Sir Hugh Beadle's Message T HE evidence mounts that the first
phase of the Government's Rhodesian policy has been a remarkable success. Mr. Smith's hope that economic sanctions would prove a nine-days' wonder has been rudely shat- tered: even the threatened oil embargo, against all expectations, has proved effec- tive. As his friends abroad stand idly by, the dolce vita that was white Rhodesia gives way to a siege economy, and the exodus of the disenchanted is about to begin.
The evidence also mounts that the second phase of the Government's Rhodesian policy is likely to prove an unmitigated disaster. This is the view of Sir Edgar Whitehead, powerfully argued in an impor- tant article on page 100 of this week's SPECTATOR. It is also the view of the Queen's representative in Rhodesia, the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs. And it is the view of Sir Hugh Beadle : hence his sudden flight to London last week. These men are not racial- ists, nor are they disloyal. They are men who know Rhodesia a good deal better than Mr. Wilson does, and in all probability care a great deal more for the future of the black man there, too.
Sir Hugh Beadle's message to the Prime Minister was unequivocal. There is now no alternative to Smith as leader of the white Rhodesians. The economic war has merely strengthened his position. The idea that the hard-pressed populace will oust Smith and turn to some 'moderate' is on a par with the then Sir Anthony Eden's notion that British troops had only to set foot in Egypt for Nasser to topple. It is true that, if sanctions are continued and intensified, the Smith administration will eventually collapse. But this will not occur before the July deadline accepted by the Prime Minister at the Lagos conference. The best estimate of the Governor and Sir Hugh Beadle is that it is more likely to take a full year, during which time Rhodesia and the Rhodesian economy will have been reduced to total chaos, and irreparable hardship will have been caused to Zambia and Mozambique.
Sir Hugh's conclusion, therefore, is that the British Government must negotiate with Smith. It must negotiate with him as head of a de facto, albeit rebel, Government; and it must negotiate on the basis of an immediate transfer to legitimate independence, with no intervening period of direct rule. Both Sir Hugh and the Governor believe that such negotiations, backed by the proven power of sanctions, would produce a settlement that would ensure progress to majority rule in Rhodesia, on terms more favourable to the black majority than those Mr. Wilson was prepared to offer before UDI.
In the circumstances that have now arisen, the logic of this conclusion is inescapable. Yet when Sir Godfrey Nicholson, one of the handful of Tory MPs who supported Mr. Wilson on oil sanctions, and who is known to have had lengthy discussions with the Governor and Sir Hugh in Rhodesia, advocated it in the House of Commons on Tuesday, the Prime Minister had the im- pertinence to accuse Sir Godfrey of having been 'brainwashed.' The truth is that if any- one attempted to brainwash anyone, it was Mr. Wilson who tried to brainwash Sir Hugh Beadle before allowing the Chief Justice to meet Mr. Heath. Hence the row. But there is no evidence that Sir Hugh left London any less convinced of the need to negotiate with Mr. Smith.
Nor, it must be said, is there any evidence that the Prime Minister has changed his mind either. It would be insulting to suggest that his tragic obstinacy is due to a deter- mination to crush Smith, come what may, or to stick by his ill-advised statement, in defence of the egregious Mr. Bottomley, that Smith could neither be negotiated with nor trusted. It must be assumed that the major factor now determining Mr. Wilson's Rhodesian policy is the pressure from the Commonwealth, from the Organisation of African Unity, and from much of the world.
These pressures are substantial, and it is understandable that the Government should heed them. Yet there comes a time when blackmail, whether from white or black, has to be resisted, if further disaster is not to follow. British communities in black Africa may be in jeopardy : they must be protected. A number of nations may leave the Com- monwealth : they cannot be prevented. British assets in black Africa may be seized : this would be a bagatelle compared with the cost to the British economy of rescuing Rhodesia and Zambia from anarchy and chaos. But appeasement is never justified.
In a matter of weeks the time will have come for Mr. Wilson to negotiate with Mr. Smith. The negotiations may prove unsuc- cessful, but they remain the only hope. Should the Prime Minister refuse even to make the attempt, the Governor may not much longer remain silent. If Rhodesia be- comes a party political issue, and the repre- sentative of the Queen appears to support the policy of the opposition, Mr. Wilson will have only himself to blame.