THE ANNEXATION OF THE CONGO STATE. T HE procedure of annexing
the Congo Free State to Belgium will present itself more clearly to the mind if it is regarded as consisting of two distinct parts : the first the sanction of the Belgian Parliament, and the second the sanction of the Powers which signed the Berlin Act. The first step has virtually been taken, as no one supposes for a moment that the Belgian Senate will refuse, or even trouble to deliberate long over, what the Chamber has passed ; the second step belongs to the future. Till we know more precisely what is passing between the signatories of the Berlin Act and the Belgian Government we cannot speak of the question of annexation as settled. The responsibility Of the Powers for the Congo natives is as clear as anything can be ; their consent cannot be dispensed with. Whatever room there may be for various interpretations of the Berlin Act—and the Belgian inter- pretation of course differs from • ours—there can be no doubt about this, that Britain agreed to the formation of the Free State chiefly in the interests of the natives. That reason was urged upon the British people by men of high standing and character, and in this country the horror of the Leopoldian regime has been felt—and it has been very deeply felt—in direct proportion to the public sense of sharing in the scandal. While annexation was being dis- cussed in the Belgian Chamber we purposely said very little on the subject, as comment from outsiders was likely to do more harm than good. A serene international atmosphere was the only favourable one, and we had no wish to help others in disturbing it, as one might easily have done with even the best intentions. The opinions'of the British nation were already known, and Sir Edward Grey was actually impressing them on the Belgian Government while the debates were in progress. At last the Belgian Govern- ment have carried their scheme through the Chamber in what we take to be practically its final form, for the amend- Ments of the Senate will probably be slight. It does not give any guarantee in so many words that the economic Conditions of native labour, which are the first and last cause of all the misery, will be reversed. That is undoubtedly a disappointment. We still believe, however, that the intentions of the Belgian Government are as high principled as become an enlightened people; and, indeed, Sir Edward Grey said in the House of Commons on July 30th that the Belgian Government "carry the matter as far as it can be carried by general assurances," and that "the line taken by the Belgian Government is very different from that taken by the Congo Government." It remains, therefore, for the good intentions of the Belgian Government to be embodied in more definite undertakings, and that is the end which Sir Edward Grey, strongly aided by the United States Government, is still trying to reach. The existence of "general assurances" is much, and if only the present Belgian Government were able to carry out all that they wish, we might rest content. But other Governments will take their place, and—most ominous fact of all—the wording of the Colonial Law may mean much or little, according to the character of the Government in power. Even the present Belgian Government might fail radically to change the character of the Congo administration in spite of themselves. Therefore Sir Edward Grey no doubt feels that he would be untrue to the whole meaning of the Berlin Act if he did not receive more precise promises in exchange for the permission to exercise sovereignty. We await the result of his negotiations—which lead to what we have called the second part of the procedure of annexation— with anxiety, but still with hopefulness. We admit that it is a great thing that the Belgian people are willing to accept the burden of colonial rule. They will be directly interested in it ; they will know what is happening, and it is inconceivable that they should sit down com- placently under a story of such wrongs as have been committed in the past. What we hope tiC.: see secured by the requirements of the Powers would really be a strengthening of their hands, for the Belgian Government would be equipped with definite authority to change entirely the economic conditions of native labour. Unless that change is effected, we fear there will be no happiness for the Congo.
Let us state briefly once more what the economic con- ditions are, and show why no improvement is possible till they are reversed. The Congo Government, professing a right to vacant lands, used this excuse to appropriate the lands held by the natives on communal tenure. They have kept part of these lands for themselves, and have granted the rest to concessionary companies. The Government and their partners have established a monopoly in the produce of the soil. The source of all wealth has thus been taken from the natives ; they have no means of trading. Yet they are required to pay taxes, and the only way in which they can do so is by a. "labour tax,"—by giving their labour instead of the money or produce which- they have not got. Fixed amounts of rubber have to be brought to the tax-collectors at regular intervals. The natives who fail to do this are sternly punished. In many districts they have to make long journeys through dangerous forests to gather the rubber. They have little or no time which is not spent in the crushing labour necessary to pay the tax. They are cheered by no prospect of winning back their independence under the present system. The mortality is terrible. The whole miserable business is slavery of an odious kind passing under another name. Chapter and verse for these charges were given in the recent White- book ; and, if other evidence were needed, the charges were confirmed in the Belgian Report of 1906. The atrocities which shocked the world formerly were all part and parcel of this method of taxation, which has no parallel anywhere. We believe that Sir Edward Grey .is applying himself first of all to this labour question, and we are heartily glad of it ; for if British concern for the Congo is quite obviously not prompted by selfishness, our motives are less likely to be misunderstood. For a long time we have suffered from a great disadvantage ; it has been commonly believed in Belgium that we had an axe to grind. A fair statement of the issues before us must, none the less, mention the breakdown of the freedom of trade guaranteed by the Berlin Act. After the native labour question, this freedom of trade is the next matter in importance. The taking up of the whole land by the Government and the concessionary companies has shut out, or at least made very difficult, the enterprises of outsiders. We should not complain, however, of having to wait a very long fume for the restoration of the freedom of trade if only the communal lands were restored to the natives so that they might have the means to pay their taxes in their own way. As a matter of fact, we fancy that the simultaneous restoration of the lands and of the freedom of trade would be the simplest and wisest policy ; the natives would recover their independence quicker in free markets, and the loss to the State through the non-payment of taxes would probably be less. But we have no wish to interfere un- necessarily. The native labour question is by far the more pressing of the two, and let us remember that it concerns the whole Congo territory. So much has been said about the Crown Domain, which is the private property of King Leopold, that it has been rather forgotten that the abuses, so far as the natives are concerned, are the same elsewhere, even though the profits do not go into the King's pocket. Sir Edward Grey is no doubt trying to screw up to a higher pitch the proposal of the Belgian Government to grant lands to the natives. The granting of lands was promised among the Congo reforms of 1906. Nothing came of it ; and not very much, we fear, could come of it now unless it amounted to the nearest possible equivalent which the circumstances permit to a restoration of the communal lands. The natives, of course, are scattered and have dwindled in numbers, but a substantial policy of restoration is the only true solution. We shall not be satisfied, as we have often said, unless the economic conditions of native labour are reversed.
It is earnestly to be hoped that Sir Edward Grey, with the invaluable help of the United States, will bring about an agreement among all parties which will involve neither a surrender of conscience nor international bitterness. We take it that the Belgian Government desire just what we desire, and all we ask is that the methods of attaining it should be accurately stated. Naturally Englishmen look upon the beginning of Belgium's colonial career with the utmost sympathy. Without experience in these matters, she desires to take over a territory larger than Europe ; and she engages in this adventure for a good end. Although we contemplate the future anxiously, it would be ungenerous not to pay a tribute to the fine services of those Belgians who have made the Treaty of Annexation, the Additional Act (which buys the King out of the Crown Domain), and the Colonial Law (which provides for the administration of the Congo) as good as they are. The original ludicrous terms proposed by the King were resisted and amended ; the Belgian Parliament, to its credit, refused to let the King have the money while the people had the disgrace. Further, Parliament has provided for its own Constitu- tional control over the Budget and administration of the Congo. The whole financial problem is terribly difficult. The estimates of the revenues of the Congo as they were laid before the Chamber were calculated on the assumption that forced labour would be retained. The chief authority on the Congo in the Belgian Cabinet actually said : "Forced labour is necessary, or civilisation will be arrested." We are sure that the Belgian people do not agree with him. If forced labour is abolished, however, Belgium may be for years in the position of a farmer who begins to cultivate land which has had everything "taken out of it." Probably Belgians expect the colony to cost them a good deal at first, and are prepared to pay the bill. If that be so—if the Government have not pretended that the Congo is a good speculation—Britain and the United States ehould be able to induce the Belgian Cabinet more easily than some people expect to assent fearlessly in writing to the claims that are advanced both by conscience and Treaty rights.
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