TOPICS OF THE DAY.
WAR, OR PEACE ?
TT is the duty of every journalist, no doubt, to avoid writing so as to stimulate warlike passion, and even, so long as there is hope of peace, to be reserved in his expressions ; but we deny that it is his duty either to conceal his information or to misrepresent his convictions. If the conductors of the Daily .News believed, as we do not doubt was the case, that they had good reason for their statement of Monday as to the im- minence of war, they were right in publishing it, even at the risk of annoying or alarming those whose interest is peace. It is not their business to protect the speculations of the " bulls." We have no secrets to reveal, and have as regards war a per- manent distrust of what is called " special information ;" but we cannot keep back our impression that the pessi- mists are for once in the right, and that while war may be avoided either by accident or by a change in the combinations, the more reasonable calculation is that it will occur, and that within a closely limited time. It is admitted on all hands that the nations are getting ready and are expecting war, and it is seen that such petty incidents as transpire—for example, the recent purchase of tinned meats for France by the hundred ton—point to contingencies in the near future ; but putting both aside, what is the situation when broadly viewed ? Is it not this, that three of the great Military Powers may have an interest in immediate war ? We take it that a Continental ruler, whether Sovereign, statesman, or General, usually acts on his conception of his interest—which includes, of course, his country's interest— that he is not much influenced by moral scruples, and that he is not swayed at all by the soft-heartedness which has in this country of late been so great a factor in all policy. If the object is, in his judgment, worth an expenditure of ten thousand men, he expends them, without much consideration of the men expended. Such being the rulers, how do matters stand I Clearly, as it seems to us, if the Czar has, as he appears from Prince Bismarck's speech to have, liberty to fight Austria, provided only that he takes no territory from her on the conclusion of the war, his interest is to fight her,—that is, to clear once for all his road to Constantinople. His reward would be the conquest, veiled or explicit, of the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula, the certainty that he could attack Constantinople at his own dis- cretion, and the rebuilding of his autocracy, now shaking from internal troubles. The very rouble would rise if a pitched battle were won. The Czar, in truth, has every motive for war, if only it could be war with limited liability ; and if Ger- many were neutral, or too hampered to interfere, the war would be precisely of that kind. Austria can no more invade Russia than an angry bull can invade a house. That this is the opinion of the Austrian Government is certain, for it has ordered the Reserve men due for service in April to appear on February 10th, has purchased a million pairs of boots for the Landsturm, and has directed the million men of that force to appear with yellow badges on their arms if summoned before uniforms are ready. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to believe that the Russian Government may intend war. On the other hand, Prince Bismarck, if, as he says, he feels certain that France intends an invasion, must feel it his interest to fight now. France is growing stronger every day. His great master, whom he understands, and who understands him, cannot in the nature of things remain much longer on earth, and the next Sovereign may not be so cordially his friend. He himself is growing old, and sees his work still insecure. He must feel that his interest is victory, and towards victory, if he fights now, he possesses, first, the greatest strategist of the age, now also very old ; secondly, an Army in such condition as no Army ever was ; and thirdly, the pre- cise advantage which enabled him to defeat Austria so rapidly, a weapon which broke the hearts of the private soldiers on the other side. He has the repeating-rifle, and the French have not ; and that advantage may disappear twelve months hence. Unless, therefore, he has hope of avoiding war—which he flatly denies—or secretly dreads Russian bad faith, the interest of Germany is to fight quickly, and it is his rule to consider that interest alone. While, therefore, we hold it folly for any man but himself to say that he will fight, we maintain that alarm lest he should fight, and fight now, is most entirely reasonable. As to pretexts, there are always pretexts, and the one given in the Berlin Post will do passing well. Prinoe Biimarek has only to ask the French Government and
Chambers for a distinct declaration that France neither seeks nor desires to abrogate the Treaty of 1870, and in the certain refusal is his pretext ready-made.
But France ? It is possible to take many views of the situation in France ; but, as we believe, the most reasonable one is this. The French cultivated classes and the French peasantry are disinclined to war, and full of a vague alarm as to its possible result, an alarm so deep that wealthy Parisians are anxiously providing refuges for their families whenever war breaks out. They doubt, in fact, if Germany be not the stronger Power. On the other hand, the Army and the populace of Paris think the time has arrived for " the revanche," and believe that while the material force of France is at its highest, she has at last found a competent General-in- Chief. This belief may seem to Englishmen folly, as General Boulanger is untried in great commands ; but it is the truth, affirmed by all French testimony, by that of the competent Englishman who writes on foreign politics in the new Fortnightly, and by the patent fact that the Opportunists, who hate and dread General Boulanger, dare not venture to remove him. It is next to certain that this is the opinion of the General about his own competence ; and if he is confident, why should he wait ? To see the German Staff add fifty thousand more to their thoroughly drilled men ? It is almost impossible that General Boulanger, if he is the able and ambitious man he is said to be, should not reflect that his present position is unprecedented ; that he is the favourite alike of the Regular Army and of the "Army of the Revolution," the populace of Paris, which alone could protect the Chambers against a military coup d'e'tat ; and that this condition of affairs cannot last long, and may disappear as suddenly as it has arisen. He has not, it is true, the repeating-rifle ; but French Generals are believed to say that, although this rifle must be purchased, its efficacy in battle in the hands of soldiers who already fire too fast is more than questionable. His interest is to act at once, while the flood runs with him ; and with the Army now so strong, the Chamber now so fickle, and the financial difficulty so rapidly closing in, he may well believe that it is his country's interest too. An ambitious man generally does believe that it is his country's interest to let him rule it ; and all the acts of the General, while they leave his ability in no doubt, indicate a man of profound, though not necessarily dishonourable, ambition. He may desire only to be President, or permanent Minister of War ; but even to realise those objects, he must have won a great victory in the field against the only enemy victory over whom would re-establish the confidence of France in her military headship among mankind. We hold it, there- fore, reasonable to believe that General Boulanger will go to war if he can, and that while anxiously securing the benefit of all remaining time, and averring that war is of all things furthest from his thoughts, he will not be sorry if the war comes quickly, and comes from the German side.
With the great military States all armed, with their rulers strongly attracted towards immediate action, and with the whole European world listening eagerly to every word of com- mand, it is folly to write, as some English journals do, as if an anticipation of war were treason to the cause of peace, and still greater folly to allege, as the French journals do, that those who expect war wish for it. All England, say the newspapers of Paris, thirsts for a Continental war, in order that she may steal Egypt. Our countrymen scarcely remember Egypt, and war, whatever its beginning or its end, will not help them one whit towards the object they really desire, the pacification of Ireland. There is, in truth, in this country no wish for war whatever, except among the few who hold that peace is now impossible until the Powers have become exhausted. All sensible persons in England see clearly that the war will be deadly, that it will atop social progress for years, that it will develop instead of curing militarism, and that it will either place a new burden of taxation on the nations, or lead to partial repudiation and consequent loss of credit. Englishmen have absolutely nothing to gain by the war, and, so far as we can see, as regards Western Europe do not even take sides. They would grieve to see Germany de- feated, because that would be to place an unquiet State at the head of the world, and they would grieve to see France defeated, because that would throw her, perhaps permanently, into the arms of Russia. They would welcome, almost to a man, a disarmament of both Powers, or even the discovery of a modus vivendi ; and it is only as observant spectators averse to the idea of war that they perceive so keenly, and, as we fear, so accurately, the signs of its near approach. May the omens be averted, but they will not be the more terrifying because Englishmen discuss them with their cool, though, we admit, sometimes over-arrogant, impartiality. It is the order for rifles, not the mention of it, which facilitates war.
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