A S our readers know, we have again and again insisted

during the past six or seven years that it is the duty of Parliament to pass a Redistribution Bill which will do away with our existing electoral anomalies. Under these anomalies the accident of residence in a particular con- stituency or part of the United Kingdom will often endow a voter with five or six times the amount of electoral capacity which he would enjoy did he happen to live in some other part of the United Kingdom. We have held, that is, that as far as possible the votes of the electors should be of equal value. Though we have made the gross over-representation of Ireland, and especially of Southern Ireland, the immediate ground for this demand, and have drawn special attention to the injustice done to England by the over-representation of Ireland, we have never failed to urge that there are anomalies within England which also call loudly for redress. Even if there are no electoral scandals in England equal to those of the boroughs of Galway, Newry, and Kilkenny, there are several towns in England which do not deserve a Member to them- selves, and one or two others which have two Members when they ought only to have one. In England as a rule, however, the scandals arise in connection with single- Member constituencies with a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand inhabitants. Only a month ago, following an article on the same subject in May, we urged upon the Government the necessity for introducing a Redistribution Bill, and used an argument which must, we held, especially appeal to them,—namely, that they would not be doing their duty to the cause of the Union if they left Ireland with thirty more Members than she had any right to possess. We feared at the time that the preoccupation of the Unionist leaders with the Fiscal question would prevent them doing their duty to the Union. We are delighted, therefore, to see this week indications that the Government seriously intend to take up the Redistribution question next Session. For instance, the Times of Tuesday had a leading article, apparently of an inspired character, declaring most emphatically that the subject ought to be dealt with next Session. The same issue of the paper also contained the first of a series of articles calling attention in detail to our present electoral anomalies. What may have been the grounds which have thus in- duced the Government, or at any rate their chief supporters in the Press, to take up the problem of Redistribution we do not care to inquire too closely. It may be, as has been suggested, that the real reason for the sudden interest thus displayed in the over-representation of Ireland is the fact that the advocates of Tariff Reform hope to find in this question an excuse for postponing an appeal to the country. A Redistribution Bill, it is argued, will take a whole Session to carry through, and after it has been carried six months or more must be allowed for the work of a Boundary Commission. A Redistribution Bill, therefore, will postpone the General Election by at least a year, probably by eighteen months. Be this as it may, we are Free-traders, and do not care, as long as the goods themselves are sound and wholesome, to ask for certificates of origin. We are content to know that the doing away of the existing electoral anomalies is a matter of vital im- portance to the welfare of the nation, and as long as the Government do the right thing we shall not stop to examine their motives. It will be enough for us, what- ever the original impulse for action, if justice is done to England, and if we get rid of the imminent danger of an Irish party dominating the politics of the United Kingdom, not because the number of electors whom they represent gives them a right to such dominance, but because a foolish and ill-arranged electoral system endows them with thirty more votes in the House of Commons than they have any right to possess. While such a state of things as that exists we are always in danger of measures of vital importance being passed contrary to the will of the nation. A majority of thirty is capable of passing any measure, or adopting any policy, or of keeping any Ministry in office. Yet those thirty votes may now represent, not the will of the majority, but may be based on the over-representation of Ireland. It is quite con- ceivable that our Fiscal policy might be revolutionised, and a Protective tariff imposed upon us, simply because we allow Ireland to have thirty more Members than she is entitled to. We need hardly say that we would not deprive Ireland of one jot of her just electoral power. She ought to have her full share of representation in the House of Commons ; and if, owing to that full share, Protection, the dissolution of the Union, or any other evil policy were to be adopted by the House of Commons, we should have no right to complain. Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, and we. must take the consequences of her fair representation in the House of Commons, whatever they may be. What we need not do, and ought not to do, is to make it possible for the majority in Ireland to over- rule the majority in the United Kingdom as a whole.

In our view, Liberal Free-traders should be quite as strong as Unionist Free-traders, or Unionists generally, in determining that the present state of things shall be brought to an end. Free-traders very naturally desire that the present Government should appeal to the nation, but it is better to postpone that appeal even for a year and a half than to miss the opportunity of establishing a, just and safe electoral system. It cannot be to the interest of the Liberal party that thirty more Irish Pro- tectionists shall be returned to the next Parliament than Ireland has a right to send there. A Liberal Free-trade Ministry will only have the support of the Nationalists in the next Parliament if they agree to legislation of a kind that will ruin the Ministry. Hence the undue excess of Irish representation is certain to ruin the Ministry, or to reinforce the Opposition to the next Free-trade Ministry. This being so, we would most strongly urge upon the Liberal leaders to offer no opposition to a just and reason- able Redistribution Bill, but rather to inform the Ministry that if their Bill is an equitable one, they (the Opposition) will do their best to secure its speedy passage through the House of Commons.

What form shall the Redistribution Bill take P In our opinion, the best plan would be to adopt an automatic system which could be applied after every new Census. The difficulty of enacting such an automatic system with- out too gross an interference with existing constituencies is not nearly so great as might be imagined. Some three years ago—i.e., in January, 1902—we entered fully into the subject, and laid down the principles on which such an automatic measure might be constructed. We cannot on the present occasion repeat the whole of our article, but we will quote here the six principles of action which were then laid down :- (1) "As soon as each Census has been taken, the total population of the country shall be divided by the existing number of Members of the House of Commons, to determine the average number of inhabitants represented by one Member."

(2) " The inferior limit of any Parliamentary constituency shall be 80 per cent. of the number of inhabitants shown at the last Census, according to Clause (1), to be represented by each Member."

[In the present case, this limit would work out to about 50,172. Therefore our " inferior limit " may be taken as 50,000.] (3) "Any constituency which, in the year following each Census, is found to have fallen below this limit, shall be thrown into the neighbouring constituency, as hereafter defined."

(4) " Any constituency which, in the year following each Census, is found to have a population of twice the limit fixed in Clause (2) shall be divided into two constituencies : but if such a constituency would be formed by the union of two neighbouring constituencies under Clause (3), then the two existing constituencies shall remain unchanged, so long as the excess of population in the one continues to balance the defect in the other."

(5) "Any constituency which is found to have fallen below the limit fixed by Clause (2) shall be united to the neighbour- ing constituency with which it has the longest conterminous boundary; but 'neighbouring constituency' shall be defined to mean a constituency in the same county, or city, or borough ; and in no case shall county boundaries be broken into, or constituencies belonging to two counties be inter- mingled."

(6) " If the application of this principle at any time leaves Wales, Scotland, or Ireland with a smaller proportion of Members than each country is entitled to by the comparison of its total population with that of England, the necessary number of Members shall be added by the preservation of threatened constituencies in order of magnitude, beginning with the largest."

We may note in regard to Clause (1) that it would be necessary to except the nine University Members, who stand on a different footing from their colleagues. They must be retained or abolished on special grounds. For ourselves, we should like to see them retained, and one of the representatives of Trinity College, Dublin, transferred What is intended by the phrase " inferior limit " ? The ideal constituency under a system aiming at "one vote one value" is obviously a constituency whose inhabi- tants equal the number arrived at by dividing the popula- tion of the United Kingdom by 661. Members,—i.e., by the total number of Members minus the University Members. At present the ideal constituency would have about 63,000 inhabitants. But this ideal could not be reached without interfering with every constituency in the country. Therefore it is proposed to leave all constituen- cies alone which attain to 80 per cent. of the ideal,—i.e., do not fall below 50,000, which we term the "inferior limit." Again, it is not proposed to divide a constituency into two unless it is double the " inferior limit " in population,- i.e., has 100,000 inhabitants.

We may also quote from our leader of January 25th, 1902, the net results of the application of these six principles :— " Taking England first, we find that the effect of the application of our principles is a net gain of 5 seats : 6 seats are lost to the boroughs, and 11 gained by the counties into which these boroughs are merged. The following list includes the 26 English boroughs which, having less than 50,000 inhabitants, would lose their separate Parliamentary existence:—Bedford, Boston, Bury St. Edmunds, Cambridge, Canterbury, Carlisle, Durham, Gloucester, Grantham, Hereford, Kidderminster, King's Lynn, Liverpool (Exchange division), Oxford, Penryn and Falmouth, Peterborough, Rochester, Salisbury, Scarborough, Shrewsbury, Stafford, Taunton. Warwick, Whitehaven, Winchester, and Windsor. In addition, 8 two-Member constituencies, being under the limit of 100,000, lose a Member each,—viz., Bath, Devonport, Halifax, Ipswich, City of London, Northampton, Stockport, and York. On the other hand, certain boroughs have so increased as to entitle them to additional representation, especially in the Metropolitan area, where there would be a net gain of 12 Members :—Battersea, Clapham, Deptford, Fulham, Hackney (S.), Hammersmith, Lewisham, Wandsworth (2), West Ham (3), Woolwich. Other boroughs would be entitled to re- division and extra representation, as follows :—Birkenhead, Brighton, Croydon, Gateshead, Hanley, Leeds (N.), Leeds (W.), Leicester, Middlesbrough, Newcastle-on-Tyne (2), Oldham, Ports- mouth, Sunderland (2). England would thus lose 34 borough Members, and gain 28, with a net loss of 6.

It is when we apply our principles to the counties that England begins to profit. There are 11 county divisions, however, in which it involves a loss of Members. These are :—Cambridge- shire (Newmarket division), Dorsetshire (W.), Essex (Saffron Walden), Huntingdonshire (S.), Lincolnshire (Louth), Norfolk (S.W.), Northamptonshire (S.), Rutlandshire, Somerset (E.), Westmoreland (N.), Yorkshire (Holderness). On the other hand, we find a gain in the following 22 county constituencies:— Cheshire (Eddesbury), Essex (Walthamstow 2, Romford 3), Kent (Dartford), Lancashire (Blackpool, Clitheroe, Prestwich, Bootle), Middlesex (Enfield, Tottenham, Hornsey, Harrow 2, Ealing), Northumberland (Tyneside), Staffordshire (Handsworth), Surrey (Kingston), Yorkshire (Barnsley, Osgoldscross). Many boroughs, like Chester, Darlington, and Worcester, and many county divisions are saved by the operation of Clause (4).

We see, then, that the application of the proposed principles would lead to the loss of 34 borough and 11 county Members in England, and the gain of 28 borough and 22 county Members, with a net gain to the ` predominant partner' of 5 Members."

In Wales there would be a gain of 2 county and 2 borough Members, and a loss of 1 county Member and 6 borough Members, or a net loss of 3 Members. In Scotland we should have a loss of 8 borough seats and 2 county seats, and a gain of 4 borough and 4 county seats, or a net loss of 2 Members. In Ireland we have a net loss of 6 borough and 29 county Members, or of 35 in all. The net result for the whole United Kingdom would be a diminution of 35 Members. But if we work out the proportions by divisions of the United Kingdom, Ireland will be found to be two Members short of her ideal number. Therefore under Clause (6) 2 Members must be returned to Ireland, or, rather, not be withdrawn from her. We will add the percentage table which we gave in our leader of 1902 to show that the net result of our scheme is by no means unfair to the different parts of the United Kingdom. It will be understood that by " ideal " repre- sentation we mean that which is exactly proportional to population :— REPRESENTATION.

Present. Proposed.

England 69.5 per cent. ... 74-0 per cent. ... 74'3 per cent.

Wales 4.5 „ „ 4 3 „ „ 4-1 „ „

Ireland 15-3 „ „ 10'8 „ ... 10-8 „ „ Scotland 10.6 „ „ 10'8 „ „ 10.8 „ „ We may add one other point. If it should be enacted, as we should certainly like to see it enacted, that in no case should the operation of the automatic principle be allowed totally to deprive a county of representation, only Rutland, Radnor, Caithness, and Berwickshire would be affected. In order to preserve the historical continuity of representation, so slight a departure from the logic of the law might easily be pardoned. But though we fully believe that an automatic system would be the fairest and best, we confess that we have little hope of Parliament adopting it. In that case, the next best plan would be to allocate to each division of the United Kingdom—that is, to England and Wales, Scot- land and Ireland—its fair share of Members, and then within those limits to make as equable a redistribution as possible by cutting off the small boroughs, and adding the Members thus saved to the big constituencies redivided for the purpose. We can only end as we began, by urging the Liberal party not to make this a party question. The measure, if a fair one—as we, of course, assume it will be—must be democratic ; and therefore no Liberal can believe that it will be opposed to the interests of the Liberal party. He cannot surely wish to see the question of Protection or Free-trade, or indeed any other question that he has at heart, settled, not by the will of the majority of the nation, but, as is now quite possible, by the over- representation of Ireland.