THE SECOND FAILURE IN GALLIPOLI • [To the Editor of
THE SPECTATOR.] SIR,—The Australian Official Historian's comments on matters of historical fact are, of course, unexceptionable ; and his opinion that "personal intervention by the higher commander is a dangerous cure" for failure in leadership is doubtless equally unexceptionable under average conditions of warfare. However, it may be pertinent to observe that a battle fought over so small an area as that of Sari Bair offered an unusual opportunity for higher personal leadership—, as the Turks theniselVes were to dernotiStrate in the redoubtable person of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the future President of the Turkish Republic; and that the German. coinmander, Marshal Linuin von Sanders. did not subscribe to Dr. Bean's point of view in his own conduct of this battle. Half way through it he 'dismissed the hesitant conunander of the Turkish forces without warning. and replaced him by Mustafa Kemal, who forthwith counter-attacked at Stavin. and on the following morning counter-attacked at Anzac.
It may further be observed that Mustafa Kemal was a general who made a practice of going to see for himself. At Anzac, after a " daring personal reconnaissance" of the British position on Chunuk Hair, he settled on his objective. concentrated his force, launched his counter-attack which " placed the Turks in undisputed Imssession of the main Sair flair ridge "—and finished off time campaign. During these episodes the British divisional general in actual command of " the operation on Sari Bair "--as stated in the English official history—" had never seen the ground, or had 31Ily idea what it looked like." His headquarters remained estab- lished within a few hundred yards of the sea. Throughout the battle not a single officer from corps visited the head- quarters of the New Zealand Brigade on the edge of Clumuk flair—the nodal point °title battle. At the time when Mustafa' Kemal was making his personal reconnatissamee of the British position the corps commander and the commander of the operation were conferring by the seashore and bemoaning the lack of personal drive in the command at Suvla. Hence the comment in my book--which Dr. Bean would appear to deprecate : " The corps commander, whose plain it was, might have been expected to spare no effort to bring it to
success. In actual fact his headquarters staff really knew time Peninsula, and had the invaluable asset of local knowledge—played little or no part in the battle." To this extent—and to ahis 'extent only– can the hook be said to ascribe to General Birdwood ." responsibility for the second failure in Gallipoli."
The other day Captain Liddell Hart observed that " the Great War has been lying-in-state strangely long." I am acutely aware of the validity of this observation. Sir lam Hamilton was kind enough to remark of the book over the radio that " it was written as it might be in the year A.D. 2(100" ; but your reviewer—understandably enough, in view of his distinguished personal associations with the campaign—would appear to -have approached it in terms of present-day personalities. For this reason I should be Nvry grateful if you willallow me to note that I quote Dr. Beau's• description. of General Birdwood as " one of the greatest leaders of men possessed by the British Arany during the War," and that I add that- he was a leader whom the Austra- lians would have followed " to death and beyond." Never. timeless, in the highly difficult cireurnstanms of the battle of Sari Bair there would _appear to be considerable significance in_ Dr. Bean's further comment that he lacked " the cast of mind peculiar to an organiser " ; for it is hardly in disputa.' that there can rarely have been a battle in which military organisation was more vital to. success. ----1 am, &c.,
JOHN .NORTH.
Junior Aural and Military Club, 06 Piccadilly, W. I.
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