THE RUSSIAN PUZZLE.
IT is difficult to see daylight through the Russian confusion, and we fear there is nothing for it— though this is not a very comforting saying—but to leave the Government alone to shape their policy, and to hope that they will take wise decisions in the constantly changing situation. Fortunately decisions, as Mr. Churchill explained in his statement on Tuesday, so far as the safety of the British forces is concerned, will depend not upon the Government but upon the British Generals in command. It must be admitted with sorrow that the whole military scheme in Russia has miscarried. Mr. Churchill had no difficulty in justifying the original expeditions to Archangel and Murmansk. They were despatched while the Great War was still in progress and Germany was continually transferring divisions from the Eastern to the Western Front. Mr. Churchill stated that after the British expedi- tions had reached Northern Russia no further German divisions were transferred. No reasonable person can quarrel with British policy up to that point. But after the Armistice was signed a new policy had to be framed. Were the British expeditions to be withdrawn, or to stay in response to the requests for help to save Russia from Bolshevism ? In a general way we have no doubt in our own mind that it is the duty of any civilized Western Power to fight Bolshevism if it can possibly contrive to do so. Bolshevism is the enemy of humanity. Above all, there is a moral obligation on the League of Nations to suppress Bolshevism. Of course the difficulties may be quite insuperable, and we well know it is not always possible in international affairs to do what on general principles one ought to do. Nevertheless we should have liked to see a crusade declared against Bolshevism by the League of Nations. For, after all, what is the League of Nations for ? And can there be a greater danger to its existence than is presented by this very Bolshevism ?
Look at the frightful danger if Bolshevism maintains itself in existence very long. The German military party are undoubtedly co-operating with the Bolsheviks so far as they can and now that the blockade of Germany has ceased, it is impossible to prohibit free communications between Germany and Russia, or to prevent Germany from supplying Russian Bolsheviks with the materials of war. Already there is evidence that the Bolsheviks are trying to inflame the Young Turks, the Afghans, et hoc genus ovine, against Britain, France, and America— in other words, against the League of Nations. It has become known here that the Bolshevik orders to their agents in various countries are wickedly explicit. These agents in Britain, America, France, Italy, and elsewhere have been instructed to stir up strikes, promote riots, circulate propaganda likely to increase international conflicts, and to make attempts on the lives of leading men. They are also ordered to damage machinery and bridges, and to do what they can to disorganize transport, as it is explained to them that revolutions are raised most easily when there is confusion. Further, they have orders to forge and circulate paper money. The League of Nations is confronted with the possibility that the buffer-States between Russian Bolshevism and Western Europe may be brought down in ruin. The new Poland might find it impossible to carry on against countless impediments and intrigues. It would be too optimistic to hope that if the Russian Bolsheviks added considerably to their military strength, and began successfully to " mop up" their neighbours, there would not be a junction of Russia and Germany, served by frightened and subservient satellites. This combination would threaten the very existence of the League of Nations.
Now, having glanced at the magnitude of the danger, let us return to the military policy—rather a half-cock policy, it is true, but the Government have all along been alarmed by Labour criticism, and by the possible results of calling for more military service from a war-weary nation—which Great Britain framed after the signing of the Armistice. The general idea was that, in Mr. Churchill's words, we should stretch out a left hand along the line of the Dvina in order to join Admiral Koltchak. When Admiral Koltchak had thus been put in potential possession of Murmansk and Archangel, the British expeditions were to be withdrawn. Everybody remembers the high but, as it turns out, misleading hopes which were indulged at that time. It was said that the Russian anti-Bolsheviks could take Petrograd when they liked. General Yudenitch was said to be confident of that. But quite other things happened. Admiral Koltchak's forces seem to have been quite untrustworthy. Things became so bad that he could never go to sleep at night without fearing that by the morning a large part of his forces would have vanished. When he lost Perm it was seen that everything had gone astray, and the whole military scheme was thrown back by at least a year. Since then there has been the very disconcerting mutiny of friendly Russians who were serving with the British expeditions. It is evident now that if we are to help the non-Bolshevik Russians in the field we can do it only by military operations on the grand scale. That is impossible. What the exact truth is about the degree of help given to us by the French and the Americans we do not know, but it is plain that they have no enthusiasm for military intervention in Russia. Half-hearted action would accomplish nothing. The whole experience is yet one more lesson in the dangers of intervention, no matter how favourable the circum- stances may seem when intervention is begun.
With things as they are, the primary object of British policy must naturally be to withdraw our troops in safety— for the Government are determined in any case to withdraw. The country would not tolerate another disaster such as happened when Gordon was abandoned at Khartum in 1885. It may be a very difficult operation, for all soldiers understand the danger of a withdiawal when those retiring can be followed to the sea by the enemy. And then there arc those Russians who have come under our control and government. What is to happen to them ? The cause of the mutinies was evidently the desire of these Russians to make their peace with the Bolsheviks while there was yet time. They felt that otherwise they would be massacred when the British departed. Mr. Churchill explained on Tuesday that the friendly Russians had been informed from the very beginning that our occupation of Murmansk and Archangel was only temporary. Literally that is of course true ; but one cannot help feeling that no Russian would have exposed himself to the certainty of massacre by the Bolsheviks if he had not been very strongly encouraged to think that by co-operation with us he was guaran- teeing his safety. If that be so, we cannot honourably ride off on a frigidly legal interpretation of words. We must do what we can. Some critics seem to contemplate the possibility of washing our hands entirely of the Russian business by means of getting rid of Mr. Churchill. But Mr. Churchill's policy, right or wrong, has of course not been his own policy. He may have invented it, but it was adopted by the Cabinet and by the Allies.
The nation ought to support the Government, remem- bering, as we said at the beginning, that their trust really reposes not so much in the Government as in the experi- enced and skilful British officers in Russia. It is foolish for newspapers to try to decide what ought to be done when the facts are not known to them and there is neces- sarily no basis of judgment.
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