BOOKS.
A STANDING ARMY OR A MILITIA ?
GENERAL TON FREYTAG-LORn GHovIMPs new book reinforces the true moral of his Deductions from the World-War—namely, that the real rulers of Germany, convinced at heart that they have lost this war, are busily discussing how they may do better next time. This interesting and plausible little essay on the advantages of a • A Nation Trained in Arms or a Militia By Lieutenant-General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven. With an introduction by Major-General Sir Charles G. tAllwv.11, K.C.B. London: Constable and Co. 14s. nttj
standing army as compared with a militia of the Swiss type derives all its importance from the fact that a prominent member of the German General Staff should have published such a book at such a time as this, when Herr Erzberger and other tense German politicians are prating about the beauties of disarmament after " a peace by understanding." Let us never forget for an instant that the military caste is all-powerful in Germany, and that this General, who, in his tacit assumptions no leas than in his direct admissions, expresses the views of that caste with unmistakable clearness, speaks for Germany with far more authority than all the Erzbergers, Scheidemanne, and Kuhlmann put together. The lesson of the war, for him, is not that its horrors must never be repeated, but that Germany did not prepare suffioiently for the ordeal. He boasts of German successes and then adds " Yet much would have been easier, and the arduous struggle would have been shortened, if our peace-preparation had been still more comprehensive, above all, if, before the war, we had actually enlisted all those liable for service." Germany was staggering under the burden of the vast armaments which she had created and which her neighbours were obliged to rival, but the author regrets that she did not increase her burden, and indicates that she must do so as soon as peace returns. As General Callwell says in his Introduction, it is not an encouraging prospect for the " dreamers of dreams that conjure up Leagues of Peace," or for those fanatics of the Independent Labour Party who still cherish their " German friends."
The author's contention that " a firmly knit, trained national army " must always be superior to " a loose militia " is supported by a rapid historical survey, ranging from the American and French Revolutions to the Franco-Prussian and the South African Wars. The abstract proposition is indisputable, as applied to a brief campaign, but that is not to say that every great nation should always be armed to the teeth, as the author believes. In the true German fashion, he lays down his theory and pushes it to its logical conclusion, without giving a thought to any but military considera- tions. Thus in regard to the Prussian Army reforms of 1859 ho ignores the well-known fact that the Lancttag resisted the measure, not because it objected to a stronger army, but because it was denied any sort of control over that army or the expenditure to which it was asked, as a matter of form, to assent. The author professes to believe that a sentimental belief in the old Landwehr was at the root of the quarrel between the King and the Landtag, as the result of which Bismarck finally extinguished political liberty in Prussia. But the Landwehr controversy was only a side-issue. The question was whether the elected representatives of the Prussian people were to have any influence in the management of the army, and it was decided in the negative. This question now concerns the Allies. The author fails to see that so long as Germany main- tains a huge national army, which is under the sole control of the Emperor, she is a standing menace to the world's peace. As in duty bound, he repeats the pitiful German falsehood that Germany was forced into this war by a hostile coalition, and points to the fact that she had not actually enlisted every available man as " the best refutation of the accusation made by our enemies that Germany deliberately provoked the war." The truth is, of course, that she had enlisted every man whom she thought necessary for a war which was to be short, sharp, and decisive. But the battle of the Marne upset al.1 the German plans by dispelling the dream of another Six Weeks' War, ending with the occupation of Paris and the collapse of France. '1'he author confesses that the long trench warfare helped the Germans just as it helped the Allies, by giving time for the training of new troops. The first new German formations " did not prove equal to the test " of modern war, partly because the regular officers' corps had sustained very heavy losses in the early battles, and the retired and reserve officers who filled the gaps were not able to supply " confident leadership " to the raw young troops. He speaks in a patronizing way of our own effort, commending Lord Kitchener's great work, but concluding that " the English Army was by no means adapted to a war of movement," and that " it is in fact impossible to build up an army adequate to all the demands of war in the course of the war itself." The General says what he would like to believe. We, for our part, know that he is wrong. In the war of movement, the victories of the past two months have shown that the British Army is " ade- quate to all the demands of war," and the American Army, which is still younger, has already begun to prove its quality against the best German troops. The author's criticisms of the Tsar's Russian army as brave but ill organized are not so wide of the mark, but it is characteristic of him to omit any reference to the notorious fact that the Russians were ill armed and munitioned. if in 1915 they had been as well provided with rifles, guns, and shells WI they were in 1917, they would have been a match for Marshal Mnekensen, as the author knows very well, though he is careful not to say a word about it.
The General never faces the problem of the uses of an army. He dismisses the Swiss experiment briefly on the ground that "the whole armed force of Switzerland is really only cut out for the armed defence of neutrality and for the defence of the mountainous country," whereas " a Great Power will in case of war only abandon
the better mode of defence, which consists in preserving the initiative and in attack, at great cost to itself." That is to say, Germany wants an army for offence and not merely for defence, and therefore will not be satisfied with a militia. Here again we come on the real cause of quarrel between Germany and the civilized world.. The Allies were not prepared for offence ; even Russia under the late Tsar was mainly concerned to defend her frontiers against the German peril. If one Great Power is resolved to maintain a huge striking force, ready for instant action at the word of an irresponsible despot, then the peace of the world can never be secure from one clay to another. That has been the position of Germany for the last half-century, and she has become an intolerable nuisance. If she learns from defeat to be content with her own large and rich territories, and ceases to hanker after the land of her neighbours, and if she abolishes her despotic system and becomes a democratic State like the Allied countries in league against her, we may begin to oonsider profitably this abstract question of a standing army or a militia. In present circumstances, however, the disoussion is futile. General von Freytag-Loringhoven wants Germany to remain, more than ever, an embattled nation, docilely following its War Lord, and unless he and his caste are dispossessed of power no other Great Power can afford to be content with a militia.
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