THE POSSIBILITY OF BOULANGISM IN ENGLAND T HE clever though not
statesmanlike writer who has been discoursing in Macmillan's Magazine on the possibility of Boulangism in England, raisdescribes, in using that word, the real danger which arises from our new in- stitutions. Boulangism is not Caesarism ; though General Boulanger, if he ever wins a pitched battle against Ger- many, may, with audacity and good luck, develop into a Caesar. The first object of Boulangism, as distin- guished from elective Monarchy—and a Caesar is only an elective monarch who professes always to em- body, and not merely to rule, the collective people, —is to separate the Executive from the Legislature, to make the former independent and permanent, and to reduce the latter to the position of an inferior and usually obedient division of the Government. The sovereignty is taken from the representatives, and transferred to the multitude, who retransfer its executive portion to their individual and favourite nominee. In France, that nominee being head of an enormous Army, possessed of a patronage which directly interests almost every family in France, controlling foreign relations which involve liability to armed invasion, and able to exercise a guiding influence on elections, would be the real master ; would be President and Premier in one ; and might, without exaggeration, be described as wielding the whole power of the State. He could not be resisted without efforts almost involving revolution. He would be as great in France as the King in Prussia, and though not so irremovable, might continue, if successful, to hold power for life. In France, as we see, with its long history of more or less successful despotisms and unsuccessful Republics, the rise of such a person is not only possible but probable ; but in England it is, we think, prohibited by the first conditions of the problem, one of which is that neither the popular favourite nor the people would, if they carried out the new French plan, in any way realise their desires. The favourite would have thrown away power by adopting Boulangism, not gained it, and the people would find him unable to realise their ex- pectations. The secret, the dangerous secret it may one day prove, of the British Constitution, is that the head of the Executive is also the head of the legisla- tive body, and therefore, so long as he is obeyed, is possessed of a political power which is more complete and can accomplish bigger things within its very wide range than that of any autocrat. His decisions, until he is removed, have the force of plebiscites, and he can with perfect safety, and often amidst applause, propose measures from which an autocrat would shrink. A Czar could not impose a new income-tax on a whole people. No favourite in England would throw away such a power as that merely to gain for himself a certain permanence in the headship of the Executive ; and if he did, he would cease almost immediately to be the favourite. Who wants to be a Premier unsupported by a Parliament ? The people would expect from him measures such as they know a Minister with a majority could pass, but such as an English head of the Executive, with his limited powers, could scarcely propose, or proposing, could not carry nearly so easily as if he had been a Minister. An American Presi- dent may easily reign and pass away, having carried nothing that he wished during his whole term of office. The mere fact that if beaten he would not depart, would, when legis- lation was wanted, limit the English favourite's ascendency; and he would constantly find, as the President of the Union constantly finds, that "the Government," though irresistible within its sphere, was powerless the moment it stepped out- side it, could carry no changes, and, indeed, no laws of the very first importance. The English people will never make a revolution to secure a result like that, and would tire of such a supreme representative within the period of an average Parliament. So sure are we of this, that we believe Boulangism would in England tempt only the conservative classes who are alarmed at the instability of the machine ; and an independent Executive would be seen from the first to limit the power of the people, to discourage change, and to disable the electors from making their momentary will executive instantly and to the full. That England, roused by some tremendous failure on the part of the democracy, a momentarily successful invasion, or a grand attack on property, or an effort to carry out the semi-socialistic, semi-religious ideas which have for some minds so extraordinary a charm, should resolve on such a change, we can conceive ; but that it should come from the plebs in order to instal a favourite in power, is to us inconceivable. There are many dangers inherent in our Constitution as it stands ; but of Boulangism properly defined, there need, we believe, be no apprehension whatever.
The true danger of this country is that, the masses of the people being possessed, as they are, of the most for- midable constitutional weapon ever forged, the British House of Commons, under the rule of the Closure, should allow a popular favourite to use that weapon as he pleased, should decline to form judgments of their own, and should accept all measures blindly in the full confidence that he who proposed them could not and would not lead them wrong. Such a favourite is perfectly possible, and though he would be no more a Boulanger than a Bismarck, he would wield a power which within these islands would be greater than the power possessed or even claimed by either. There would be literally nothing anywhere to stop him. Suppose he proposed to place all taxation on the rich, or to disband the standing army 4 in favour of Volunteers, or to submit a vote of "Independence,—Yes, or No ?" to all Colonies and Dependencies, so that Britain should hold nothing except by "love," what is there to resist him ? The writer in Macmillan says there would still be four defences against his sway,—the Septennial Act, the non-payment of Members of Parliament, single-Member constituencies, and the House of Lords ; but surely he is dreaming. If that is all we have to rely on, the prospect for the future is dark indeed. The force which made the favourite master would sweep away the House of Lords at a blow, even if it troubled itself about such useless destruction ; single-Member constituencies can return pledged men just as easily as the people can give a plebiscitary vote—witness the American Electoral College, —unpaid Members obey the whip of a leader just as servilely as paid—witness the eighty-six from Ireland,—and the Septennial Act would operate in the favourite's favour. He and the Parliament elected with him would be independent for six years. We should have far more confidence in an appeal to the people from the Crown, which is supposed to be dead, but which possesses a residuum of force never yet accurately gauged, or, indeed, gauged at all ; but, in truth, we have no confidence in anything except the reli- gious feeling, political sense, and business habits of the majority of the people. If they fail us, the constitutional defences assumed or imagined to exist will avail us no more than a debate in the Russian Imperial Council avails against a decision of the Czar. There are no constitutional defences, that is the truth of the matter, which are worth thinking about if the people have once resolved upon a course, and have elected a House of Commons to carry out the behests of their chosen representative; and it is that fact which makes it so unspeakably important that, however else they may be guided, they should invariably hear the truth ; that the ultimate Sovereign who can act with such terrible rapidity, and who is always liable to act on mere emotion, should always have before him the materials for judgment. We dread the effect of political falsehood more than the effect of political unreason, for while the latter has always an obstacle in the moral sense of the people, the former has not.
Previous page
