THE GOVERNMENT OF LONDON.
THERE is a chance,—a faint one, perhaps, but still a chance —that the Ministry may have energy and time to face a third great initiatory Bill this Session. They must bring forward and carry their Irish Tenure Bill, and they will bring forward and carry their Bill for National Education, and they may, by possibility, bring forward and even carry a Bill for the Organization of London. That is a reform which many 'of our readers have very strongly at heart, and we shall, we think, do many of them a service in attempting to explain, as clearly as we can, the present position of the question. -Opinion has advanced upon it of late, not, indeed, to any satisfactory point, still less to any point at which action is imperative, but, nevertheless, has advanced so far as to become intelligible. All politicians are agreed, we think, that the Government of London cannot be let alone, that it is in theory anarchical, that in practice it works very badly, and that a reform of the big kind, a constitutional reform, which shall not be a patchwork reform, is imperatively required. All are agreed further on one preliminary but most important point, that for such a reform the word "London "must be held -to include the Metropolitan District ; that oar unique capital, the "province covered with houses," which contains more people than Scotland, has treble the foreign trade of Spain, -and contributes more revenue than Ireland, should be treated for municipal purposes as one ; and that, consequently, its 'Government must, if possible, be strong, dignified, and rich. At that point, however, the reformers part company. A large majority, whose chief was Mr. John Stuart Mill, and whose -spokesman is Mr. Charles Buxton, a majority including, we imagine, most of the vested interests and a great number of conspicuous politicians, hold that these ends can be obtained only by a Federal constitution, that London must be divided -into ten or more cities, preferentially conterminous with the Parliamentary boroughs, and that the real crux and duty of -municipal statesmanship is to frame a body which shall unite those boroughs into a federal Union. A minority, on the other hand, which has as yet no avowed chief of any eminence, and for spokesmen only the Pall Mall Gazette and the Spectator —journals not very often in accord—holds that this scheme is imperfect or impracticable, that it will in working display all the faults and none of the merits of the American Con- stitution; that it would throw immense power, patronage, and means of gain into the hands of inferior men ; that, in fact, the true hope, it may be the one hope, for London lies in the crea- tion of a single government strong enough to do the work re- cluired of it, that is, strong enough to do very strong things indeed, things which no existing body, except the House of -Commons, dare attempt, yet which, by virtue of that strength, will attract to it competent men. For a time we supported the Federalists, as our only hope amidst the present anarchy ; but this new Parliament is so strong and resolute, and has displayed so unexpected a degree of force, that we venture, with many lingering misgivings, to express our real desire, and to offer a plan as distinct, and, as we think, as workable, as the Federal scheme.
We prefer the British to the American Constitution for the capital, and would propose to govern it through a sovereign House of Commons, consisting of one hundred aldermen -elected by all householders, in the proportion of two for every ten thousand electors. This House of Aldermen, or Ruling Council, should be elected for five years, but subject to dissolu- tion in contingencies to be named hereafter, and should be as absolute within the limits of municipal work as the House of .Commons practically is in Imperial affairs—should, that is, receive and exercise all the powers now exercised by the Metropolitan Board of Works, by "the City," by all the -vestries, by all the guardians, and by every local board, commis- sion, and other legal municipal body within the Metropolitan District, and should further have power to pass any "Regu-
lation" for London, no matter what, which was not vetoed within one month by the Home Secretary. The debates of the Aldermen should be public, their sessions fixed for a par- ticular time of the year, and their proceedings regulated on the model of those of the House of Commons. Their power of taxation should be limited only by the Home Secretary's veto,—that is, practically by the discretion of the House of Commons ; and it should be distinctly declared by law that the revenue of the Cit3bestates, as apart from taxation, might be and ought to be expended in the maintenance of the muni- cipal dignity and grandeur of the Metropolis, whether such grandeur took the form of Holborn Viaducts or mighty enter- tainments to foreign Sovereigns.
The Executive of the Metropolis, under this scheme, would form a Cabinet like that of the Kingdom, elected by the Council, and dismissible from day to day by a vote, and sitting under the presidency of a constitutional chief, elected annually, called the Lord Mayor, whose external rank should be most strictly maintained, but who should otherwise be nothing but Chief Magistrate of the Metropolis. We make that concession, we must add, with reluctance, detesting the falsehood of constitutions ; but we are told that the conversion of the Lord Mayoralty into a City Premiership, tenable till the House dismissed him, would seem to all tradesmen in England a distinct injury, a closing-up of their one road to the honours freely bestowed upon every other department of effort. There is sound reason in the objection, if that were really the con- sequence of the change, and there would be no difficulty in leav- ing the office intact ; but substantial power would belong to the elected Cabinet, consisting of the London Premier, who ought, if the tradesmen would give up their desire for rapid rotation of office, to be Lord Mayor, but might otherwise be called Lord Warden, with the right of selecting his colleagues and a general control over their policy, of dissolving the Council, and of exer- cising all patronage; a Chief Builder, with the powers of Sir John Thwaites and his Board ; a Treasurer of London, who would be Chancellor of the metropolitan exchequer ; a Provost of London, with the power of recommending, and, within ordinary English limits, of supervising the local magistracy, and with full control of all Police ; a Chief Guardian, who would be for London what Mr. Goschen is for the United Kingdom ; and a Chamberlain, with the charge of all representative functions, ceremonials, and the City estates.
Each member would have his own staff, and would have in each parish—the boundaries of parishes to be equalized more nearly—a subordinate, having charge of the works, streets included ; of finance, collections included ; and of the poor. Or, to speak more plainly, the town clerk of each vestry, the surveyor, and the collector of each parish would be retained as agents of the Council, instead of agents of the local Boards, who now worry them into inefficiency. The members of this Cabinet would be well paid, would be sub- ject only to the Council, and would be removable only by its vote, that is, only when they had forfeited the confidence of the majority of the citizens. For such offices we believe that good men would strive, men of almost Parliamentary rank ; and with such a machinery their orders would be actively carried out, while collision, quarrel, or interference would finally come to an end. The Council invested with such power would attract men who now take no part in munici- pal affairs—it is most disgraceful both to them and to London that no considerable London landlord, except Miss Burdett Coutts, can ever be induced to open his mouth on municipal subjects—and would draw upon itself a vigorous and critical public opinion. We do not see why it should not govern London as well as the House of Commons governs England, re-awaken genuine municipal pride, and become by degrees the recipient of enormous wealth. We ven- ture to say, as a single illustration of this latter point, that a Chief Guardian of London, occupying the position we have sketched, who struck Londoners as efficient, would, in two years, have the direct control of half the London charitable funds, say, two millions a year, and would be ex officio Visitor, with most extensive powers, of every endowed charity in the Metropolis, while the habit of bequest "to London," which is dying out, from the hopelessness testators feel as to the disposal of their bounty, would at once revive. Indeed, every officer in the Cabinet would be gradually overloaded with work and responsibility till he was com- pelled in self-defence to make himself the chief of a strong permanent department, which is precisely the object of the scheme. London offices would be guided by men competent to govern, and responsible to a public which, with all its faults, is not slow to recognize efficiency in departments within the range of its comprehension ; while gradually City policies and City parties would crystallize themselves in forms as definite and as intelligible as the policies and parties of the kingdom.
There exists, we believe, but one single objection to this scheme, an objection so powerful that it has hitherto stopped the introduction of any measure based upon a similar prin- ciple. Such a Council, it is said, would be too strong, would rival Parliament in its own capital,Ehnd might, in times of political excitement, prove too powerful an adversary for the Government itself. The answer to that objection is a two- fold one. In the first place, a Government of London ought to be very strong, so strong as to have a perceptible and a heavy weight with the Government of the Kingdom. It is be- cause no such body has existed that London is reduced to such anarchy, that the first city in the world is less cared for than many a tenth-rate capital, that a population richer than that of many kingdoms cannot get itself even heard upon its own affairs. London has not, and since the Revolution never has had, its just weight in England. It has fallen into such contempt, owing to its anarchical condition, that no first-rate politician will stand for any of its boroughs except the one which is still organized ; that a city like Marylebone, third or fourth in the Empire, cannot find even decent representatives ; that grave statesmen are accustomed to say the real obstacle to equal electoral districts is London. It would have the repre- sentation of Scotland! Why should it not have the representa- tion of Scotland ? It has as great and as varied a population, has many times the trade, is much richer, and has almost as splendid an historic tradition. To say that it is vulgar is true, but in that sense is not England vulgar too ? At least, it has through all its history been populated by working persons who talked bad grammar, and cared mainly, or at all events very much, for the advancement of their own interests. We contend that London is entitled to a great Government, that no govern- ment can be good for it which is not great, and that the con- tempt so often expressed for the greatest, richest, and freest city man has yet made, is the result of that vulgar aristocratic feeling which has arisen from the feudal habit of avoiding contact with the masses of the people. Secondly, we do not believe that a Council of London, subject in every act to a veto from the Home Secretary, either would or could measure strength with Parliament. How could it, watched as it would be by every other city in the kingdom and by the Commons themselves, regarded with jealousy by the Executive, and fettered by a public opinion which has never yet exhibited the slightest separatist tendency? If this be really a grave objection, if the capital is really feared as an element of danger in the Empire, let us treat it as, under a similar fear, we treat the Army, and make the very existence of the new Municipality, the new City of London, subject to an annual vote. The fear, however, is chimerical, and has arisen from an entirely false analogy with Paris, and those who entertain it may take com- fort from a truer one. New York City is to New York State what London would be to Britain if it had ten millions of people, and is far more completely the centre of all State life ; and yet a contemptible little Legislature, sitting in a village on the Hudson, has never failed, when unbought, to modify the City constitution at discretion, is at this moment about to abolish five-sixths of its organizations. New York has crimes enough to answer for, but rebellion against Albany is not one of them.
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