LORD SALISBURY ON CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY. T4 ORD SALISBURY'S brilliant reply in
the November number of the National Review to Mr. Gladstone's threat that if the House of Lords throws out the next Home-rule Bill, he shall have to "deal with" the House of Lords, is, to our minds, the ablest contribution be has yet made to the political discussion before the country. The paper contains no imprudent sarcasm, no epigram which is likely to have a greater effect in irritating the passions of his foes than it will have in stimulating the zeal of his friends. Yet it is full from beginning to end of the keenest and pithiest common-sense, all of it founded on the clearest democratic principles. His great point is this,---everywhere else among the nations which exult in representative and democratic institutions, one of the most highly-prized of all the principles of political duty, has been the pre-eminent importance of not allowing the constitutional basis of the popular life to be easily shaken or invalidated Almost the first thing which the American statesmen thought of in constructing their organic law was to prevent its being tampered with and altered for any light reason. Anything that could be done without a change in the organic law was child's play in comparison with the difficulty of effecting any change which involved an alteration in the organic law itself. So, also, it is in Holland, Norway, Greece, Switzerland. Everywhere the greatest possible anxiety has been shown to secure the people against the consequences of their own possible political caprice in relation to the fundamental form of their Constitution. And surely nothing can be more reasonable, especially under a democracy. With a democracy, the great danger is that, the popular will being at the basis of everything, caprice itself may obtain a certain prestige, if it be the caprice of the people. Yet such a course would be fatal to the growth of that patriotic sentiment which is deepest where tradition and usage has grown into the hearts of the people. Just consider what the United States would be if that passion of reverence for the Constitution had not sprung up there, which, to us on this side of the Atlantic, sounds so quaint. Every one here smiles at Artemus Ward's excellent joke, that 'the earth con- tinued its revolution on its axis subject to the Constitution of the United States." Yet, without that passion of Con- servatism for the Constitution which made such a joke possible, the Union would certainly have melted away into its constituent atoms when the great anti-slavery quarrel broke out in all its fury. If popular caprice in relation to the organic law of a State is to be permitted, patriotism would have no solid trunk to cling to. It would be like ivy without a tree or a wall. You cannot be patriotic to a chopping and shifting political kaleidoscope. Where would the deep household passion be if the house were changed once a month ? Where would be the deep family passion if marriage ever became a temporary covenant ? Something in the Constitution must be more or less final, and capable of exciting that deep sense of loyalty which attaches itself only to that which does not change, if patriotism is to be a real and serious passion at all. Yet, without a passion of patriotism, what would be the security for any national life ? Accordingly, as Lord Salisbury shows us, the first care, even of demo- cratic statesmen, has been to see that the organic and fundamental law of the State shall not be lightly changed, shall not be altered at all except with the greatest circumspection and every kind of security against acci- dental fluctuations of policy or opinion. Yet where is there any security for this element of permanence and stability under our Constitution, unless there be some branch of the Legislature which can decline to allow fundamental arrangements to be overturned at any mere whim of popular feeling ?
Under our Constitution, the only security against such fluctuations of popular feeling is the House of Lords, which requires the fullest evidence that the nation is in earnest, and has made up its mind firmly, before it assents to any great constitutional revolution. It is said that the House of Lords would accept a Home-rule Bill "if Mr. Gladstone and the nation were thundering at its doors." "That," says Lord Salisbury tranquilly, may no doubt "be admitted as more than probable. But it must be real thunder and a real nation." Have we a real nation favour- able to Home-rule, when England is dead against it, when even Great Britain is distinctly against it ; and when the United Kingdom itself, with Ireland counted in, gives a dubious and barely audible reply ? Lord Salisbury takes the pains to show that if 21 constituencies, with Glad- stonian majorities varying from 3 to 62, and amounting in sum total to only 765 (out of some six millions), had gone the other way, there would have been no Glad- stonian majority at all. Can any one in his senses speak of that number of votes in the balance,—a number attained, too, in most cases by distracting the minds of men from the true issue, by all sorts of petty interests and promises, which have no connection with the true issue,—as giving a , result that the merest breath of popular caprice might not easily reverse ? That the character of a single Parliament and Administration should depend on such a majority, Lord Salisbury does not complain. That is one of the chances of war. But if the permanent character of our Constitution, if the fundamental organic law which ties the United Kingdom together is to depend on a political accident of that sort, farewell to anything like national stability and patriotism, farewell to that sense of confidence, familiarity, and security which makes the whole difference between home and travel. The United States permit no tampering with their constitution, unless, in the first place, two-thirds of both Houses of Congress deem a change necessary, or two- thirds of the legislatures of the separate States demand it, and then the legislatures of three-fourths of the States ratify it when determined upon. Belgium will permit no such change, unless the legislature having declared it necessary, and a dissolution having taken place, both the new Chambers agree with the throne on the change pro- posed, the Chambers by a two-thirds vote in each. In the Netherlands, the provisions for effecting any change of con- stitution are very nearly the same. The Norwegian Con- stitution requires a two-thirds majority in a new Parlia- ment, summoned expressly to consider and decide upon a constitutional change decided upon by the previous Par- liament. In Greece, any constitutional change must be adopted by a three-fourths majority in two successive Parliaments ; and even then a special Chamber, containing twice the number of members, must confirm the decision thus twice arrived at by these large majorities. In Swit- zerland, if a change of Constitution is demanded by either Chamber, or by fifty thousand citizens, there is first a re- ference to the people at large, to ask if it shall be considered. If the answer is in the affirmative, both Chambers are dis- solved, and re-elected to consider specially the proposed change ; and even then, the measure they pass must be submitted again to the people at large for confirmation or rejection. What would any one of these Democracies say to the stability of a State which took no further security at all for the confirmation of a fundamental constitutional change which had been passed through a single popular Chamber by a majority of 38, a majority which might have been due to the caprice of 765 voters out of 6,000,000? Yet Mr. Gladstone is indignant, and even wrathful, at the mere suggestion that the House of Lords should presume to secure for the people at large the opportunity of recon- sidering and revising so mere a political accident as this, —the turn of a most sensitive balance by the dropping of a mere political grain into one of the scales ! Was there ever a more inappropriate and unreasonable display of patriotic passion ? The House of Lords, in so acting, would only be taking a fraction of the security for the continuity of our fundamental organic law which every democratic country in the world provides against the chances of popular caprice.
Lord Salisbury has taken up firm and, indeed, irre- fragable ground for the House of Lords. It would be just as possible to get up a cry against the House of Lords on the ground that it threw out a revolutionary change, passed by a bare majority of a highly composite and temporary character, in such a House of Commons as ours, as it would be to get up a popular cry against the Speaker for giving his vote against such a change if there were an equal number of votes for and against it. The very essence of a Constitution—as distinct from a mere law—is that it should be more permanent, more difficult to change, less exposed to capricious fluctuation. You might as well propose to alter the ground-floor of a house, with as little precaution as you take in altering its top storey, as to alter a Constitution with as little precaution as you take against altering a mere law. We venture to say that, instead of raising up a prejudice against itself by dis- allowing a permanent Constitutional revolution, which can- not be carried by a greater majority than thirty-eight, the House of Lords will thereby recover any popularity it may recently have lost. It would be the most popular and cautious decision it could take. Submission to the Commons in such a case as that would be a grave crime against the country.
Previous page
