The Truth about Rhodesia

By SIR EDGAR WHITEHEAD

PROBABLY one of the most striking facts about the Rhodesian crisis is the general ignorance of the true situation there as displayed by most comments in the British press.

The picture most commonly painted is of a white community who over the years have gone out from Britain to seek a more graceful and affluent existence in Central Africa, but have omitted to fall into line with their counterparts in Kenya and elsewhere in East and Central Africa in accepting majority rule.

Nothing could be farther from the truth. At the last census held in 1961, only 27 per cent of the white population had been born in Britain and probably not more than a third had ever been there in their lives, even on a short visit. It would be far nearer the truth to describe Rho- desia as an outpost of South Africa.

Recently we have had a number of suggestions that after the collapse of the Smith regime there must be a temporary return to colonial rule. This is complete nonsense. There is no question of a return to colonial rule for the very simple reason that Rhodesia has never at any time been under colonial rule. From 1890 till 1923 Rho- desia was administered by a chartered company and from 1923 onwards has been a self-govern- ing colony in which the powers of the British government over internal affairs have been limited to a few subjects, and those purely negative. Even these powers were terminated by the 1961 Constitution. which, in effect, limited Britain's powers to external affairs provided the Rho- desian government observed the Constitution.

The British government plainly believed that economic sanctions alone would topple the Smith regime, and this calculation was based on the misconception of the nature of the white Rho- desian population. Sanctions are no more likely to produce a change of government in Rhodesia than in Cuba. They may in the long run, if ruth- lessly administered, completely destroy the inter- locked economy of all Central Africa and produce chaos. They may over a long period of time drive out most of the European inhabi- tants of the region as the result of mass unem- ployment. They will not result in a political change of heart amongst either whites or blacks.

The basic misconceptions which I have out- lined above have led the two major political parties in Britain into adopting a bi-partisan policy of imposing sanctions. The idea was that white Rhodesians, in the face of severe sanctions, would return to constitutional paths and that it would be possible to reinstate the 1961 Constitu- tion with additional safeguards against abuse. A moderate multi-racial government could be ap- pointed by the Governor, an aided programme of African advancement could be undertaken. and in due course majority rule could be brought about in an orderly manner.

This plan never at any time had any chance of success. It was based on utter ignorance of local conditions. So far as the Smith government was concerned. sanctions have rallied the moderate Europeans behind it and it Will not fall until there has been a total economic collapse. So far as the Africans are concerned, Sir Edgar Whitehead was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia between 1958 and /962. after three years' experience of the Smith government, they would never accept another white-dominated government of Rhodesians. The point of no return on a multi-racial govern- ment for Rhodesia was passed at the general election of December 1962 w hen the electorate rejected the concept.

Rumours in the British press that certain indi- viduals of high standing were prepared to take over from Smith never had any foundation in fact. If any had been prepared to do it, they would have been regarded as 'quislings,' but some of those mentioned have indignantly denied that they would even have considered such a move.

The next Rhodesian government will either be white supremacist if sanctions fail or black supremacist if they succeed. The multi-racial and still more the non-racial approach is no longer practical politics for a self-governing Rhodesia.

The basic error in British official thinking is that they believe political and racial attitudes can be altered by economic pressure. They have for- gotten what they would have done to anybody 1940 who had suggested that they must give in to Hitler because otherwise they would be subject to sanctions and short of petrol. They have forgotten that economics are the handmaid of politics and will always take second place when emotions are really roused.

The bi-partisan policy is now plainly collaps- ing. There is more and more talk of a period of direct rule. The Conservatives are cer- tain to oppose direct rule or they will split their party from top to bottom on the eve of a general election. Their position is very difficult because their extreme right wing is backing Smith, while their responsible leadership rejected Rhodesian independence on the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At that time the Rhodesian Prime Minister was Mr. Winston Field, whose whole approach was far more sym- pathetic to the African than that of Mr. Smith. When still in office, they warned Rhodesians of the grave consequences of UDI. Since UDI they have supported sanctions in the mistaken belief that they provided a means of returning Rhodesia to constitutional government. If they now oppose Wilson they are really only left with a policy of negotiating with the Smith regime on a basis of surrender, provided there is a face-saving formula.

Another major misconception in Britain is that the Rhodesian problem can be treated in isola- tion from the affairs of the rest of Central and Southern Africa. Only since UDI has there been any realisation that economically Rhodesia and Zambia have been Siamese twins since long before Federation.

Apart from the crude-oil pipeline to Umtali, Mozambique never gets a mention, yet Mozam- bique could not survive if an African nationalist government took over in Rhodesia and would be utterly ruined if the Rhodesian economy collapsed. There seems to be a conspiracy of silence over the fact that there is a large oil refinery at Lourenco Marques and there is ob- viously nothing to prevent refined oil products being continuously railed to Rhodesia, despite crude oil for the Umtali refinery being banned.

There is no mention of the aim of the African nationalist leaders to overthrow white government throughout Southern Africa. The

Rhodesian UDI has temporarily gained them the effective help of Britain and the West in achieving their objectives in Rhodesia and Mozambique. They will expect similar help against South West Africa and Angola before long. The final campaign against South Africa will be opened as soon as the others have fallen. If sanctions fail against Rhodesia, then the African states will turn to the United Nations and probably to the Communist states for aid in their campaign against the white governments of Southern Africa.

It is not likely that the political parties in Britain will be able to maintain a bi-partisan policy on Rhodesia for much longer. Sanctions, if effectively maintained, will destroy the Rho- desian economy before they topple the adminis- tration and this process is not likely to be speedy. The Smith government cannot negotiate except on the basis of recognition of its inde- pendence. The British government has committed itself at Lagos to the overthrow of the Smith regime and has indicated that there will almost certainly have to be a period of direct rule from Britain thereafter. Most Conservatives want early negotiations for a settlement with the Smith regime and are entirely opposed to the unlimited commitments for Britain which would be opened up by a period of direct rule. The two approaches are quite incompatible. If sanctions are fully effective, some form of direct rule will be in• escapable after the collapse of the economy; therefore the Conservatives are really committed to seeing that sanctions do not produce this effect I therefore forecast that at some point fairly soon the Rhodesian crisis will become a major political issue between the parties.

If the bi-partisan policy comes to an end, it is highly probable that the whole issue will pass from the hands of Britain to those of the UN, and that a complete breach will take place be tween Rhodesia and Zambia, resulting in the closing-down of the Zambian copper mines tot the duration of the crisis.

The British government has pledged itself to the Commonwealth and the rest of the world, with the full support of most other nations, to continue the destruction of the Central African economy until the Smith regime falls. It has been obvious all along to those who know Rho• desia that a complete collapse of the economy will come before the fall of the regime, if at all. If Britain goes back on her determination now the full wrath of the African and Asian con- tinents will be turned against her and the scorn of her Western allies who have backed sanctions at her request.

The aims of the Smith administration and the British government are so wide apart that there is no possibility of a genuine compromise. Britain must either surrender to Smith with an agreement which will include some face-saving clauses or go on to destroy the political and economic stability of Central Africa for a generation. That is, unless a completely new approach is made which can safeguard the legitimate interests of both races in Rhodesia and those of all her close neighbours.

I still believe that the only solution which can maintain a bi-partisan policy in Britain and satisfy justice to all the people of Rhodesia is an Act of Union between Britain and Rhodesia. I do not believe Britain at this stage will be generous enough to accept it, but, as the stark alternatives of the consequences of present policy become more obvious, I believe it will be seen as the only practical alternative.