30 AUGUST 1930, Page 15

Letters to the Editor

week on the difficult problem of sanctions '' The diffi-. culty in this matter, as in so many others, is to keep in mind at the same time many different series of considerations.

1. We all agree with Sir Graham Bower that in a reasonably contented world, the less force is thought about the better. Every threat is really a disturbance of the peace.

2. At present, however, we have a discontented world. The Great War ended in a settlement which many nations would like to see either modified by negotiation or upset by violence.

3. The chance of modifying the present settlement by negotiation is in germ contained in Article 19 of the Covenant. This should be developed and made practically helpful in the way indicated by the League of Nations Union proposals. Any attempt, however, at upsetting the settlement by means of war must obviously, and for overwhelming reasons, be prevented.

4. The peace is at present preserved, partly by the general exhaustion, largely, I hope, by general confidence in the fair dealing of the League of Nations, but also, in the last resort, by the over- whelming military superiority of France and her allies, who are determined not to lose what they have gained by the war. This is an extremely dangerous and undesirable state of things—the French group overwhelmingly armed ; their defeated enemies forcibly disarmed ; the neutral nations mostly weak, and, at any rate, unwilling to fight.

5. Thus, the threat of armed force already exists, but it is force in the wrong place—force on the aide of one party, not on the side of impartial justice. The French and their allies have promised to disarm, and explain that they are unable to do so because many nations have a motive for attacking them, and they cannot trust the League to defend them if they are attacked.

It seems to me that only three courses are possible for Great Britain :-

(a) To abdicate and let France, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Poland with their enormous armies do what they like to the rest of Europe.

(b) To abdicate and connive at the secret re-arming of Germany with her possible allies, in the feeble and fantastic hope that another European war may do good rather than harm.

(e) Resolutely to shoulder our burdens and face our responsi- bilities ; to insist that the power of coercion should rest with the League, and not with particular nations or alliances ; to press with all our force for a general reduction of armaments, and to make it absolutely clear that when such reduction is achieved, we will fully and without hesitation act up to our engagements under Articles 11 and 10 of the Covenant.

Between these three, I do not think it is difficult to choose.

—I am, Sir, &c., GILBERT MURRAY. Yaiscombe, Boar's IIill, Oxford.