ZANZIBAR. T HE question whether England has gained or lost by
the exchange of Heligoland against Zinzibar is once more before the country. In 1890 we simply accepted facts as we found them. We took over not the Pro- tectorate only, but the Sultan, who needed to be protected. In 1893 we had for the first time to consider on what lines we should hold and govern the island for the future. The arrangement with Germany covered all European rights._ What we had to take into account was, first, the welfare of the native population, and next, the interests of the Empire at large. The Sultan had become a mere instru- ment of the British Government. He had died, and our obligations to him, whatever they were, had died with him. We were free to act in whatever way seemed best, calculated to bring about the results we had in view. The determination then arrived at—after what amount of con- sideration we do not know—was to continue the order of things which we had found in existence when we assumed, the Protectorate. We set up another Sultan. If we were right in what we did then, we have now an opportunity of repeating the experiment. If we were wrong, we have now an opportunity of mending our ways. Sultan Hamid is dead, and it rests with Great Britain to appoint his successor or to leave him to figure in the obscure annals of Eastern Africa as the last of his line. The events of the last three days have, if anything,. enlarged our freedom of action. This time we were not confronted by a submissive claimant to the throne asking nothing better than a renewal of the favour shown. to his predecessor, and contented to reign as the creature and servant of Great Britain. A new Sultan of Zanzibar- at once mounted the throne, but it was in defiance of the protecting Power. Khalid, the cousin of the late Sultan, had Hamid buried within a few hours of his death, declared himself his successor, and occupied the Palace and the Palace Square with a force variously esti- mated at from two thousand to two thousand five hundred men. To meet this state of affairs, the officers commanding the three British ships in the harbour, landed one hundred and fifty men. Except as a protest,. this measure could be of no avail; but on Wednesday two more vessels arrived, one of them being the flagship of the Admiral commanding at the Cape station, and the British. force on shore was at once increased to five hundred men. After the arrival of this reinforcement, an ultimatum was despatched giving Khalid the choice between complete surrender or the bombardment of the Palace. And the Palace has been bombarded accordingly and Khalif) disposed of. By this act the pretender has lost any title he could have hoped to set up. Protectorates may vary one from another in many particulars, but at least they have this in common,—that the protecting Power has a right to be consulted on the question of the succession. Still, though the English Government could, have no hesitation as to its attitude towards Khalid, it may still hesitate as to whom and what it shall ultimately set up in his place. Shall the authority exercised by Sultan Hamill remain with a native suc- cessor or pass to an English official? Twice in three years has the choice between these alternatives been presented to Great Britain. It is not often that Govern- ments have the option of undoing what they have done and making a fresh start after so short an interval. We are aware indeed that a successor has actually been proclaimed to the dead Sultan. This was probably a necessary act pending reference to the Foreign Office, but there is no reason why it should settle the ques- tion definitely and for ever. We have no doubt that Hamud, the new Sultan, would be quite willing to be mediatised on a good allowance. As it is, the Sultan has no power beyond what we have chosen to lend him for the- time being, and the transference from nominal sovereignty to actual mediatisation might be accomplished without the slightest difficulty.
We have said that our action ought to be determined by two considerations,—the welfare of the native popula- tion and the interests of the British Empire. The former virtually resolves itself into the question,—Under which• system will the suppression of slavery be best carried out ? In some cases no doubt the problem has other elements. Though the tranquillity and material, prosperity of a country may be best consulted by its annexation to the immediate dominions of the British Crown, the happiness of the inhabitants may not be promoted to anything like the same extent. As regards this latter object questions of sentiment count for some- thing. When we open up trade and at the same time close careers, we may not always be conferring a benefit. Unfortunatelythe native notion of a career is often one which is irreconcilable with the peaceful following out of other people's careers. It is to harry the country as a conquering soldier or to plunder it as a successful Vizier. But in Zanzibar this is not an aspect of the situation that we need stop to regard. There are no careers there to be made or marred. What is there is a survival of slavery with which we have hitherto found it difficult to deal effectually. Slavery in Zanzibar has become a familiar subject for questions in the House of Commons, and it cannot be said that the answers have always been satis- factory.• So long as slavery exists, in however modified a form—and in the case of Zanzibar we are sometimes tempted to think that there is more reason to be sure about the slavery than about the modifications—a radically wrong estimate of the practice of keeping slaves is neces- sarily formed, and where opportunities for its commission offer themselves, the crime of obtaining fresh slaves by capture will not be very severely judged. It is too obvious to need proof that the suppression of slavery will be easier under English law, to which such a status is unknown, than under native law, in which it is a recog- nised and familiar incident. From this point of view, therefore, the weight of argument seems to be all on the side of annexation. It is easier to manage our own subjects than the subjects of another man, even when that other man is a protected native Sovereign. Slavery and the slave-trade will alike be more promptly disposed of when Zanzibar is under British rule than while it is only under British protection.
From the point of view of Imperial interests, we are disposed to take the same view. There may, of course, be special circumstances, with which we are not acquainted, that make immediate annexation inexpedient. But we find it hard to imagine what they are. British trade with Zanzibar is growing, and contains large possibilities of development. We refuse to believe that if the island passed under the direct rule of the Crown, English traders, or those with whom they do business, would be placed in a worse position than they are in now. Local opinion, we are told, is in favour of "taking this opportunity to hoist the British flag, and to abolish Arab rule once and for all." In this case, we imagine, local opinion stands for English opinion on the spot, or, as the Times puts it, for the opinion of those who are "immersed in Zanzibar affairs." But then, our contemporary goes on to say, " a course which seems easy and natural to persons locally concerned may have fewer attractions for statesmen charged with the care of Imperial interests." No doubt that is true. Statesmen charged with the care of Imperial interests have necessarily to take a -comprehensive survey of affairs. They have to inquire how the action of England in one continent may affect her reputation or her policy in another continent. To all appearance, however, our position in Zanzibar is more than commonly isolated. We squared Germany in 1890, and when that feat was accomplished, there was no one else left to square. But the remark of the Tinws may be true in another sense, and that a sense in which it less deserves consideration. There has of late been some reason to think that statesmen charged with the care of Imperial interests have a tendency to be afraid of their obligations,—to look about to see if some expedient for lessening them may not be discovered. At one time the device in favour is a Protectorate, at another a Chartered Company. But in each case the motive for adopting it is a desire to enjoy the advantages of Empire without accepting its full burdens. We do not believe that this attempt is ever successful. For other reasons, expedients that stop short of complete incorporation with the British Empire may have their place and use. But if they are adopted simply to save trouble or cost they will never be successful. That is not the temper in which Empires are sither made or maintained.
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