THE CRISIS IN FRANCE. T HERE are dangers ahead in this
French crisis which are hardly perceived in this country, but of which we are told local politicians are very keenly aware, and regard with dismay or hope according to their fear of a revolution or their desire for it. One in particular influences every vote and scene within the Chamber. M. Maine and his Cabinet may be overthrown in the mel6e, and his successor, who will almost certainly be either M. Cavaignac or M. Bourgeois, may take a very different view of the whole business. He may decide that the regime of secrecy discredits France, and must at all hazards be abandoned, in which case two possible consequences, both of them sufficiently serious, must immediately be faced. There is the chance that the Russian Court, in a fit of annoyance at the revelation of its doubts as to the good faith of the French Ministry, doubts which caused it to seek secret information, may prefer an understanding with Germany to an alliance with France ; and there is the danger that the French Army, conceiving its honour affronted, may insist upon placing it in the custody of a military President, a Dictator, or even an Emperor or a King. The first danger does not strike us, looking on as impartial spec- tators, as very grave. The Russian diplomatists have done nothing not sanctioned by the diplomatic usages of the Continent, and will only smile when they are found out, and we cannot see why, if the French Government, which knows the whole truth, has condoned a bit of un- scrupulous espionage, the French people should be con- sidered certain to refuse to pardon it. They are not a people incapable of finesse, or very malignant against diplomatic tricks. They are much more likely to laugh sardonically at the ways of diplomacy and go on flattering the Czar, who, again, is surrounded by able men who will point out that in the Far East, as in the domain of finance, the French alliance is an assistance worth much money and some disagreeable compliances. The other danger is much more immediate. We do not affect to know secrets, but the fact that M. Meline is afraid of revealing some circumstance connected with the Dreyfus trial which will greatly affect those who control the Army, seems to us written all over the report of the recent debates. French- men are never mules, and the Premier's mulish adherence to his two texts, that the res judicata is "sacred," and that he is bound to protect "the honour of the Army," and "especially "—or was it "also" ?—the honour of the War Office, seems to us inspired by a conviction that there is a military secret which he absolutely must keep, or the chiefs of the Army will break with the Republic. What this second secret can be we cannot even guess, but of its existence we are morally convinced, and so, we imagine, is the French Chamber, which in spite of the deep anger caused by the whole affair, and the universal opinion that it has been grossly mismanaged, still gives, avowedly to protect the Army, a steady majority to M. Meline. If he falls it is felt that everything may come out, and that the General Election, which cannot be postponed, may take place amidst a scene of moral anarchy, during which everything will be possible, and especially a declaration from the Army that it can put up with the blunders and feeblenesses of government by talkers no longer. This declaration would almost certainly be made if it were found impos- sible to form a Government prepared to keep Army secrets, or if during the elections things seemed lapsing into anarchy ; and once made the Republic would either vanish or be transformed in character.
For it must not be forgotten that the masters of the Army are still the masters of France. The Republic has not altered that fact in the smallest degree, rather it has intensified it, for the first object of successive War Ministers has been to reinvigorate military discipline until it is now as stringent, not to say as terrible, as it has ever been in Germany. The fear of disobeying a definite order from a superior is upon the whole Army, officers as well as private soldiers, regiments as well as individuals. That is a most excellent change for the Army considered as a grand instrument of national defence, but it has this further consequence, that it makes of the Minister of War the most important personage in France. This is felt by all politicians, and whenever a political difficulty occurs the tone of the Army is silently watched by men whose perceptions are quickened by vivid apprehension. General Boulanger, for example, when Minister of War was observed as closely as if he had been an enemy, and even when he was out of office it was held by men like M. Constans that he must, if he gave an opportunity, be arrested, for if he made a " demonstration " the Army might not assent to his defeat. Only on Tuesday of this week the Minister of War publicly acknowledged this feeling from the tribune, and endeavoured to soothe it away by saying "his one desire was to make a national Army which would always keep aloof from politics, and would have nothing in common with a Pretorian oligarchy." General Billot, though he uses much foolish—because feeble—rhetoric, is believed to be an honest Republican as well as a capable soldier of the organising type, but he cannot alter the central fact of the situation. The group of great officers who govern the French Army do form a " Pretorian oligarchy," because they cannot help it, because the discipline of the Army is perfect, and because if they are provoked into effective action there is nothing to resist them. It is a• religion with the officers that" the barracks must not fire, as they do or did in Spain, upon one another ;" that is, the Army when it moves must move as a mass, and if it moves as a mass at the tinkling of an electric bell in the War Office, where is the resisting force to be found ? There is none even to be thought of except the populace ; and the Army, with its Maxims and weapons of precision, would disperse the populace, if it rose simultaneously in all the cities of France, in five and twenty minutes. The scene by the Church of St. Roch as described by Carlyle would be nothing to it, for the Sectioners who fought then had equal arms with the soldiers and some tincture of regi- mental order. Power of this complete kind is always formidable ; and when it is in the hands of French Generals who have a traditional contempt for civilians, who have their own notion of the "honour of the Army," and whose belief it is that they were greatest under tho Emperors, it is very formidable indeed. We do not wonder that when the Generals begin to pull their moustaches the Government and the Deputies take to walking so warily that they sometimes seem not to be moving at all.
If the danger should become acute, as we still incline, viewing the fury of the parties, to believe it will, what an object-lesson we should all receive on the futility of human calculations. It is only yesterday, as it were, that the adhesion of the Pope seemed, by pulverising the Monarchical parties, to place the future of the Republic beyond all question, and make the sovereignty of the electors as safe as it is in Switzerland, or the United States, or the United Kingdom. The opposing parties were broken to pieces, all Pretenders bad disappeared, and it was more than possible that at the coming election 90 per cent. at least of the Deputies returned would be Re- publicans of different shades of thought. M. Faure, the glorified Lord Mayor, seemed to be as safe in his seat as a Hohenzollern or a Romanoff. Suddenly a suspicion arose that a Jewish officer from Alsace, condemned for selling military secrets, had been unfairly tried, there was a cry for a new trial, the whole nation took sides, the Jewish people and the Army were involved as corporations, and in a few days it was at least possible that the Republic might be upset. If it were upset, or if, which is more likely, a military dictatorship were evolved within the Republic itself, the great alliances of Europe would be worth nothing, the elaborate arrangements for securing peace would become mere words, and every country in the world, from Spain to China, would be placed in a new position as regards all the remainder of mankind. The Governments and the diplomatists, and, we greatly fear, the Treasuries, of the different States would have to begin their combinations afresh ; all business men would halt like ants interrupted by a falling pebble ; and all who possess securities would be poorer by, say, some eight hundred millions. No one will say that the chance is outside speculation, or even calculation, and yet if it occurred where is the limit to be found of its possible results? We confess we grow impatient of the theory once so prevalent, that it is easy to govern the world, and that it matters but little whether competent or incom- petent men are at the head of affairs. Suppose a great man had been in M. Meline's place, and had dared, if Dreyfus is innocent, to retry him, or if he is guilty, to reveal to the world the proofs by which, as we read the affair, that guilt must have been proved to a Court- Martial's satisfaction.
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