TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE.
WE are by no means through the Egyptian wood yet, but at least one grand difficulty is out of the way. The Government will not be turned out in the midst of one of the most difficult and complex negotiations of our time. The Tory chiefs have yielded to the pressure of the ignorant hotheads behind them, and intend to insist on taking a Vote of Censure ; but its result is already predetermined. From the moment when Mr. Gladstone sat down on Monday, after describing the Agreement arranged with France, it was evident that the Liberal party could support the Ministry in unbroken strength ; and, that condition once secured, opposition became an academic exercise. So far from the agreement being a discreditable one, or one too full of con- cessions to a rival Power, it was seen to be exceedingly able, and full of advantage, not only for those who agree heartily with the Government, but for those who, like ourselves, desire, if the consent of Europe can be obtained, to administer Egypt for many years to come. The refusal to annex once admitted— and the country, whatever its wishes, is not prepared to order annexation—it is difficult to see how better arrangements could have been formulated. France, in her own idea, surrenders a great deal. She formally and explicitly gives up her claim— which, whether real or imaginary, was most inconvenient—to revise the Dual Control. She pledges herself absolutely, if Egypt is evacuated by Great Britain, not to occupy the country. She agrees to the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain until January 1st, 1888, a period of three years and-a-half ; and she consents that, when this period has expired, Europe in Confer- ence shall decide whether the country shall or shall not be entrusted to Great Britain for a further period. And finally, she agrees—agrees with pleasure and eagerness—that in the event of Egypt not being so entrusted to us, it shall be neutralised, that is, guaranteed by Europe against falling into the hands of any European Power. In return, Great Britain has pledged herself not to remain after 1887 against the will of "Europe," which, added Mr. Gladstone, is "a phrase per- fectly well known in diplomacy," and, as he subsequently im- plied, is always used to signify the general assent of all the Great Powers. She has also consented to allow the International Caisse de la Dette a general right of remonstrance if the Egyptian Budget threatens creditors ; and a veto upon any unsanctioned expenditure not prearranged in the Budget, and not indispens- able to peace and order. This right does not extend to habitual interference, but only to the prevention of sudden and unsanc- tioned outlays, such as have repeatedly occurred in the recent history of Egypt. It is, in fact, a right to safeguard the in- terest on the Debt, as regulated by the Conference about to sit, and nothing else. Now, will anybody just tell us how a Government resolved not to annex, and allowed by the country to adhere to that resolve, could possibly have obtained from a Great Power, morbidly sensitive about Egypt, better terms than those ? We might, it is said, have disregarded France, and that is true ; but to what end, if we are not to annex Egypt, after all ? Are we to spite France, just to show we can ? We could not have disregarded all Europe ; and it is Europe which, in January, 1888, is to decide upon the fate of Egypt, and our position there. That decision, it is further contended, might have been asked for at once ; but how was that possible, when the Government thought immediate evacuation unwise, and was firmly deter- mined not to accept an order to remain for ever ? As it seems to us, who ardently desire to remain, and administer Egypt, at least for one generation, on English principles, the Government has made the best arrangement which, on its convictions, was possible ; and has even shown deference to those who desire that, if permanent occupation is now impossible, the chances of the future should not be roughly cut off. The present is provided for in such a way that France is content, and the future is left open for decision three years hence. A great deal may happen in three years ; while, if nothing happens, the only two alternatives left to Europe are the only two which Great Britain can endure,-;-that Egypt should be entrusted to her, or that Egypt should not be entrusted to anybody at all.
But, it is asked, and will be asked a thousand times during the debate, why should "Europe," in which France is so in- fluential a Power, be entrusted with the ultimate settle- ment of the fate of Egypt? Ought not England to have in- timated her will, and then have left Europe to take any stepa she pleased? That seems a plausible proposition from the Chauvinist point of view ; but there are at least two answers to it, the second of which is nearly, if not quite, final. One is, that if we had acted in Egypt as conquerors, determined to take our own way, the Imperial Powers, who are restless under the present position in the East, might have seized the opportunity to declare that, as Turkey had no longer any life, and her pro- vinces were being distributed without a European vote, the dangers arising from her weakness must be finally pre- vented. That would have meant partition upon a plan which, though fatal to Turkey, and therefore so far beneficial,. would also have been fatal to all the Balkan populations. Their dream of independence would have been over for a century ; for they would have been loaded-down by the three strongest Empires in the world, and could not have been re- leased without a huge war, in which England and France might have been overtaxed. That was a serious risk to en- counter for the sake of a possession which the Government did not heartily desire. Secondly—and this is a much less dreamy consideration—the difficulties of holding Egypt, always great, would have been made, by the resistance or- annoyance of Europe, almost insuperable. Egypt is full of foreigners, and the task of so governing them that the fella- heen should have no. damage, yet every Power should be satisfied with the treatment of its subjects, would have been nearly impossible. The Foreign Office would have been besieged with remonstrances, reclamations, and demands for compensation ; and Egypt would always have afforded to any hostile Power grounds for menace or for war. To hold Egypt. with the consent of Europe is one thing, and, in our judgment, both a feasible and desirable thing ; but to hold it in defiance of Europe is quite another,—one so difficult that we, at least, who fully acknowledge the importance of the Valley, should hesitate to counsel any Government to undertake such a task. The risk might be worth while, if the alterna- tive were a foreign occupation, but not if the alternative is Egyptian autonomy, even if that autonomy should be disorderly or decadent. There are limits to the sacrifices it is wise to make, even for the Valley of the Nile and to contend for its sovereignty with all Europe, even if the contention stops short of war, is outside those limits. The Agreement, in fact, is impugnable only from one point of view, —that we ought to have asked from Europe the permanent charge of the country ; and that is the point of view which the Government has steadily rejected. All who vote for it, therefore, will be voting for a chance of obtaining Egypt—it is nothing like a certainty—at the cost of accepting a new Government, the head of which must be Lord Salisbury.
But then, it is argued, behind the Agreement stands a financial proposal. Certainly there does, and that proposal neither will be nor can be settled without the consent of Parliament ; but before Parliament can debate it, it must know what the proposal is, which it does not know at present. The Tories assert that it ought to know ; that Mr. Gladstone has privately settled all details, and that he is tricking his oppo- nents by compelling them to discuss half his scheme. That is nonsense. The Tories are not in the least compelled to discuss the scheme before it appears in its entirety. The Conference.- meets to-day, the needful information is all ready, the decision is expected in ten days, and the Opposition has, in fact, only to wait a fortnight to have before it the perfected scheme. What prevents it from waiting, except its own impatience ? Mr. Gladstone can- not, even if he would, reveal his scheme in advance ; for if he did, he must adhere to it, and the diplomatists would have practically nothing to do except to register or reject his decision. They would not allow themselves to be placed in such a position, and would refuse to meet. The scheme, moreover, is opposed by very powerful interests, by financiers • who can move Governments, and by the whole Jewish com- munity, and the British Government must leave themselves free to consider and discuss alternatives. They cannot shut up the Plenipotentiaries to a single proposal, nor can they run the risk of seeming to offer certain terms which the Conference may in a week decide to be unaccept- able. It may be inconvenient to politicians, and more incon- venient to speculators, not to know exactly the way in which the necessary money will be raised ; but the inconvenience is unavoidable, and would be unavoidable were Lord Salisbury in power. The Conference, as is evident from the despatches, is to do something more than sanction either an English loan, or the cutting-down of the rate of interest,—it
is to lay down "the normal Budget for Egypt ;" and to reveal proposals about the Debt before that work had been done, would not only. be discourteous, as Mr. Gladstone said, but would be futile. If, indeed, there were any danger that an arrangement would be made without the consent of Parliament, there might be reason in the cry ; but there is no such danger. Not to men- tion Mr. Gladstone's pledges, the essence of the scheme is a loan ; and the boldest English Premier who ever lived would only promise a loan "subject to the consent of Parliament." The Tories have only to move that no such loan be made, and carry the motion, and the Conference, and the Agreement, and her Majesty's Government will all tumble to pieces together. What better opportunity could an Opposition wish ?
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