TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CAPE BLUE-BOOK ON THE JAMESON RAID.
OWING to the enterprise of Messrs. Simpkin and Marshall, who have imported a number of copies a the Report, the English public has now the oppor- tunity of reading at length the evidence laid before the Committee appointed by the Cape Parliament on the Raid. Those who wish to get a clear under- standing of the facts must not be content with the very perfunctory quotations from the Blue-book which have appeared in the daily Press. Those quotations were taken from the Report, which is a mere summary of portions of the evidence. To estimate the full significance of the story unravelled by the Committee the evidence must be read in bulk. On the present occasion we cannot attempt to give a digest of the Blue-book, or to explain as a whole the transactions there described. All we shall attempt to do is to notice important facts to be found in its pages which have not been hitherto made known.
The first of these concerns Mr. Rhodes's complicity with the Raid. It is usually believed that Mr. Rhodes, though be helped to plan the Raid, did everything he could to pre- vent Dr. Jameson moving, and when he did move tried to stop him. As proof of this it is asserted that he drew up a telegram intended to stop Dr. Jameson, but was prevented from sending it owing to the wires being cut. Now, what are the facts as elicited by the inquiry ? On Sunday morning, December 29th, at about midday, Mr. Rhodes received the final telegram from Dr. Jameson, despatched by him from Pitsani on Sunday morning at about 9, and an hour after Captain Heany's arrival. It was in this telegram that Dr. Jameson announced that he should leave for the Transvaal that night. What did Mr. Rhodes do ? His first step was perfectly correct. He drew up a telegram containing an order to Dr. Jameson to stop. Here are its terms :—" Heartily reciprocate your wishes with regard to Protectorate, but the Colonial Office machinery moves slowly, as you know. We are, however, doing our utmost to get immediate transference of what we are justly entitled to. Things in Johannesburg I yet hope to see amicably settled, and a little patience and common-sense is only necessary. On no account whatever must you move. I most strongly object to such a course." But it is one thing to write out a message, another thing to send it. Mr. Stevens, a confidential official of the Chartered Company, and sometime its acting secretary, was given the telegram to despatch. He went to the telegraph office and tried to send off the message but failed on Sunday, though he tried several times, as the wires had been cut at Dr. Jameson's orders. Early on Monday Mr. Stevens again tried to send the message, but the wires had not been restored and he failed. This was the last attempt to get the message through. At noon on Monday, however, com- munication was restored, but no effort was then made to get the message on to the wires. In other words, Mr. Stevens tried assiduously to get Mr. Rhodes's message through as long as the wires were cut. As soon as they were restored his efforts ceased. Perhaps it will be said that this was merely an unfortunate coincidence. Those who are inclined to take this view had better read Mr. Stevens's evidence before the Committee. He was naturally strongly pressed to say why he did not leave the message at the office to be sent on at the earliest moment. He had no explanation to offer for conduct so extraordinary. But we had better quote the examination on this point in full :— " 2896. You left no message at all to go at the earliest oppor- tunity to Mafeking P—No, there was no message left. 2897. Nor on the Monday did you leave any message P—No. 2899. Can you explain that ? Is it not unusual ? If you have a very important or urgent message, would you not save the risk of losing a chance of sending it by leaving it at the office with instructions to send it through with the very earliest opportunity, when it is a matter of the greatest public importance. Don't you do that ?—Not always. 2899. Not when it is a matter of the greatest urgency ? —Yes, but it is not always safe to do that. 2900. Why is it not safe ?—If the line had been open I am perfectly sure the message would have got through. 2901. In fact you were not told that this was a matter of the greatest importance P—It was of the greatest importance. 2902. Were you told that ?-0h, yes. 2903. Then why did you not leave a copy of the message at the office to be sent ?—They could not have sent it. 2904. Why did you not leave it at the office to be sent at the earliest opportunity ?— I was there very late. 2905. Why did you not do that P—I may have been wrong, but I did my best.. I waited at the office late. to get the message through. 2906. You told the Committee that in a matter of urgency you would have left a copy of the message P' — I won't say always. I would rather wait and get connection, but there was no connection with Mafeking then. 2907. Whyt would it not be safe to hand the telegram to the office to transmit.. at the earliest opportunity ?—(No reply.) 2908. It was in code ? — Yes. 2909. You said it would not be safe P—I did try to get it through, but there was no connection. I remained there until late in the evening."
Note that though the officials of the Company did not send on Mr. Rhodes's telegram on the Monday, another telegram, that of the High Commissioner, was sent on the- Monday, was received by Dr. Jameson, and would haver stopped him if he had been willing to be stopped. But perhaps it will be said, as is suggested by Mr. Schreiner, that Mr. Rhodes, though he personally would have like& to stop Dr. Jameson after he had started, did not like to do so out of a sense of loyalty. This is the innuendo in Mr. Rhodes's dramatic conversation with Mr. Schreiner on- the Monday evening. Mr. Schreiner tells us, "I said, Why do you not stop him • although he has ridden in, you can still stop him.' IL said, Poor old Jameson Twentyyears we have been friends, and now he goes in and ruins me. I cannot hinder him. I cannot go and, destroy him." That would, we admit, be a credible and creditable argument if it stood alone. But, unfortunately,. Mr. Rhodes had tried, or says that he had tried, to send a.. stopping telegram on Sunday and on Monday. Indeed, he excused himself for having kept Mr. Schreiner in ignorance about the Raid when he saw him on the Sunday by saying that he then believed he had stopped Dr. Jameson. Mr. Schreiner asked : "'Why did you not say anything to- me yesterday when I was here ? ' and he said then at once, 'I thought I had stopped him. I sent messages to stop. him, and did not want to say anything about it if I stopped him." There is one more point which it is necessary to notice in this connection. It is always as- sumed that Dr. Jameson was neither to hold nor to bind, and that he had got utterly out of Mr. Rhodes's control. We do not read the telegrams quite in this way. For example, on the afternoon of Saturday, December 28th, the day • before Dr. Jameson "rode in, Dr. Harris, the secretary of the Chartered Company and Mr. Rhodes's confidential agent in the whole matter, received the follow- ing telegram from Dr. Jameson :—" Received your tele- gram ichabod re Capt. Maurice Heany. Have no further news. I require to know. Unless I hear definitely to the con- trary, shall leave to-morrow evening, and carry into effect my second telegram of yesterday to you, and it will be all right.' Surely if Mr. Rhodes did not intend Dr. Jameson to move, he would have let him know "definitely to the contrary" without an instant's delay. Possibly Mr.. Rhodes may not have seen the telegram just quoted till the Sunday morning, but if that is so it can hardly have been for any other reason than that Dr. Harris knew that he did not then, at any rate, wish to let Dr. Jameson hear to the contrary. Mr. Rhodes is not the sort of man from whom people keep important messages against his will.
Another incident of a very curious kind is elucidated by the Cape Blue-book. One of the first questions of im- portance that arose after the news of the Raid had spread was, What is going to happen about the Rhodesia Horse ? ' If they could be stopped the danger was likely to be minimised. If they joined Dr. Jameson the mis- chief would be greatly increased. Mr. Rhodes appeared at the time to have acted very properly in this matter. On January let be sent a telegram to Bulawayo to Captain Spreckley, who commanded the Rhodesia Horse, telling him on no account to move. Nothing could have been better, but unfortunately we now know that Dr. Harris telegraphed next day as follows :— " Telegraph No. 1,033. Handed in 10.10 a.m. Despatched 12.36 p.m. From Harris, Cape Town, to Spreckley, Bulawayo.— Rumour from Johannesburg states that Jameson has had a fight and won. I believe he is now safe with his friends in Johannes- burg. You may be quite sure that no one who knows him will leave him even with fifty Proclamations against him.—(Signedl F. R. H., Sec. 2.1.'96."
We shall make no guess as to the exact significance of this telegram, but the message is clearly more or less inconsistent with the order not to move the Rhodesia Horse on any account. Dr. Harris was not evamined before the Cape Committee. Let us trust he will be examined in London, and on the meaning of this telegram. One more matter of importance is brought out by the Cape Blue-book. Our readers will remember that one of the telegrams sent by the Chartered officials—i.e., by Mr. Stevens to Colonel Rhodes—ran as follows :—" Dr. Jameson wires most urgently to urge no postponement of shareholders' meeting, and let J. H. Hammond inform weak partners any delay most injurious. Dr. Wolff will explain fully reasons at directors' meeting. The London Times also cables confidentially to that effect ; post- ponement of meeting would be most unwise course." The able and honourable men who are responsible for the Times when this telegram was published by the Trans- vaal Government at once denied most absolutely that any such telegram was sent, and we need hardly say that we fully accept this denial. We have, then, this fact. The acting secretary of the Chartered Company was instructed by some one to invent, or else himself in- vented, the untrue assertion that the Times had cabled confidentially to urge on the Revolution. A more base and treacherous act than the perpetration of this false- hood about a great paper of honourable standing cannot well be imagined. The question then is, Did Mr. Stevens invent this statement himself, or did he receive it from some one else ? We do not think that any one can read Mr. Stevens's evidence and imagine that he invented it himself. The general result of his evidence, which is singularly incoherent on this point, is that he did not invent the statement, but that it was dictated to him by some one else. Two quotations will be sufficient to show this :— "514. Mr. Merriman. That remarkable telegram of the 15th [this is of course a slip for the 13th] December, which was sent by you, that the London Times also cabled confidentially that postponement of meeting would be most unwise course. I want to know at whose dictation you wrote that tele- gram P—I do not remember, you examined me on it the other day. 515. We want to examine you on it again P—I cannot explain the telegram in any way. 516. Who dictated it to you P—I should not have sent it myself. 517. Who told you to send it P —It may have been dictated to me by Mr. Rhodes, but I should not like to say so certainly. 518. It is a very remarkable telegram P—(No reply.) 519. Mr. Jones. Could any one else have dictated it to you P—Any people dictate telegrams to me, Dr. Harris, Dr. Jameson, anybody."
Here is another portion of Mr. Stevens's evidence on this point :— "553. The telegram of the 13th about the London Times, which you supposed was Dr. Harris's, is one drawn by you P—Yes. 554. Upon instructions direct from Mr. Rhodes P—I would not say direct from Mr. Rhodes, but I would not have sent it without instructions. 555. And from whom would you get instructions, if not from Mr. Rhodes P—Well, I do not think I could have got instructions from any one else, unless it was by letter. 556. You would not draw a telegram like that of your own motion P—No. 557. You do not know anything of what the London Times cabled ? —Oh, no."
It is difficult to read this and doubt that the message came either from Mr. Rhodes or from some other very re- sponsible person. Mr. Stevens would never have dared to wire such a message from the first comer. It is not our business to press home the conclusions that arise from these facts. It is enough for us to say that a monstrous outrage was committed upon the Times by the officials of the Chartered Company at the Cape or their superiors, and that steps ought to be taken to punish the perpetrators of that outrage. No doubt the Times will itself take steps to protect its honour and punish those who have committed so grave an offence against it. But the matter is wider than that, and concerns the whole public. The incident is, perhaps, the meanest and most discreditable, because the falsest, in the whole of the intrigue con- nected with the Raid. Fortunately, the matter can be probed to the bottom when the South African Committee begins its sittings. If Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Harris are examined, one or other of them can be forced to say who invented the false statement about the confidential telegram of the Times.
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