TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SCHNAEBELE AFFAIR.
TEE obscurity in which the actual facts of the Schnaebele case have hitherto been wrapped begins to disappear, and it becomes possible, therefore, to form an opinion as to the true meaning of the incident. It may be assumed, we think, in the first place, that M. Schnaebele, a French Com- missary of Police on the frontier, exerted himself to organise a system of espionage within the disaffected province, Alsace- Lorraine. The German officials assert this strongly, nor is it denied by M. Schnaebele, who, indeed, but for some such charge, must have been either unknown to Germans, or an object of profound indifference. He was so successful in his task—which, we may remark, is One occasionally imposed on its agents by every Government in Europe, though they do not mention the fact in debates—that it was resolved to arrest him ; and accordingly, orders were issued, either from the Stadtholder, from the supreme Government, or, as is alleged, from a High Court in Leipzic, to arrest M. Schnaebele, should he enter Germany, for treason to the Empire. These orders, according to the official report made to the German Government, and published in the North German Gazette of April 28th, were issued to Herr Gautsch, Commissary of Police in Lorraine, who, according to French official accounts, thereupon forwarded to M. Schnaebele a letter asking for an interview in order to inspect some posts which mark the boundary, and which had fallen into disrepair. M. Schnaebele accepted the invitation, and crossed the frontier, upon which he was seized by two German policemen and hurried off to Metz, where up to Friday night he still remained a prisoner, charged with a capital offence. The substance of the story is so far proved, for not only has the French Govern- ment published a fac-simile of Herr Gautsch's letter, but Herr Gautsch, in a conversation with a correspondent of the Daily News, unhesitatingly admits its authenticity. Here, however, a curious and significant conflict of testimony occurs. Herr Gautsch utterly, and indeed passionately, repudiates the baseness attributed to him. He denies the receipt of any order to arrest M. Schnaebele, and avers that he did not even know of the intention to seize him. He wrote his letter in perfect sincerity, in the ordinary course of business, and though he had mentioned to a detective who called upon him that he had arranged an interview with the Frenchman, he was astounded when he witnessed his arrest. Indeed, he ordered his release, and was himself arrested on suspicion as to his identity, and carried away to Metz in company with M. Schnaebele. We do not know anything of Herr Gautsch, and cannot, therefore, form an opinion of his veracity ; but his story, as reported by the special correspondent, leaves prima fade an impression of his good faith. It is most unusual for a German official to make any statement at all, unless provoked by slander ; and if he had been lying, he would have been more thorough, and have denied the letter itself. In either case, the evidence comes to this,—the German police, under instructions from high authority, whether local, Imperial, or judicial, availing them- selves of the special and most oppressive German law which holds foreigners liable to punishment in Germany for acts against Germany done outside her territory, either decoyed M. Schnaebele over the frontier, or used his presence there on official business at the invitation of their own Commissary of Police, in order to effect his arrest. In either case, they were guilty of an act which their Government ought instantly to repudiate. It is most unfair that a foreigner should be liable to arrest at all in Germany for acts done in his own land—we doubt if Germany would bear as against herself the application of her own law—but that he should be trapped into entering German territory, and there made liable to punishment for such an offence, is altogether intolerable. That the editor of the Times should, if he publishes a libel on the German Emperor, be liable, on entering Germany, to the penalties of treason, is bad enough ; but that he should be officially invited there to give orders for the benefit of Germany, and then seized, is more than opinion in Europe ought to tolerate for an hour. Yet that supposed case is precisely analogous with the case of M. Schnaebele, even if the latter did execute his orders to procure intelligence in an unscrupulous manner.
It is stated that M. Schnaebele will be released, the German Government acknowledging that the method of his arrest involved a breach of a virtual safe-conduct, and we sincerely hope that this course will be adopted. It behoves the
German Government, with its gigantic strength, to avoid' so using it as to irritate the world, and especially to be solicitous that its inferior agents, in their reliance upon that strength, do not show themselves oppressive. Nothing con- tributed to the fall of Napoleon so much as his contempt for the international right of asylum, and his pretension to seize personal enemies or dangerous political opponents wherever he could find them. The Germans claim to use their present ascendency in Europe justly and in the interest of peace, and we do not deny their claim ; but strength like theirs requires to be used something more than justly, with a circumspect or- even anxious fairness which in this incident we fail to find. We should like to have seen Prince Bismarck even eager to seize so brilliant an opportunity of proving his desire to be inflexibly fair to France, and hope that he will not, as reported, make his discoveries a reason for bringing diplomatic pressure to bear in Paris. After all, his grip of the Reichsland cannot be shaken by anything any spy can do ; and the intelligence of the German Staff is curiously overrated if they also do not seek to know what is done in Belfort and the fortresses which now prevent German entrance into France. What else is the business of an Intelligence Department ? There should be a little give and take in these matters, and a State does quite enough to protect itself if it imprisons or shoots a spy caught in the act of breaking its military rules. The spy knows his risks, and runs them ; but to seize the officer who sends him out is practically to assert that to prepare for war with. Germany is to be guilty of high treason against that State. Why is it high treason, any more than for Germany to do any act necessary to provide for war with France ?
The newspapers are loud in their praise of the "calmness displayed by both peoples, and in one way they are right. Both Frenchmen and Germans have avoided cries, and the silence, though more creditable to the man kicked than to the kicking man, shows a manly self-restraint. But we cannot concur in the view that the calmness displayed increases the chances of future peace. Our notion is that both German and French journalists let off the steam in shouting when they know war is unlikely, and that this is one reason for their violence whenever England offends them. Their calm seems to us to have been produced by a conviction that the situation was terribly grave, that the smallest incident might end in war, and that, like travellers in the High Alps, they must only whisper, lest even a louder noise than usual should start the avalanche on its path. Englishmen, being quiet them- selves, are always impressed by quiet ; but we are not sure that, wishing for peace as we do, we had not rather that the journalists of Paris had emitted their usual cries. Certain we are that, owing in part to this repression, France will register " l'affaire Schnaebelfi " among the grievances, real or imaginary,, which she treasures up against Germany, and which, whenever- Russia is ready, she will be far too eager to avenge.
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