LETTERS FROM PARIS, BY 0. P. Q.
No, XXV.
THE SPANISH FINANCR.4, A.r.;., APPROACHING BANKRUPTCY.
" La Itideuse banqueroute"—M IRABEAV. TO THE EDITOR OF TIIE SPECTATOR.
Paris, 23rd September 1834.
• Sm.—I hate all tricksters, and all tricking—am no lover of sleight-of- hand—set my face against all legerdemain—am no believer in fortune-
telling—would not encourage a juggler in a country village, even to make pretty girls stare and old women open their mouths. In one word, I hate all tricksters and tricking. ' For this reason, as well as for many others, I am therefore about to denounce the game which is now playing by the tricksters at Paris, London and Madrid, relative to the Spanish finances, and am about to caution the unwary against losing their money through the tricks and cajoleries of the Spanish, English, and French speculators, stockjobbers, and capitalists. The game which is now playing is the following,—to gain time of the Cortes ; to throw out by a majority the report made by the majority of the Finance Corn- mission; to refuse to make use of the word " BANKRUPTCY ; " to con- tinue the mystification of 1831 and 1832, and exchange one sort of Scrip,, and Coupon, and Rente, and certificate and receipt, for another Fort; to distract the attention of the holder of Spanish Royalist Stock from the real question ; to affect to pay dividends and capital by issuing other pieces of waste paper in the place of those already issued and in circulation to gull the bond fide rentiers with some scheme of a new sinking-fund, and of drawing by series or lotteries ; and finally, to make it to appear for the moment that something is really settled, when in truth and in fact nothing is arranged, nothing terminated. The object of all this tricking is to gain time ; to raise the price of Spanish Secu- rities; to get out of the hands of those bankers and capitalists who now hold Royalist Spanish Stock, at high prices, the stock they so hold; to get this stock into the hands of little speculators, shopkeepers, servants, clerks, and stewards; and then, when all this tricking shall be at an end, to invoke that very bankruptcy against which now these tricksters inveigh so vehemently, simply because they are holders them- selves. The plan, then, is to cry "No bankruptcy ! " to vote by a majority the recognition of "ALL the Loans ; " to pretend for the moment that it is designed to pay all these existing loans off again, both capital and interest, but really not to pay theta—practically to become bankrupt, and only to keep up the appearance of solvency for a few days, or months, or at most for two or three years. The great holders of Royal Spanish Stock are for "keeping the game alive" a little longer ; for forming financial combinations which no one (not even themselves) shall understand ; for cheating the little
i
speculators out of their silver and gold, and giving them n exchange Spanish Royalist Scrip ; and for averting Spanish bankruptcy by every means in their power, until they themselves shall have got transferred by degrees to small speculators the stock which now fills all their portfolios. These men tell you every day (and their satellites repeat what their masters declare), that the Cortes will not adopt the opinions of the ma- jority of the Spanish Finance Commission ; that "some arrangement" will be made ; that if the plan of M. DE Ton ENO be not adopted, some other "juste milieu" arrangement will; that the word " bankruptcy " will not be pronounced by the Cortes ; and that all the agitation now felt as to whether Spain will or will not-be bankrupt, is exaggerated and absurd. For a moment, indeed, the report of the majority of the Finance Commission staggered them ; but they instantly sent off couriers to Madrid, ordered M. DE TORENO, coute.qui-coute, to buy a majority of the Cortes against the proposed bankruptcy, amid sent large sums of money to assure the votes of the wavering and obtains negative to all insolvency. But when you say to these men, and to their secret agents—" Notwith- standing all your schemes' the bankruptcy must come at last ; you are merely postponing the evil day until you are no longer a Spanish stock- holder, except it he of Cortes llonds,"—why then they reply—" We know all that ; we know that Spain can never pay, though she may recognize these Royalist Loans : but this is of no importance to us; we shall get up the price of Stock—sell what we have—and then leave Spain after- wards to arrange with her new creditors as she can." In like manlier, if you speak to a. Carlist or a Royalist banker or capitalist, be will tell you, that "his Royal Master is about to recognize all but the Cortes Loans, und indeed to acknowledge every species of Stock which FRHDI. NAND in his life time ad tni tted tube legal; and that this recognition will doubtless enable Don CARLOS to obtain his loan in Holland, Belgium, and France." But if, in reply to this stuff,—if in spite of the pro- mises of the Baron DE HABER, his cowardly master, and the Junta of Navarre, you observe to the most active of their agents in London, Paris, or A uisterdion,.that "to recognize is one thing, but that to pay is another,"—they shrug their shoulders, raise their eyes to heaven, laugh out most lustily at the mere idea of " paying ;" and tell you in so many words, "that, wanting money for Don CARLOS, it suits that Prince and themselves to recognize all loans (except those of the Cortes) —not because to recognize compels them to pay, but only because it gives them time to look about—to get out of the scrape themselves—to ob. min a loan to enable Don CAnLos to carry on the civil war in the Northern provinces, and to gain the necessary popularity for their cause, so that the desired loan may be large and abundant." Thus, both by the Cbristinos and the Carlists, the unfortunately credulous are de- ceived; and these tricks are resorted to, to obtain two new loans for the combatants, and to put millions of francs of money in the pockets of the bankers, capitation, and large Royal stockholders. I have thus ex- posed the tricks of these jugglers, in order to show, first, what are the- opinions of those respecting a national Spanish bankruptcy, who are necessarily best informed as to the condition of the Spanish finances. and second, in order (if possible) to save the unfortunate little specu- lators from being again made dupes of such wholesale rogues as those alluded to.
All plans, therefore, which may be proposed to or adopted by the Cortes, short of the plan submitted by the majority of the Finance Commission, are mere tricks—will never be carried into effect—and are most unprincipled manceuvres on the part of unprincipled men. A man who has no resources, no trade, no business, no property which is saleable—who has a large family requiring his support—who is ruined —and who yet wants to continue " to figure in the world "—to strut and swagger, and give filte5 b31.18 as in former times—may, in order r" "%cure an additional loan, make false representations as to his re- versionary property—may talk of what he shall be worth when his father or his uncle dies—may sign post-obit bonds—may give bills and notes for all his debts and interest, and fix epochs at which all these bills and notes shall fall due and be paid : and this trick may answer for a while—he may &lain new loans, procure additional credit, and for months or years be may again deceive his blind and stupid creditors : but at last the bills come due—the notes are not paid, the " means" are all expended, the father dies, and leaves no property behind him to his spendthrift son : the exposure becomes complete, and the creditors deplore the day when they were fools enough to listen to their debtor and augment their original debts. Now every word of this is applicable to the creditors of Spain. Attempts are now making to obtain new loans—to increase the debts of the country, whilst its expenditure is necessarily in all respects increasing ; and " futurity " is offered as a security for the payment of both old and new debts. I regret to say that M. DE TORENO is a party to this system of deception. He has gained large sums of money at the Paris Bourse. He owed large debts : they are paid. He was poor : he is now rich. All this has been gained by speculation in the Spanish Funds. He knew what plan he was about to submit to the public : he knew a large fall must take place : he sold stock at high prices, and took back at one third of the value for which he had sold, making two-thirds of profits. And yet now, all agree in stating that his plan he is " willing to modify ;" that be does not hold firm to his original announcements ; and that he is "not willing to create any division, by pressing his plan to a vote, but is anxious to gratify the English and French Governments by coming to terms with all the Spanish creditors." M. DE RAYNEVAL, the French Ambassador, has threatened the members of the Cortes to demand his passports if bankruptcy shall now be pronounced. Mr. VILLIERS is ordered to plead the cause of the holders of Royalist Spanish Stock with the same earnestness as the cause of the holders of Cortes Bonds; and the Reform Minister of Foreign Affairs (Lord PALMERSTON) is aiding the Minister of Foreign Affairs in France (M. DE RIGNY) in his efforts to intimidate the Spanish Chambers, and compel them to vote the acknowledgment of loans which were made to aid and sup- port a French invasion—a government opposed to the liberties and happiness of the Spaniards—a government of the Inquisition, and all the horrors of the most horrific government of the Absolutists, Jesuits, and Monks.
And yet, if you were to ask M. DE TOREN°, M. DE RAYNEVAL, Mr. VILLIERS, Lord PALMERSTON, or M. DE RIGNY, if they believe in the possibility of Spain "paging" the loans and interest she is now required " to recognize,"—they would all be forced to admit that they (lid vot see their way at all; that Spain required to be relieved from her burdens, and not to have her burdens augmented ; and that it was merely to gain time, and put off the final bankruptcy which must arrive that all these tricks are now resorted to. Whatever, then, may be the present decision of the majority of the Cortes relative to the report of the majority of the Finance Com- ruission,—whether the Deputies shall act wisely, patriotically, and justly, and reject all loans not voted by the Cortes--or whether a majo- rity shall be found stupid and base enough to " recognize " loans they never mean to pay,—of one thi»g rest assured, and that is, that SPAIN CANNOT PAY, even were she willing to do so; but that all the pretended debts, except those of the Cortes, must as they ought to remain unpaid. In my last letter I showed you that the debts claimed by the creditors of the FERDINAND dynasty and faction ought not to be paid by Spain. In this letter I have shown you the tricks resorted to, at Paris and else- where, to obtain a recognition by the Cortes of debts which will not be paid merely to suit the ends of private speculation and individual enter- prise. It will be my duty in my next letter to prove to you that Spain CANNOT pay either the principal or interest of any other than the Cortes Loans, whatever may he the engagements or recognitions which may be wrung from the Chimibers. In the mean time, I am,
Sir, your obedient, servant, 0. P. Q.
Previous page
