• TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE POWERS AND MOROCCO.
rrHE dramatic rout of Abd-ul-Aziz's army is one of those definite events for which Europe has long been waiting, and one which must be used to shape European policy. A little patience, it is true, may still be necessary before the problem clears, for although Mulai Hafid is now Sultan of Morocco in form, it remains doubtful what support he will have from his subjects when it becomes commonly known that he wishes to govern with European sanction. But we cannot help feeling that the Moroccan tangle has become greatly simplified in the last few days. And this relief—we write as having no particular leaning either to Abd-ul-Aziz or Mulai Hafid on their personal merits—was the more welcome that it was unexpected. European information about Morocco was hardly less at fault than our information about Turkey on the eve of the revolution. We were told by correspondents, and even by French officers on the spot, that Abd-ul-Aziz was recovering lost ground ; that his advance from Rabat, which had been his tent of Achilles for months, to Marakesh, the Southern capital, was something like a triumphal progress ; that tribesmen hastened to lay offers of loyal service at his feet ; and that Marakesh would fall as soon as he cared to attack it. All that bubble is burst. The offers of loyal service turn out to have been a care- fully laid train of baits to decoy Abd-ul-Aziz to his doom. The vicissitudes of the civil war were the figments of observers in the dark, and corresponded to their varying degrees of perplexity. The star of Abd-ul-Aziz has declined steadily from the time that Mulai Hafid was proclaimed Sultan in the South, and its extinction was inevitable.
With this enlightenment of the matter we see how ridiculous it has been to say, as some dissident Frenchmen and a few Englishmen have done, that France has been secretly aiding the cause of Abd-ul-Aziz,—trying to thrust his sovereignty upon an unwilling people because he was likely to be a more amenable agent of French ambitions than hii brother. When Abd-ul-Aziz bestirred himself at last and marched out of Rabat on the road to Marakesh, he was forbidden to move through the territory under French control. He had to take his chance along a way exposed to his enemy's attacks. Was that giving him French aid? And before then, the French army, during its operations in the Shawia district, again and again looked the other way when Mulai Hafid's adherents came near. Was that suppressing Hafidism in the interests of Abd-ul-Aziz? The fact is that France recognised Abd-ul- Aziz only so far as she was bound to do. The Algeciras Act assumed his sovereignty, and France, as one of the mandatories of that Act, accepted the assumption. Frankly, we cannot understand the state of mind which argues, in the interests of peace in Morocco and else- where, that France ought to have renounced Abd-ul-Aziz when he fell into difficulties, or even have declared in favour of somebody else not recognised by the other Powers. We do not believe in conciliating other nations by stealing a march on them. France, we say, could not have behaved otherwise. She has regarded Abd-ul-Aziz as Sultan, but she has not helped him to remain Sultan. As M. Lautier remarks in the Figaro, General d'Amade's ten thousand men could easily have turned the scale in his favour. The proof that this was not thought of is that the balance has fallen heavily on the other side. The one mistake in policy into which France, in our judgment, has been in danger of falling was an excess of military enterprise against the tribesmen. The good sense of France, however, was against allowing herself to be com- mitted to adventures from which withdrawal would have been difficult, if not impossible, and we believe that the danger is past. ' Thu attitude of the Powers towards the new Sultan has now to be considered. It has often been said that Mulai Haficl is well disposed towards foreigners, and the fact that be sent a delegation to the Powers, which for all we know is still touring Europe, proves that he understands the value of their support. On the other hand, he probably would never have been proclaimed if he bad not been looked upon as the champion of Morocco for the people of Morocco, whereas his- brother was held to have sold his soul to the foreigner. How will Mulai Hafid be able to reconcile these two conditions,—the Holy War passion of his people which swept him up to the throne, and the absolute need of the help of Europe which is the very object of that hatred ? So far as the signs go at present, Mulai Hafid means to deal openly with Europe, and trust to his skill, or good luck, in appeasing his people. It is fortunate for him that he has the services of El Menebbi, who can mediate between Europe, which he understands, and his own country, which he loves, as perhaps no other man in Morocco could. El Meneblii is brave and wise, and is trusted by every European in Tangier ; he is liked as a sportsman by Englishmen, and as an engaging personality by all. If Abd-ul-Aziz had not been persuaded to get rid of him years e when he was Minister of War, the civil War might ago, ended differently now. Already El Menebhi, who, by the way, owes his life to British protection, has shown his goodwill and pluck by going out to the hills and calming the Hafidists, who were showing an ugly temper. He told them that the French and Spanish police were necessary to keep order, but that they were a Maklizan force, and he added that any disturber of the peace would find his neck in danger. The tribesmen, whether they trusted or feared him, departed quietly to their homes. But before Europe enters into official relations with Mulai Hafid he must, of course, make it perfectly plain what his inten- tions are. Europe will not appeal to him ; he must appeal to Europe. He must formally accept the Algeciras Act—the Times correspondent at Tangier says that he has already written to the Legations that he is willing to do so—and he must take over such obligations of his defeated brother as the Powers think necessary. Till he has shown his hand there is naturally very little for the Powers to do, and. that is why we said at the beginning that patience may still be required. Of course Mulai Hafid may find the more fanatical of his subjects intract- able, and a new Pretender may arise to preach yet another Holy War ; instead of directing the storm, Mulai Hafid may find that the storm directs him. But if be is a man of sense, as he is said to be, be must run these unavoidable risks, for the country is almost bankrupt, and a helping hand from Europe can alone save it. Some people seem hastily to have assumed that the Act of Algeciras will ho cancelled, and a new instrument be substituted for it. We earnestly hope that nothing of the sort will be attempted. The Algeciras Act, which emerged from a period of perilous quarrelling, expresses well enough the sense of Europe. A new Algeciras Conference might end disastrously ; and even if it -did not, we should expect from it no better compromise than we have got. All that is needed now is friendly communications among the Powers, without any fuss, as to transferring the Agreement made at Algeciras bodily to the new circumstances. And then Mulai Hafid, if he gives the guarantees of which we have spoken, would be recognised, not by any one Power, but by all the Powers at the same moment. France and Spain, whose "special position" in Morocco is admitted, might legitimately take the lead in communicating with the other countries ; but it really would not matter much how it was done. It would be a sad reflection on diplomacy if it could not arrange these affairs without throwing down another bone of con- tention to be snarled over internationally.
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