'lab NAVY AT THE DARDANELLES

Sin JULIAN COBBEIT, In the second volume of his Official History of the war at sea, deals with the period from the end of November, 1914, to May, 1915, and is thus mainly concerned with the Dardanelles enterprise. He repeats in his preface the warning prefixed to the first volume—namely, that the Admiralty " are in no way responsible for the presentation of the narrative or for the opinions expressed." The Admiralty have given the

author access to all the documents and have examined the proofs " with a view to pointing out errors of statement which may have arisen from a misreading of the existing documentary evidence," but we are assured that they have not exercised " anything in the nature of censorship." We can well believe it, for Sir Julian Corbett is a singularly dispassionate historian, and he does not hesitate to point out the mistakes that were made, either at Whitehall or at sea. On the other hand, he is a just and temperate critic, because he recognizes the difficulties whir& had to be faced. The main value of his history lies in its picture of the situation as a whole. He does not fall into the common error of regarding each naval episode, or even the naval war, as an isolated problem. Military, naval, political and economic affairs acted and reacted upon one another at every stage in the world-conflict. It would have been as unwise as it would have been impossible for the Admiralty to consult their own convenience alone in arriving at decisions. Further, we had to work with our Allies, whose views and interests were too often divergent. In the closing days of 1914, for example, Lord French had planned a combined attack by the British and Belgian armies and the British fleet on the enemy's right flank on the Belgian coast, with the object of driving the enemy out of Ostend and Zeebrugge Marshal Joffre accepted the plan, " but when it was submitted to the King of the Belgians, he was unable to agree "—" he was ready to co-operate to his full strength, but he could not consent to the proposed unity of command." Again, when Italy was on the eve of declaring war the Admiralty found that, " instead of relieving our burden in the Mediterranean, as might have been expected, the effect was to increase it materially." Italy wanted French and British naval support for a combined attack by land and sea on the Austrians at the head of the Adriatic. The plan was a bad one in any case, for battleships in such shallow waters would have been easy targets for enemy submarines, but it almost came to nothing because France would not place her battleships under the command of an Italian admiral. In the end, we had to reinforce the Italians with four battleships, which were sorely needed elsewhere, while the French sent reinforcements to the Dardanelles and also provided a separate squadron to patrol south of the Straits of Otranto. The incident was typical of the difficulties of waging war in co-operation with other countries. The arguments for and against the Dardanelles expedition are well set forth. Sir Julian Corbett seems to be convinced that an attack on Turkey was desirable, especially in view of the fact

that Germany, after her failure to crush France, was counting on permanent gains in the Near East. Lord French, he says, in January, 1915, did not believe that a decision could be reached

in the West and looked for ultimate victory to the Russian front, of which he evidently knew very little. But Lord French strongly opposed any weakening of the British Army in France, on the ground that we.must not run the risk of letting the French be overpowered ; he desired, indeed, that the new armies, when ready, should all go to the Western front. Again, there was a strong body of military opinion which feared an invasion of these islands and therefore insisted on keeping a considerable armyfor home defence. On the other hand, Lord Fisher approved of a combined naval and military attack on Turkey, involving the diversion of a large force of troops from France. These contradictory views had somehow to be reconciled by Mr.

Asquith's Cabinet. The author shows very clearly how they gradually drifted into a mode of action which pleased neither the Admiralty nor the War Office and which was contrary to all the teaching of experience. But he says of the famous War Council of January 27th, 1915, when Mr. Churchill advocated -a naval attack on the Dardanelles while Lord Fisher protested against it, that

" It is to be doubted, however, whether it was a case which could be decided on naval authority at all. A purely naval attack on a strongly fortified base was admittedly a departure from established doctrine which involved manifest risk. Once, • Natal Operations. Vol. II. By-Str Julian S. Corbett. History of the Great War, based On Official Documents, by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee 61 Imperial Defence, Loudon ; Longman, [21s, net.] and only once, had such an attempt succeeded, and that was when Rooke, with the fleet alone, had seized Gibraltar by a coup de main. But the famous rock fortress was then but in its infancy, and scarcely comparable, as an objective, with the Dardanelles. On the other hand, owing to new technical developments, the chances of a fleet against a fortified naval position could not be measured by the most accomplished experts with any degree of certainty. All that was clear was the political necessity for action and the decisive advantages that success would bring. It was pre-eminently therefore a matter for Ministers to decide. When expert opinion differed it was they, and they alone, who must judge the extent of the risk involved, and they, and they alone, who must judge whether the probable advantages of success justified the acceptance of the risk."

Lord Fisher wanted to resign after the Council meeting but was dissuaded by Lord Kitchener; it is apparent now that Lord Fisher was right in desiring to have nothing more to do with a purely naval attack which, he knew, could not yield decisive results.

In the next few weeks, as the author points out, the ' U' boat menace in home waters became more and more serious, taxing all the efforts of the Admiralty, who then had comparatively few vessels suitable for patrol work. "We must remember," says Sir Julian Corbett, " how deeply tho new developments in home waters emphasized the merits of his [Lord Fisher's] plan for

attacking the enemy on his own coasts a plan which he foresaw would never be realized if we became entangled on unsound lines in the Mediterranean."

A combined attack on the Dardanelles, in which the first naval bombardment had been followed immediately by the

landing of an army, would probably have succeeded. The naval officers on the spot were of this opinion. Captain FitzMaurice of the ' Triumph,' who had been at the capture of Tsingtau, reported to Admiral Carden that the Allied fleet had made no great progress against the German forts until they had secured an observation post on a high hill dominating the place. He suggested early in March, 1015, that Achi Baba should bo

occupied and entrenched so that observers there could correct the fire of the ships' guns. The experience of the Japanese at Port Arthur, where they obtained no decisive success until they captured 203-metre Hill and obtained a clear view of the harbour, should indeed have been remembered before the bombardment was begun. The author comments severely on the neglect of such well-established facts. Whether there were troops avail-

able for a landing in force is not wholly clear, but Sir Julian Corbett is careful to point out that Admiral Carden's proposal to occupy the end of the peninsula was rejected by the War

Office, not on the ground that it had no troops, but because the occupation was not " an obligatory operation for the first main object." That is to say, the War Office did not know enough about naval gunnery to realize the importance, and indeed the necessity, of securing a " spotting " station on shore if the Turkish batteries were to be quickly overpowered. The author does not believe the rumours that the Turks were do- moralized by the bombardment of March 18th and that a renewal of the attack would have sent them scuttling home. He thinks that the damage done by our gunfire was. much exaggerated. His description of the landing on April 25th is excellent. That miraculous feat of arms will always be a source

of pride to both the Navy and the Army. Up to May 13th, when the tail of the peninsula was secured, tho situation seemed

promising, and there this portion of the narrative ends. Sir Julian Corbett concludes with the resignation of Lord Fisher, followed by that of Mr. Churchill, and by the formation of the

first Coalition Ministry. While the Dardanelles campaign necessarily fills most of the volume, there a-o admirable chapters on the Scarborough raid of December 16th, 1914, and on the Dogger Bank action of January 24th, 1915, and on the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal and other minor episodes. The author shows that at the Dogger Bank defective methods of signalling had much to do with the enemy's escape from what might have been complete disaster. The volume contains seventeen excellent charts and plans and is well indexed. It is a scholarly and illuminating record of a most critical phase of the war.