Arms sales
Plains to Spain
David Wragg
The story is told that, at the height of the, second world war, General Franco advised Britain to negotiate a peace with Germany, 00, the grounds that she could only be the loser 01 the war, regardless of any military victory. I. retrospect, having won the war and repute& lost the peace, and seen half of Europe under • Soviet domination, the advice seems to have been sound, even though many might doubt whether it was motivated by any affection for Britain or British institutions. Somewhat similar observations can be macre about the Spanish navy's order for eight Hawker Sid; deley Harriers, the so-called 'jump jet, fighters, which must be welcome not only to the manufacturer, but also to the Government
and the Royal Navy, although there is the small and embarrassing point that the Spanish aircraft will have a superior performance to those in service with the Royal Air Force! Although the only operational vertical take-off fighter aircraft in the world, the Harrier has so far failed to meet its full export promise, in spite of the large order from the United States Marine Corps, who are in fact alSO ' ordering' the Spanish Harriers. No other customer has come forward, for a variety of reasons ranging from caution with a new concept, through the near-certainty of an embargo on sales to the parties to the ArabIsraeli dispute, to United States pressure on the British Government not to sell sophisticated modern arms to Latin America.
The real opportunity for the Harrier is as a Shipboard fighter, without the costly complication of launching catapults and arrester wires. The United States Marines use the aircraft in this role, but the Royal Navy has only been interested in a navalised version with improved radar. Hopes that an order for Harriers for the new through-deck cruisers, of Which one, HMS /nyincibie, is under order, would be announced early in August have remained unfulfilled, and in the meantime Other navies delayed their orders, in spite of successful trials with the aircraft. One result of these delays has been the slowing down of the production line and a Measure of uncertainty about its future. There IS gratitude among the manufacturers and the Workforce not only for the continued work, but for an opportunity to get the order book rolling once again. The Royal Navy knows that the more navies and marine corps use the Harrier, the more certain their order will k
While for the Government the risk of closing the production line, only to have to reopen it again at some cost later, has receded.
Arms sales are seldom without controversy, and this order has not been an exception to the rule. Unlike the much-discussed South African Buccaneers and Nimrods, moreover, the Harrier is an aircraft which could be used on counter-insurgency duties, although cheaper alternatives exist from Spain's own industry. Regardless of any undertakings, an attack on Gibraltar is out, simply because the victor would have nothing left worth taking, with an attack on such a small area meaning only destruction. Perhaps some easing of Anglo-Spanish relations could result from the order, remembering that a dispute between the last Conservative government and the then Labour Opposition, over the sale of warships to Spain, was one of the contributory causes of the rapid growth of the Gibraltar dispute in the first instance, although the question of arms sales must still only be a side issue.
• Labour attitudes over arms sales smack of hypocrisy, however. After refusing to sell sophisticated combat aircraft to South Africa, the last Labour government sat back quietly while British engines were produced under licence for an Italian-designed counter-insurgency aircraft for that country. They also allowed the Sudanese Arabs to buy armed trainers from the British Aircraft Corporation for use against the Negro population of the Southern Sudan. It is certainly odd that the anti-submarine Nimrod and the Buccaneer bomber, designed to attack heavily-defended land and sea targets, should be barred to South Africa in this light. However, more important issues, coming
much nearer to home, arise with the Spanish Harrier order. If an elderly American aircraft cartier, of diminutive size, on loan to the triditionally ineffectual Spanish navy, can besome a potent weapon with the addition of the Harrier, what possibilities are open for the Royal Navy's more modern and much larger commando carriers? At present, HMS Albion is being withdrawn from service and replaced by a refitted HMS Hermes, while another ship, HMS Bulwark, sails on. Rather than spending £60 million for a through-deck cruiser of pitiful armament for 1978, which will then need aircraft, a refit of the existing ships and an order for as few as twenty-four Harriers, at a cost of £36 million, would provide a valuable addition to Britain's defences, and bridge the gap in naval airpower which will otherwise occur when the last big aircraft carrier, HMS Ark Royal, is retired in 1976.
Westland Sea King helicopters, capable of fulfilling the dual roles of anti-submarine warfare and troop-carrying, already operate with the fleet, but the need is to provide a means of striking against missile-armed Soviet warships, and this can only be done with carrier-borne aircraft in the absence of competitive Western missiles. Even the existing ' export' version of the Harrier would suffice for this role, and if a naval version were to be developed, at some future date, the additional standard aircraft could then be passed to a grateful Royal Air Force. It is not enough to leave the availability of the aircraft to the possibility of export orders, with the risk of having to stop and restart the production line; much-needed home market orders are also essential, as is some way of getting better value for money in Britain's defence expenditure.