Lebanon ends an era
Patrick Cockburn
In every real sense Lebanon is now partitioned. It is well on its way to joining Cyprus a hundred miles away as the second eastern Mediterranean country within two years to be divided between its communities. The main contact between the Christians in east Beirut and the Muslims in the west is the rain of mortar and artillery shells—some of it from 155 mm guns—into their respective strongholds. Muslim efforts to take the port have reduced it to ruins.
The Christian paramilitary leaders have long had partition at the back of their minds as a last resort. Some compare their position to that of Israel in 1948. This is optimistic. They control only a third of a country which is itself only the size of Norfolk and Suffolk combined. Worse, their remaining enclave has its main population centres in the front line. If east Beirut and the towns of Zghorta and Zahleh to the north and east came under heavy attack, the Christians would be hard put to it to defend them.
The only alternative to partition, as the
civil war enters its second year, is some f°11/1 of Syrian domination. Neither choice is Pr ticularly attractive. The ferocity of the fight. ing has left little room for co-operation bed. tween the two sides. With over 20,000 elea, and an unknown number wounded-01°s. of them civilians—and stories of massacre. kidnapping and torture forming the Main topic of conversation, it is difficult to see how any form of power-sharing can be devised. At the beginning of the year the Lebanese; war-weary and confused, still talked attea 'the Lebanese talent for compromise'. Since then there has been precious little sign tlf Since it became independent in 1943 Le" anon never had much by way of a goverri' ment. Every job was distributed accordil to a complex formula through which each° the seven major sects got a share of the cake' The flourishing business community-0,0t ly Christian—was happy because it did °";, pay any taxes. Political leaders, operating 0 principles which would have been familiar`, Tammany Hall bosses and the nastier tYrI, of Scottish border baron, distributed the Pa ronage among their followers. The war has shattered this system. It . „s
ives
created on the assumption that Christla," were the majority community and raalnr, tamed even when they had become a Mill, °0 ity. The Shia Muslims in the south art° Beirut became increasingly restless. The guard of Muslim bosses began to lose surr; port. Yet their demands for reform muted by their own religious differences avre divisions between right and left. They only united by Christian attack. tact'. For the Phalange party and the Ke—,„„s the Christian militia, the whole problem always seemed much simpler. What ,evi wrong with the country was that it had Tes. invaded by over a quarter of a million Pa in tinians who lived semi-independentlY their camps. When the fighting bega,,I1.0g April last year they hoped to repeat 1‘101, Hussein's success in quashing the Palest.0 ians. Sustained by a strong belief in the °Aid plicities of their own propaganda theY 0. not see that this was impossible in Leban°0 Their plan went wrong from the beg re, fling. The Palestinians, who could alst °lare member what happened in 1970—indee as obsessed by it—kept out of the fighting .,11 much as they could. They let the iv.-d of Lebanese do most of the fighting. I nSte3.cie ii the army joining in on the Christian sl s.blit, large numbers of the rank and file forming their own paramilitary units. By January this Year the military balance of power had Swung towards the Muslims and the Syrian intervention was welcomed in the circum stances even by the most militant Ketaeb leaders.
The trend since then has been for Syrian Influence to increase. The ties between the Christian leadership and Damascus have beeitn.ne steadily closer. Initially President Assad forced the Muslims to agree to only a ll measure of political reform. Even President Frangieh was to be maintained in ?rower and in this Damascus went too far. „ majority of Lebanese Muslims wanted oornething to show for the months of fighting, spite of set-backs the Syrians have re1:nained true to their initial policy of restraintig Karnal Jumblatt's leftist army and its
hay "alestinian allies. Ammunition supplies
s k,cen cut off. The 7000 Palestinians in
Sale ga, the Syrian-controlled guerrilla group, a,,te used with the PLA, part of the regular
Ytian army sad's Policy. to enforce acceptance of As The election of President Sarkis as the hIllan Damascus trusts is further evidence of e"rovv far Lebanon's independence has been eve'cled. Without an army, a bureaucracy or _en a presidential palace his power will be sea limited. It will almost entirely de the on the assistance he can get from across ""e border.
Not the least impressive aspect of the Syrian achievement has been that it has been accomplished without provoking resistance from Washington and only a few cheeps of protest from Israel. Mr Dean Brown, Dr Kissinger's envoy, has made it fairly clear that the State Department would infinitely prefer a Syrian-dominated Lebanon to one largely controlled by the Muslim left and the PLO. For the Palestinians this is bad news. Lebanon was the last country in which they could operate with relative freedom. At the same time they have been too dependent on Syrian supplies and diplomacy to risk a total break.
Instead they have moved closer to the Egyptians. President Sadat has been busily fishing in troubled waters and has eagerly exploited this opportunity to embarrass the Syrians. The PLO is suddenly getting complimentary references in the Egyptian press. This will not last as Assad is prepared to make concessions to Cairo.
Such developments are significant of the way in which Lebanon has become an increasingly central issue in Middle Eastern politics. President Assad is certainly worried that he has a bear by the tail. Lebanon is too complex to square everybody. The Palestinians may decide to throw all their weight behind Kamal Jumblatt and the Christians refuse to offer anything which in any way approached a compromise. Damascus may one day regret having acquired an Ulster of its own.
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