THE ESSENTIAL TANK
By S. S. HAMMERSLEY, M.P.
" WHEREVER German tanks come up against our new 17. pounder guns the German tanks are knocked out "—this we learn in recent dispatches from Italy. In so far as we are meant to understand that these very efficient high velocity guns, proto- types of which were in existence two years ago, are now being delivered in quantity' to the Army, the news is very welcome. If, however, we are expected to infer that by the use of 'these guns the German Mark V and Mark VI tanks can be written off as of little military value, the purport of the announcement is not so satisfactory.
Based on experience in Libya and Tunisia, a school of thought has arisen holding the view that the mobile gun is a complete answer to the tank. Such views are dangerous. They are particularly dangerous now that we have reached the stage in the war when not victory merely, but early victory is essential. In North Africa the main objective was to destroy the enemy's armour. This was frequently done by tanks drawing the enemy's tanks on until they were within the range of skilfully Concealed guns. El Alamein was a victory of massed guns over mobile tanks. For the invasion of Europe conditions will be very different. Ability to advance rapidly with maximum striking-power—this means glins in tanks—is essential. In an offensive, guns which have to be drawn into position by tractors are not so useful to an attacking army as the same guns mounted on self-propelled mountings ; they are very much less useful than the same guns mounted in tanks, which provide not only the mobility of self-propelled mountings, but the all-round protection of- heavy armour.
It is true that the main function of tanks is to bring effective gunfire to bear on the enemy, but tanks, unlike guns per se, have two other characteristics which in the kind of warfare we may expect in Europe may prove of outstanding' importance—those of mobility and protection. In the last war it was the protection which tanks afforded against rifle and machine-gun fire (the only kind of fire which in those days could normally be used against them) which made the tanks such a potent instrument of warfare. When France was over-run in 1940 it was the mobility of the Panzer divisions which played such • havoc with the French defence organisations. None of the tanks which the Germans used in this early fighting could stand up against the 2-pounder guns with which our Matildas and Crusaders were armed, but as we had so few Matildas and Crusaders* it France the speed of the attack overwhelmed the defence. We want, therefore, not merely better guns—which we are getting—but better guns in tanks.
As the war proceeds these three tank characteristics—mobility, fire-power and protection—are being developed to a greater and greater degree by the contending armies. They are qualities which in the main are contradictory rather than complementary. Increased fire-power involves some sacrifice of mobility, and greater protection is gained at the expense both of fire-power and mobility. On the other hand, a high degree of mobility is inconsistent with over- whelming gun-power and effective all-round protection. It is only by new inventions—lighter and more powerful engines, new guns I to fire heavier projectiles with a higher muzzle-velocity, with little increase in weight and so on—that tank development is prevented from degenerating into a vicious circle.
The Germans, and to a great extent the Russians and Americans, seek to combine in one general purpose tank the greatest common f measure of. these three conflicting essentials. A high degree of success has attended the efforts of our American Allies in this ti direction, and the Sherman tank is probably the most successful v general tank in use in any army. British tank development has r been different. No attempt has been made to combine all the good ti features in one type of tank. Cruiser tanks, whose main charac- teristics are speed and long-range anti-tank guns, have been tI developed quite separately from infantry tanks, whose main require- ments are a high degree of protection and effective anti-personnel tl guns. While this development of tanks has been proceeding in a steady but not spectacular manner, the development of anti-tank
weapons has made gigantic strides. Highly mobile anti-tank guns, mobile medium artillery guns—even up to the highest calibre— mounted on self-propelled carriages, are all part of the equipment of our armies and the armies of our Allies and enemies. In addition, anti-tank mines, now made from plastics to render detection more difficult, can hold up the onslaught of the most powerful tanks.
There is undoubtedly a strong body of opinion holding the view that the day of the tank as a decisive instrument in warfare is over. The correct antidote for the enemy's tanks, they say, is not other and better tanks, but mobile guns and minefields. In the words of the communiqué: " Wherever the tank comes up against the big gun, the gun wins." In the pursuit of this argument one is apt to overlook the fact that the operative word is " wherever." Thus amidst the vicissitudes of this tremendous conflict there is a possi- bility of the country which invented the tank being the first to suggest its obsolescence. There are substantial grounds for the belief that the superiority of anti-tank devices is just a phase in the age-long battle between offence and defence. Our role in Europe is to take the offensive. To rely too much on the defensive weapons of anti-tank guns and anti-tank mines may be a cardinal error. Highly mobile tanks are needed to exploit weaknesses in the enemy's defence. Tanks with a high degree of protection are needed to attack strongly defended positions where gun-fire from mobile artillery cannot be brought within range because there is not enough protection for the gun-crews.
Tanks mounting dual purpose guns to fire both solid shot and high explosive (solid shot for use against armour and high explosive for use against personnel) are needed to give our offensive the punch of victory. It is true that the main purpose of tanks is not to seek out and destroy the enemy's armour, but a battle between armour and armour is the final sanction, just as the fight between battleships is the final test of naval supremacy. We can only achieve the success we seek with a minimum number of casualties if the tanks available to the United Nations are in their respective classes more mobile and better protected than the tanks of the enemy and capable of out-gunning them.
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