THE UNREST OF THE WORLD.
IN almost whatever direction one looks there is unrest, or forces making for unrest, and no man can foresee the end of these things. The rapidity of communications, so far from simplifying the management of the world, has vastly complicated it. People sometimes wonder bow a difficult foreign problem was dealt with at all in the days when a fast frigate took weeks to bring news that is now written and received within a few minutes. But the old way had its advantages. A crisis was localized for want of publicity, and by the time the news had spread, the original impetus of the movement had often spent itself. Crises, unfed by superfluous fuel, frequently settled themselves, as letters which remain long unacknowledged answer themselves. To-day every part of the world is joined together in permanent committee, and, as in the case of all unduly large committees, agreement is very difficult, if not impossible. The Balkan imbroglio is the gravest problem of the moment, but it would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of the issue which is being fought out in China. The existence, or at least the independence, of a country which contains more than a quarter of the population of the world is at stake. In South Africa the Union is facing a labour question in the most acute form in which it can present itself ; and the menace to the right of the community to exist is complicated by racial jealousy and the inflammable character of native thought. In Mexico the outlook is feverish and electrical. A fresh turn in the situation, a new and partially successful revolution, a financial crash, might bring about the intervention of the United States—very much against her will, no doubt—and an embarrassment such as the Washington Government has not known since it first felt its hands cumbered with the heavy burden of Cuba. Let us briefly take stock of all these perplexities.
First of all, the Balkan crisis. The tendencies of the -week have undoubtedly been encouraging. Au armistice has been arranged, and the Conference of the Balkan States at Bucharest appears to be in a mood that offers the hope of conciliation and adjustment. It is probably a fact that this comparatively gentle mood is the result of military exhaustion rather than of confidently anticipated satisfaction in terms of territory. The blood-letting has done its work. It was a good sign when the proposed secondary Con- ference which was to have been held at Nish was abandoned. The suggestion was that the preliminaries of peace should be discussed at Bucharest and the conditions of an armistice at Nish. But Bucharest managed to arrange the armistice without Nish. The scattered nature of the conferences dealing with Balkan affairs has throughout been a heavy handicap on the makers of peace. It was King Charles of Roumania who discountenanced the Nish Conference, and persuaded the Balkan Premiers to come to his capital. In several ways it has become clear during the week that he has been acting as a moderating force. Three weeks ago we suggested that Roumania might possibly be employed as the policeman or mandatory of Europe. She has now appreciably taken up that part, no doubt encouraged by Russia and Austria-Hungary. Of course, we should infinitely prefer that the Concert should speak with its own voice and not through another's. Still, a declaration by the Powers even at one remove is much better than nothing. We trust that the Concert before many days are past will give a new sign of life, and leave no doubt as to its determination to impose a settlement on all the Balkan States. The settlement must be an universal one, and nothing but a settlement having the authority of the whole Concert will be of any avail. The Turks must be made to retire behind the Enos-Midis line on pain of losing the sympathy and support of Europe in reconstructing their remaining possessions, and if neces- sary in fear of losing the strip of Europe that still belongs to them. For the rest, the settlement must aim at a real balance ; there must be no Balkan State left in possession of an obvious or remediable grievance ; and it will be to the advantage of the Balkan States themselves not to join in a clamouring competition for every possible pound of flesh. They all have to live side by side. Merely from a self-interested point of view it is better for a nation to have an amenable neighbour than a discontented one.
In South Africa the Trades Federation, led by a few extremists, has been playing the part of the General Confederation of Labour in France. Syndicalism is its acknowledged method. A general strike, which of course will fail to be general even if it be attempted, though it may do incalculable damage to the country nevertheless, has been proposed. An ingenious plan has been drawn up by which strikes would be suddenly ordered here, there, and everywhere, where it was found that the Government had not at the moment the means of dealing with the trouble. Happily there has already been a considerable break-away among trade unionists from this organized war upon society. M. Clemenceau once said during a French general strike that no Labour grievances and no Labour arguments whatever could deprive the community of its right to exist. Common sense everywhere confirms that opinion. But although the prospect in South Africa is less black than it was, owing chiefly to the obvious determination of the railwaymen to continue to work the railways, the danger is peculiarly pressing because of the excitability and susceptibility to impressions of the natives. This danger makes a labour dispute in South Africa wholly unlike one here, and imposes on the labour leaders a very special kind of responsibility. The natives are highly imitative. They will match unrest about them by unrest among themselves. If white men wear rosettes as a sign of revolt against the Government, the natives too must come out with rosettes. When Lord Gladstone sanc- tioned the use of Imperial troops during the Johannesburg rioting on July 4th and 5th, he did so mainly, as he explains in his despatches, because he recognized the intensity of the native peril. The Times correspondent says that the extreme Labour leaders have actually incited unrest among the natives. This is a very serious charge —a charge of disloyalty to the whole white community, which has only the thinnest margin of security at all times. It lives in safety only in proportion to its power of control over the natives, a power achieved and retained not so much by physical force as by prestige. We hope that even the extremists were not guilty of this crime. If they did actually use native unrest as a lever, they probably did so in the conviction that the Government would concede the strikers' demands because it could not deal with a Labour crisis and a native movement simultaneously.
Lord Gladstone was most plainly justified in these circum- stances in using Imperial troops. But we need not disguise the fact that the use of Imperial troops in a self-governing Dominion is a very delicate and precarious business. The British House of Commons rightly asks questions about the use of Imperial troops, and yet by so doing is brought wrongly into interfering with the affairs of an autonomous people. This is a wholly unsound state of things. Unhappily there was no alternative in the Johannesburg riots, as the South African army of defence is in a state of transition and of consequent ineffectiveness. We can only hope that the Union Govern- ment will complete its military programme at the first possible moment, so that even if the Imperial garrison cannot be actually withdrawn forthwith it need not be employed in the civil strife of white people.
It is impossible to offer a coherent summary of all the engagements in China between the troops of Yuan Shih- kai and the Southern revolutionaries. The point of the struggle is that it is a trial of strength between North and South. Neither passion nor conviction seems to be prominent on either side. The Northern troops are better trained, and, what is perhaps even more important, better paid. The loyalty of financial attachment is a considerable bond in China. The rebellion has provided the spectacle of a large number of important towns and influential persons waiting to see which way the cat would jump. Now that the cat has given a decided leap to the credit of Yuan Shih-kai, the declarations of loyalty to the exist- ing Government are daily becoming more numerous and more earnest. On the whole, the course of events is perhaps the best that could happen for China. Yuan Shih-kai is an opportunist of the first water, but be is an experienced mau, and if he is not strong he is at least the strongest man available for the job of saving the Republic. Whether when he has saved it he will allow it to remain a republic is another question. The highly abstract political philosophy of Sun Yat-sen and other Radical and Socialistic Southern leaders would probably be a worse danger than the triumph of mere cynicism. The vast majority of Chinese have not even a bowing acquaintance with the jargon of Western democracy. They would reach national eclipse in a cloud of bewilderment and administrative confusion. The friends of China can only hope that if Yuan Shih- kai is to win he will win quickly. The drain on the Treasury is incessant. The need to borrow at increasingly high rates of interest could mean only the eventual loss of Chinese independence.
Lastly, we come to the problem of Mexico, which is expressed in its immediate form in the question : Shall President Huerta be recognized ? It will be remembered that in the last revolution in Mexico General Huerta deserted the cause of President Madero and installed himself as President. It is commonly believed that he also sanctioned the murder of Madero. Since then General Huerta has held the Presidency by a kind of latent terrorism—nothing excessive or out of the way for Mexico, but still a system of oderint dum Inetuant. Americans hate a dictator, and all men hate a murderer. As General Huerta is reputed to be both, Washington cannot make up its mind to receive him into the comity of nations. Other countries, including Great Britain, have recognized him, on the principle that he is no worse than other candidates for the post, that he is the man in possession, and that no ruler whose position is not regular- ized ever has a fair chance of suppressing brigandage and insurrection, and pulling his country financially round a corner. Since Mexico is Mexico this seems to us to be the wisest course. But President Wilson holds back from dealings with General Huerta, hoping that he will fall or retire. This hesitation, though admirable on sentimental grounds, has disadvantages, some of which are definitely moral as well as material. For example, no foreigner's property or person is safe in Mexico, yet other countries are forbidden to interfere in Mexico on account of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States, in fact, warns off those whose interests it is (for most respectable but not wholly pertinent reasons) unwilling to guard. If events compel the United States ultimately to intervene, the situation will certainly be much worse then than it is now. Mr. Wilson, the American Ambassador in Mexico, has visited Washington, apparently without con- vincing Dr, Wilson that the time has come to recognize General Huerta. We hope that the United States will accept the lesser evil of recognizing General Huerta, even if it be on the condition that he holds the promised elec- tions within a reasonable time and then retires ; for the greater evil is to drift on in a mood of studied restraint till some catastrophe compels armed intervention. We do not wonder that all sensible Americans shrink from the thought of a Mexican campaign. A quarter of a, million men would be easily lost in the vast and difficult moun- tainous country. A campaign might continue for years, and a permanent occupation be unavoidable in the end. But that is just what Americans do not want. The trouble and expense of the Philippines have cured them of land hunger.
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