TOPICS OF THE DAY.
OUR FOREIGN POLICY.
CAurrousLv silent during the deliberative part of the session, Lord Palmerston has signalized its scampering penultimate week by a burst of eloquence in favour of Hungary, her independence and rights. A very imposing speech, which has quite restored the confidence of Parliamentary Liberals in the Secretary for Foreign Affairs! Yet the imposing speech is no more than a clever mystification. The whole drift of it is summed up in this pas- sage— " It is not fitting that a country occupying such a proud position as England, having such various and extensive interests, should lock herself up, and, in simple regard to her own internal affairs, remain a passive and mute spectator of every- thing going on. It is quite true it may be said, Your opinions are but opinions; you express them against powers who have large armies at their command; and what are opinions without armies?' My answer is, opinions are stronger than armies. Opinions, if they are founded in truth and justice, will in the end pre- vail against the bayonets of infantry, against the fire of artillery."
" Opinions are stronger than armies," — a pretty sentence, that quite falls in with the Mechanics-Institute philosophy of the day. But what is its practical validity ? Public opinion is only stronger than armies when it possesses those who master armies. It is true that the government of every country is based, negatively if not positively, on public opinion; because if the strong mass did not acquiesce in the incum- bency it could oust the incumbents : so that they sit by its favour ; but only because public opinion obliges the physical force of the country, including its army, to acquiesce. If the govern- ment of a country is a bad one, opinion can only prevail upon it in one or other of two ways : either by animating a material force adverse to the government,—that is, by raising up an army against the government,—or by converting the leaders of the ex- isting material force. Count Stadion is a lunatic, probably through the sickening despair of constant failure in the effort to make the rulers of Austria accept the opinion that might save their empire : the appeal has been made from that "opinion" to arms ; the contest lies between the army of a small state and that of a large state aided by a larger ; it will be decided by mili- tary skill, numbers, and weight of metal: Lord Palmerston stands by eloquently protesting, and declaring that opinion is stronger than armies. Will his protest prevail against the Rus- sian and Austrian armies on the plains of Hungary 2 There is the ready and appropriate field to test the truth of his maxim.
But it has been tested already : public opinion has sent its ver- bal subsidies to the aid of Poland—and where is Poland ? What has written and oral intervention, even with a show of guns, done for Sicily I Worse than nothing ; for indeed it has not been without practical results. A British Minister was sent to Italy to embody the views of the British Ministry : his presence, his language, his mien, were such as to make the Sicilians believe that their insurrection would be supported, their "constitution " restored, their chosen King recognized—the last point was ex- pressly declared by the British representatives : the whole lan- guage of the British agents was such as to induce the Sicilians to believe that the acts of the British would correspond. There were no acts on the part of the British ; but when the Sicilians had rebelled, reconstituted themselves, and chosen their King, Lord Palmerston, applying his maxim that opinions are stronger than armies, declined to furnish anything beyond opinion,—and the Sicilians were beaten; beaten by the wretched Government of Naples, with the heir of its foolish and faithless dynasty.
"Non volge Fenno in lui sentl Palermo
L'antica razza."
And in England too : the sentence of the Florentine satirist should be struck in brass, and delivered on a medal as an honorary testimonial to the British for their aid. The British intervention in Sicily is marked by bad faith—no less ; the same kind of bad faith which we impute to a man who deceives a woman by pay- ing her " attentions." Sicily might decidedly bring her action against England for breach of promise.
From the last brilliant, successful, and accepted oration of the Foreign Secretary, we may gather the Whig and Liberal idea of the present duty of England towards the nations in the matter of foreign intervention. It consists in a literal application of the " vox et prceterea uihil " rule—the Minister is to talk, and nothing more. If so, let us disband not only our armies but our embas- sies, and let our Ministers consummate their metamorphosis into a body of essayists. Recognize the Edinburgh Review as a De- partment of State. That would really be better, because it would be quite intelligible. Let it be understood that England is to take no further part in the affairs of Europe, except a literary part as the publisher of "articles," and then the parties that re- present "progress," &c. would not be seduced by didactic lucu- brations into rebellions and overt acts. We are not blaming Lord Palmerston for a foible that belongs to his colleagues, his party, and perhaps the bulk of the British people just now; who like to enjoy the credit and renown of intervening to main- tain opinions, without the cost. England claims to represent certain opinions, but wishes it to be a titular office—like Henry the Eighth, who retained the title conferred upon him by the Pope as "Defender of the Faith," alter he had repudiated wife and Pope.
Turn we to other parties, to see if there is any corrective to this mystified and inconsistent notion of our foreign relations ; for it is most desirable to extricate the subject from its half spon-
taneous obscurity, and see our course clearly. Lord Brougham gives voice to the opinion of the Anti-Ministerial Peers, an in- choate majority of the Upper House; who resolve with him—I. That England ought to demand " and obtain " "satisfactory " explanations touching the international proceedings of foreign powers • 2. that she ought not to interfere between governments and subjects; 3. that her conduct must be regulated by "friendly feeling towards " allies" to whom we may be bound under treaty. In other words, England is to demand satisfaction when one king quarrels with another, but is to say nothing when a people complains that its king is tyrannical and unjust. Eng- land is to interfere for princes, but not for peoples—she is to pro- tect Ferdinand of Naples, Fereinand of Austria, Nicholas of Rus- sia; but not Sicilians, nor Hungarians, nor Poles. Lord Brough- am's doctrine, we believe, has obtained no recognition since Europe had a history. The publicists declare that when a state is divided by two parties, a foreign state may take its choice be- tween the two, and aid which it pleases. The quarrel between a ruler and subject, Austria and the Guelf, became the party war of another land. King Leopold sits upon a throne which Eng- land helped to raise among a people warring on its sovereign. From the middle ages to our own day, foreign intervention has accepted the invitation of peoples as well as princes, and more often perhaps with a solid justification. Lord Brougham's rule is consistent and intelligible in itself; it recognizes in each state the powers that be, and them alone ; it was, or ought to have been, the rule of the high Tories when they existed in England, and of the Holy Alliance: it has not been the rule of nations, nor is it of this nation now ; and we do not believe that, distinctly understood, it would be the rule. From the Tory view turn we to the more popular side—the one represented at the City meeting in favour of Hungary—to see what we can learn there. Little. It is a reflex of Lord Palmer- ston's doctrine with an addendum by Mr. Cobden. The head of the Manchester school allows to opinion the help derivable from operations on the money-market. At the meeting to protest against the intervention of Russia in Hungary, Mr. Cobden takes pains to show that it is not necessary to resist Russia, because she has not money enough for more than a limited indulgence in soldiering. She can only, he says, afford so much campaigning ; she can't go further without coming to Western Europe for a loan ; and you can refuse the money. What then? will it be refused? Austria, he says, is bankrupt, and cannot raise money. Again what then? The French Directory issued assignats, and yet de- fied Europe. Bonaparte overran the Continent with troops which, cheap as they were, cost more than bean-eating Russians. The United States saw their currency go to a terrible discount, and yet beat England. South American States have obtained loans. And if Russia were to ask a loan secured on her territories, her mines, and her dynastic probabilities, would the sages of the European stock exchange refuse it, either on mercantile or patri- otic grounds "Credat Jucheus." Discount can always be stretched to the point of temptation, and capital will never find the heart to refuse a profit. That, assuredly, is not set down in the moral code of free trade. If tenders were invited, a Russian "England-invasion" loan would be quoted on the London 'change, daily, by name. There is much cant in the terrors which make Russia a bugbear ; some cant also in the neatly ruled calcu- lations which exhibit her powerless while she is threatening Ger- many, alarming Christian Turkey, invading Hungary, and nego- tiating the alliance of France.
It is time that we should leave child's play. The position of Europe is serious enough to demand something graver than clap- trap or amateur statesmanship. The vice of our foreign policy is, that it rests on assumptions, and acts in mystification. We are without a real foreign policy ; we are unguided by a distinct rule—without compass in the obscurity and the storm. Some of our statesmen prefer a compass whose pole is the stem of the ship they are steering; a foolish and unsafe device to cheat one's self. We cannot, even in foreign policy, eat our cake and have it. We cannot sit at the councils of Europe without incurring the re- sponsibilities of our presence. Lord Carlisle is right when he says that we cannot repudiate the fellowship of humanity and refuse to aid the oppressed : there have been, and will be, occa- sions in which England must declare the rights of humanity, and declaring, stand by them, or forfeit all claim to high posi- tion. But that duty is not one to be trifled with. Precisely because the judgment of so great a nation carries with it a preponderating weight, and because the declaration of so powerful a nation must be followed up with a fulfilment of responsibilities, it is necessary to define and limit the occasions of intervention, and the principles. You must do so for the sake of prudence of national dignity, and of effective results. Waste not the influence of the state, nor make it cheap. Lord Palmerston's rule is, always talk, and usually talk big, but never act : the true rule is never ta'k, unless you are prepared to act; never talk so big as you will act. Do not go so far in action even as to utter words, unless you see the whole course before you and the consequences of pursuing it, or unless you see a principle so sacred that you are prepared to follow it at all costs. Unless you are prepared for one or other alternative, act not; but then, speak not. Use not the language of strength in vain, or you depreciate the currency of the national influence. If you claim, be prepared to exact what you claim. If justice makes you think it necessary to protest, be ready to stand by your protest. How to act, is an ulterior question. Lord Palmerston declares that the first:object of England is to maintain peace, and the next to count for something in the world. A poor idea of national aspirations ! England's first object should be to uphold what to her conscientious judgment seems just ; next, to promote as much practical good as she can in the world. But what does she count good and just in politics? It would be quite possible to embody in a formal declaration the principles by which this country is prepared to stand, in such form as to accord with the actual conclusions to which England has practically arrived in her own career, and to command the adhesion of every English statesman ; and that declaration might be sent to our representa- tives at foreign courts, for communication to those courts, as the chart of English policy. It would fix our own counsel, and serve as a guide to foreign states. If it be clearly understood to what we will give and to what refuse our support, states will have no difficulty in learning how to earn our friendship and intercourse; both of which we can render practically valuable. To those who are politically just, our wealth, our experience, our extended dominion, our influence, may afford powerful help, short of send- ing forth great armies. But no army is too great to maintain the word of England. Let that word never go forth unless she is pre- pared to redeem it with a host, and it will never go forth in vain. As it is, we are likely to go to war by accident, to enforce some purpose which we do not see, and to achieve results which we shall not like—wasting the treasure of the country to purchase oppression for the nations and hatred for ourselves. We have not yet outlived the practice of war, but we can limit our own share in it to one rule—the rule of never using arms ex- cept to vindicate those fixed and proclaimed principles which are sanctioned by the experience, the deliberate judgment, and the affection of Englishmen—which have achieved our greatness, and are the key to our future security. With such fixed and known foreign policy, war would become for us, what it ought to be, an economy of peace, a guarantee of civilization : the strength of England would be known to the nations as the faithful and stead- fast instrument of enlightened opinion, dear to the just, terrible only to those hated by the just ; and thus we should gain an ever- increasing alliance of the wise and powerful—an alliance founded on something stronger than treaty stipulations, on the force of our own virtue and a common faith. With such a course marked out, we might even now enter the congress of nations, and obtain for Europe a restoration of order under new and better guarantees than those which she has forfeited.
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