Ending the war
A sudden outbreak of euphoria in Washington, occasioned by the belief that the bloodiest of all undeclared wars was about to end, was soon diminished by President Thieu's rejection of the cease-fire terms negotiated between President Nixon's indefatigable Dr Kissinger and the North Vietnamese in Paris. It is clear that Dr Kissinger was unable to persuade, cajole or intimidate the surprisingly durable and tough President of South Vietnam to agree to Kissinger's vicarious deal. Thee North Vietnamese are now prepared to settle for a coalition government in Saigon and are no longer insisting upon Thieu's ,total withdrawal from the political scene. Hanoi has also agreed to release the American prisoners of war now held in the north. But Thieu has not agreed to be pushed aside or shunted into a siding, and, although he now declares that a .cease-fire could come about "in the near future," he must know that the condition he makes — that the commtunists withdraw all their troops — is unacceptable. Even if, as a gesture, North Vietnam were to pull back its regular force's, there is no way it could pull the Vietcong out of South Vietnam nor is there any way it could disarm that Most tough and resilient of guerrilla forces. No doubt President Thieu intends his condition to be a bargaining counter, and it is safe to assume that what he really wants, and does not think he has obtained, is a guarantee that he is not to be traded in by the Americans as part of a settlement which has more to do with the conduct of the American Presidential campaign than it has to do with the political future of Indochina.
It is remarkable that South Vietnam has thrown up a President both able and determined enough to sustain the role in which Thieu now, confidently, casts himself. The irony of the matter is that Thieu's intransigence in the face of immense American pressure to accept the Kissinger deal is itself a tribute to the partial success of the American policy of building up the military strength and the political stability of South Vietnam tO the point where it can stand on its own feet. To be sure, What Washington wanted was that South Vietnam should be able to stand up to the North and to take on the Vietcong; but, given the absolutely clear determination of the Americans to pull out, it is not surprising that President Thieu has decided, for the moment, to take on Dr Kissinger instead.
That a cease-fire is on its way, whatever President Thieu may gay or do, cannot be doubted. Two considerations overwhelm all others. The first is that, in the last resort, President Thieu relies upon the South Vietnamese army; and that army, it has been made clear time after time, is both unable and unwilling to fight the Vietcong, let alone regular battalions from North Vietnam, without recourse to American air power. The immediate reaction of each and every unit of South Vietnamese troops When encountering the enemy is to summon up air strikes. South Vietnamese troops are better than they were, but their fighting capacity depends upon American air power; and this means that, in his turn, President Thieu is dependent upon the President of the United States. The second consideration is that President Nixon is determined to end the undeclared war. It is not a Republican but a Democratic war; and although Nixon would obviously like to have brought about a cease-fire before the presidential election next month, he will settle for a cease-fire afterWards. The United States accepts that it cannot win the Vietnam war; it has .accepted that its troops must came home. This horrible war, which has done great damage to the United States and has corrupted the entire society of South Vietnam, is coming to its close. The vicious circle of commitment is about to be broken at last.
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