to procure the redress of a hundred grievances, the existence of which, in the most prominent cases, is fully admitted by all parties concerned, the act is considered sheer rebellion, and punished by virtual confiscation of the provincial revenue, mar- tial law, blood, Miming, and abrogation of their Constitution. Virtuous and consistent Whigs

But let us see how stands the pretended parallel between re- fusing the supplies in England and Canada. In England, the entire revenue is at the disposal of the House of Commons, except some 40,0001. or 50,000/., still claimed as the hereditary revenue of the Crown. With the exception of the Civil List, the Judges' salaries, and the interest of the public debt, the rest is subjected to their annual revision. In this is included the Civil establishment, and the, whole Military and Naval services. In Canada, the whole net revenue in 1832, (and the accounts are not perfect for a later period,) was but 142,0001.: of this sum, the Executive had claimed to dispose at its good pleasure, and without the control of the Assembly, of 52,0001. and upwards, or more than one third part of the whole ; which in this country would be equivalent to withdrawing sixteen millions a year from the control of the House of Commons, and placing the same at the disposal of the Ministers of the Crown. The sum of 30,0001. however, of the above amount, which ought according to promise and in the spirit of the declaratory act of 1778 to have been given i

up in 1794, was only surrendered in 1831,—in other words, was fraudulently retained for thirty-seven years. In return for this pretended concession, a fixed civil list was demanded,—first, for the life of the Sovereign ; and then, when this could not be got, for a period of years certain. This would have withdrawn about 40,0001. from the control of the Representatives of the People; which, added to the 52,0001. already mentioned, minus the 30,0001.,

would have given the Executive branch of the Government the exclusive command of 62,0001. out of 142,0001., or 43 parts out of 100 of the whole revenue ; much the same thing as if the Par- liament of the United Kingdom were to place 20,000,000/. of the annual revenue at the disposal of a Whig or Tory Administra-

tion. 711 Is it possible, then, that any one should be surprised that:the Canadian Assembly should have refused to vote a permanent civil

list? After the items now mentioned, the rest of the Canadian revenue was expended for purposes almost entirely of a local nature, such as schools, roads, bridges, canals, and railways. In short, if the Assembly had yielded to the dictation of the Colonial Office, it would have lost all control over the Executive Governs ment, and been reduced to the condition of a mere municipal corporation. This proves the desire of the Colonial Office to destroy the efficiency of the House of Assembly, and to make representative government in Canada a mockery. After deducting the expenditure in the way of what was merely municipal, the hereditary revenue, and permanent appropriations, the local sum under the immediate control of the House of Assembly did not exceed 60,000/.

These facts, drawn from the Reports of the Canadian Commie. sioners themselves, will show that there is neither common sense nor common honesty in comparing a refusal of the supplies in England with a refusal of them in Canada,—a country which has no public creditor to pay, no army to " disorganize," and few parties to suffer inconvenience, except over-paid officials, and sine.

eurists, the worst enemies of the liberties and prosperity of the people. The stopping of the supplies in Canada was not only a legal and constitutional, but a moderate and necessary measure. The standing army of England has prevented it from being as efficacious one.