DIVIDED EUROPE?
AT a reception given in his honour on Tuesday evening M. Molotov declared that the main task of the Council of Foreign Ministers was to consolidate victory and secure lasting peace for the whole world. That is an unexceptionable statement, calculated to command universal assent. But unexceptionable state- ments do not get the world far by themselves. It is necessary to ask what M. Molotov's own contribution is to the endeavour he so admirably describes. The question cannot be answered quite dog- matically, for the proceedings of the Conference of Foreign Minis- ters have been shrouded with such secrecy—on the whole inevit- ably—that public knowledge of the moves and counter-moves taking place daily is necessarily limited. But all the information available from whatever sources compels the conclusion that four-fifths of the deplorable failure of the Conference to achieve results must be laid at Russia's door. There has been hardly a question—if indeed there has been a question at all—on which Britain, the United States, France and China could not reach full agreement without difficulty. On every occasion it is a demurrer by M. Molotov which precludes the unanimity by which alone decisions in such a body can be taken. The Western Powers, particularly Britain and the United States, hold that Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria are not living under democratic governments which can properly be recog- nised and with which a treaty can properly be made ; Russia (not the foremost authority in the world on democracy) holds that they are. Britain and the United States hold that these ex-enemy States should not remain heavily armed ; Russia holds that they should. The United States, with British support, desires the internationali- sation of European waterways ; Russia desires to see them divided up among the occupying Powers. Russia, which never fought on African soil, has complicated the Italian settlement by putting in a claim for the trusteeship of Tripolitania. And though she fought for less than a week against Japan she proposes for that country, in place of the present American military administration, an Inter-Allied Control Commission, in which she will apparently hold an equal place with Britain, the United States and China, and Australia and New Zealand hold no place at all. On various Austrian questions also Russia appears to take a different view from America and Britain.
These divergences must not be laboured beyond a point. Some of them may yet be resolved, and it does not follow that in every case in which Russia forms a minority of one she is necessarily in the wrong. But what is happening behind closed doors in the Conference is not the only ground for concern. In various fields Russia has acquired the habit of going her own way and consulting her own interests with little regard to those of her Allies. That applies to the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia ; Britain and the United States are anxious to comply with Persia's reasonable request, but Russia is not, and it would not help Persia to leave Russia in sole possession. Russia, having recognised the Hungarian Government (which it had a considerable hand in establishing), has concluded a highly advantageous commercial treaty with that country without giving the Western Allies, which for reasons stated have not recognised the Hungarian regime, a chance to participate. Something of the same kind has been effected, or attempted, in regard to Austrian oil. On the Balkans Russia is riveting both political and economic control. Whatever precise construction may be put on such actions it is obvious that they do not exemplify loyalty, or promote confidence, between Allies. Nor, it must be added, do the policy and practice of Russia in occupied Europe. The wholesale transportation of German machinery to Russia has much ultimate justification, for compensation in kind is abundantly due for the wanton destruction wrought by Germans on Russian territory, but such a process, which must take its proper place in the reparation account, should clearly be carried out in due order and under general inter-Allied control ; that occupying forces should be allowed simply to help themselves is complete.y inadmissible. At the same time evidence too ample and too authoritative to be ignored testifies to the deplorable conduct of Russian troops in many parts of occupied Germany. There is no need to suggest that it is universal. But dossiers of murders and rapings by Red Army soldiers are in existence, and after considerable suppression facts were recently published of British protests against forcible abductions of German citizens by Russian agents in the British zone of occupation. Again, the scale on which these things are happening is not to be exaggerated, but that they are happening is incontestable.
All this, in sum, is serious. It was Goebbels' supreme aim, during his dishonoured life, to drive a wedge between the Allies. It was Hitler's supreme conviction, or fanaticism, that the Russians were the essential danger to Europe. Goebbels failed in his endeavours. Hitler's delusion was exploded. Over and above all dissensions between Russia and her Allies today stands the dominating fact of comradeship in victory and the overruling necessity—in M. Molo- tov's words—for the strengthening of friendship between Britain and Russia and between those two Powers and all nations. Faith in that is not, and must not be, dispelled ; but there is no doubt that it has suffered shock, and all parties concerned must make their contribution to the creation of a better atmosphere. But the old difficulties arise here. Russia appears to understand friendship in a different sense from the rest of the world. She is closely asso- ciated, in a relationship largely imposed by herself, with all the States of Europe east of the Oder and the Adriatic—with the single exception of Greece, where she has declined to join her Allies in " observation " of the coming elections. All of them have estab- lished governments more or less congenial to her, and mainly for the reason that they are congenial to her. There exists, indisput- ably, an eastern European bloc dominated by Russia. That may be natural or unnatural, a good thing or a bad thing. But if it is natural and good, as Russia would no doubt claim, it cannot be unnatural and bad that the free States of western Europe,—not, like many of the eastern States, former satellites of Germany— should vaguely consider the possibility of some form of association or loose regional union for more effective common defence and the promotion of mutual trade. Yet at the mere hint of this the Moscow Press, which never utters on international affairs a word distasteful to the Soviet Government, breaks into invective such as the announcement of an offensive military alliance against Russia would hardly justify. The thing, of course, is absurd. Britain and France, the two principal Powers of Western Europe, are both bound to Russia by valuable and specific treaties of alliance ; they are bound to each other so far by nothing at all. The purpose of those treaties was to hold western and eastern Europe together. It is certain that neither Britain nor France will do anything to bring that purpose to nought.
For here, in the possibility of a divided Europe, lies the supreme danger to the whole continent, and indeed to the whole world. That the possibility exists is undeniable, and every effort of every statesman must be devoted to preventing it from becoming a reality. After all, there is something to appeal to. The five Great Powers have all fought the war together, and won it. All of them have subscribed to the general principles contained in the Atlantic Charter and accepted the specific obligations embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Over and above that, Russia and Britain, and Russia and France, are bound, as has been said, ,by direct treaties of alliance. Any further evidence of divergence between them would encourage every subversive element in a perilously disintegrated Europe. The Foreign Ministers' Con- ference will presumably end under the shadow of failure, ill con- cealed by the reference of all unsettled questions to the committee of understudies. Then the silence must be broken and the public be told what it has a right to know. Mr. Bevin will obviously need to make a full and frank statement when Parliament meets ; it might be well for him to take the opportunity of doing it sooner. America will expect a like statement, and so will France. That, if the statements are judicious and firm, will do nothing but good. It may possibly be wise, too, to consider further contacts at a higher level still. More than once M. Molotov seems to have felt it neces- sary to be more nationalist than M. Stalin The three heads of States might succeed better than the Foreign Ministers. Mean- while present disappointments make it more imperative than ever that where closer unity—between Britain and the United States, between Britain and France,—can be achieved it shall be. None of it will be inspired by the remotest thought of antagonism to Russia. A closer understanding and a more effective co-operation with Russia is to be desired above all things. But division in the world of today must be reduced to a minimum. It lies with Russia, more than any nation, to dispel the fear of that altogether.
Previous page
