FRESH LIGHT ON THE WAR OF 1870.*
EVERY day that passes serves to confirm the conviction of those who hold that the War of 1870 is likely to create a false impression of the fighting power of France. Whatever may be the ease with the nation, the French soldier has not degenerated. He fights and marches as well as he ever fought and marched, and if he is discouraged by defeat, that is no new defect. Victory raises the warlike confidence of every army, but defeat does not, in an equal degree, lower the spirits of all. The more closely we examine the facts of the war, the more we shall be convinced that it was not the French soldier who lost the battles, for his inherent military qualities as well as his inherent defects were conspicuously displayed on every field and line of march. Let no one count for the future upon the depreciation of this source of French strength. Those who do will pay dearly for their mistake. That the Germans would have ultimately prevailed we do not doubt, but the phe- noinena of success would have differed materially from those which are known to us had a soldier of genius commanded the French Army in July, 1870. It is to the almost absolute default of military ability in the highest quarters that we must look for the causes of frustrated operations, crushing defeats, and enormous
captures. • , The ordinary public have long and rightly jumped to that con- clusion, but only a few could know the startling poverty of , military qualities in Metz at the opening of the war. The imprudence of rushing into war at all, under the circum- stances, is matter of notoriety ; it is surpassed only by the incompetence exhibited in the conduct of operations. Fresh light on this important point has just been afforded by General Frossard, one of the scapegoat Generals, who, like De Failly, was sacrificed in order to cover the blunders of the Emperor, Lo Bosuf, and Palikao. General Frossard's Report, part of which has beeu pub- lished, is a simple narrative of facts, very clearly arranged, and based on what we may call contemporary documents, orders, tele- grams, despatches issued during the strife,—the only safe and authentic sources of military history. His own personal opinions and reflections, which may be coloured by events, are few, mode- rate, and easily separated from the narrative ; and on the whole, this section of his report is the best and most instructive document, so far as regards the opening scenes of the war, yet presented from the French side. It reveals, in an astounding degree, the shallow views, the lack of insight, the bewilderment that prevailed at the Imperial head. quarters, and the consequent failure of the Imperial General and his most trusted advisers to grasp the facts of the situation, and import vigour, decision, and unity into the operations of the several corps.
The Emperor Napoleon has informed the world that he had a plan of campaign, but it never reached that degree of consistency which would have rendered it necessary to impart an outline of the scheme to the corps commanders. Until the first week of August "the Army "believed that the co-operation of Italy and Austria had been secured, but all they knew was that the Germans could put 500,000 men into the field, and that the French could not muster more than half that number,—the " effective " on August 2 was 244,828 men, and 54,007 horses. Even at that date the material organization was very imperfect, and the magazines were not supplied. Up to the same date not one corps even was concen- * Rapport sear es apdrationt du Denstemo Corps do rArmoo cAm Matz, ire Fern°. Par le (Adam' Fuesuard. Paris. 5871. trated except the Second, under Frossard, who managed to keep his divisions in hand from Chalons to Forbach, and from Forbaoh to iNfetz. The rest were spread out along the froutier,—clear evidence of uncertainty at the Imperial head-quarters. Nevertheless, as General Frossard informs us, Marshal Niel had ordered, as early as 1867, a reconnaissance of the frontier, on the supposition that,. in the event of war, the Germans would seek to break into Lorraine through Saarbrtick. The result of that inspection was a report on a strong position between Forbach and Sarreguemines, suitable for the contentration of an army. It was known as the position of Calenbronn ; the points for defensive works had been. selected and traced ; and it was well known to the Marshals about Napoleon. The case foreseen had arrived, France had rushed into war knowing that she must fight at a numerical dis- advantage ; there was the position, and on the 26th of July, when Le axed visited the frontier, his attention was directed to this defensive line, but no decision was taken. On the 29th of July, the Army, by a movement from left to right, was brought nearer the frontier, but still not concentrated ; the Second Corps alone being kept together. The silence and quiet beyond the Sarre be- wildered the Emperor auclhis Major-General, and unable to endure- the suspense any longer, he ordered the attack on Ss.arbriick, in the hope of forcing the Germans to show their forces. They refused ;. Frossard inferred that they were not prepared, which was true, and he thinks that had the French corps been then or earlier thrown into the Bavarian Palativate, there was some chance of an advantageous result. And doubtless, if theEmperer had clearly seen. that he had to wage a defensive war, before the end of July he would have crossed the frontier and ruined the railway system as effectually as an American cavalry corps in 1863 would have done. There was no other effectual mode of gaining thne,—the great need of France in July, 1870. Instead of taking any resolution,. rash or prudent, the Emperor took none. He pottered between. the frontier and the Moselle. He dreamed dreams. He thought it would be agreeable to him if the enemy would debouch from Sarrelouis 40,000 strong, because he had prepared 70,000 to meet him. The idea was absurd, because, as Frossard remarks, it pre- supposed that the Germans would depart from their plan of acting in Manes on decisive points. Thus dreaming dreams, the Emperor neglected to concentrate his Army, and on the 6th of August, whilst the Imperial mind and the Imperial troops were in a state- of fluctuation, Frossard had to fight a battle, forced on him by the Germanst and to fight it unsupported. That he was not sustainecl. was no fault of his. He knew on the 5th that he was exposed to a blow, and said so, and again pointed to Calenbronn, as the- proper point of concentration ; the answer was an order to march. on the 6th for St. Avoid, showing that fear of Sarrelouis was the dominant feeling in the Imperial mind. But on the 6th it was too. late. The German Army was in movement ; You Kameke fastened upon the Second Corps, and with one division held it un- til reinforcements arrived and drove Frossard, not to St. Avoid, his. line of retreat, but to Sarreguemines. Only at this time had the three. corps, Second, Third, and Fourth, been put under the command of one Marshal, Bazaine, the Emperor and Le Bosuf still directing the whole operations. These two looked for an early battle ; they had positive information that the Germans were near. The Generals were directed to meet the Emperor on the 6th at St. Avoid, but. at four in the morning of that day Frossard received a telegram. telling him to remain at his post, and be ready for a serious attack,. which might take place on that day. Le Bosuf sent a warning, he sent no succour ! Yet Bazaine's corps, the Third, if not Ladmirault's, the Fourth, might have reached Spicheren in ample time to overwhelm Katneke, who received no reinforcements until three o'clock. Frossard asked for aid at nine, his demands were more imperative at eleven ; and so on almost every hour he appealed for- help. None came, except a brigade of dragoons, who had to be, sent back because they blocked the roads. Nay, the cannon spoke as effectually as the telegraph ; it was not heeded, or imper- fectly heeded. There were four divisions encamped at distancess varying from' eight to nine miles from Spicheren. They were all under the orders of Bazaine. One marched at four o'clock, halted half-way, and its commander sent word to Frossard that he- would join him in the morning That night it had to retreat OD Puttelange, A second, distant only nine miles, heard the can- nonade at eleven, marched about four miles, lost the guiding sound,. and went back to camp ; hearing again at six the thunder of the- guns, it started afresh, but three miles from the scene of action- met news of Frossard's defeat, and returned on its way, marching all night. A third, only nine miles distant, started about eleven,. but halted at three o'clock, four miles from Spicheren. Receiving an urgent demand from Frossard at half-past four, the commander
of the division did not move until oix o'clock, reaching Forbach at nine, when it was too late for anything but
instant retreat. The fourth division was with Bazaine him- self, guarding St. Avoid, nine miles off. One regiment was sent from this division by train ; it arrived to find the German artillery overlooking the railway station, and of course it hurried back. So that here were four divisional commanders who did not know how to help a comrade and save an army from defeat. The blame must be shared between Husain° and his subordinates ; none can be justly bestowed on Frossard, who fought his isolated battle very well, and whose re ward has been calumny. But the greatest responsi- bility falls upon the Emperor, who, with Le Bceuf, was playing at war. At this very moment, when he knew that the Germans were within striking distance, he was contemplating a flank march aleng the frontier, the result of which would have placed his right at Biteche, his left at St. Avoid, the object being an offensive move- ment in the Palatinate. Too late. The Germans anticipated him at Werth and Saarbriick, and upset his only plan.
For a moment the two defeats which his arms had sustained opened the eyes of the Emperor. On the 7th of August he decided that the army in Lorraine should forthwith retire through Metz upon Chalons, where it was to be rejoined by the routed troops of Mac Mahon and De Failly ; and orders to that effect were received by Frossard. But this wise resolve was not of long duration. On the 8th the order was cancelled. Marshal Le Boeuf had ridden over the country outside Metz, and had discovered a position of battle behind the river Nied. lie seemed to be of opinion that he could stop the Red Prince, or fall on the flank of his cousin as he issued from the Vosges into Lorraine ! In reality the "Council of Ministers" had remonstrated against the retreat upon Chalons, and the Emperor had given way. Thus early had the war, begun for political reasons, fallen under the guidance of remote politicians! The forward position on the Nied was considered untenable, and the army fell back close to Metz. There they rested three days ; by that time military reasons had once more overpowered political tremors, and the great movement on Verdun was resolved upon ; but again it was too late. Begun on the 11th, it must have suc- ceeded ; nothing could have prevented the French from establish- ing themselves behind the Meuse; begun on the 14th, there was just a chance of success, and no more. The battle, so boldly forced on by Steinmetz, pushed batik the departure one day, gave the eGermans time to cross the Moselle, and to execute those hardy manceuvres and to fight those bloody battles which effectually cut off Marshal Bazaine from the Marne and the Seine.
General Frossard does justice to his soldiers. "They fought well," he says, and his men were severely tried ; "they showed themselves devoted, active, obedient." In answer to the assertion that the soldiers were indisciplined, he writes :—" They were neither indisciplined nor degenerate, nor were the commanders ignorant and incapable, and they do not deserve the reproaches that have been showered on some among them." But General ‘Frossard's report, among others, proves that some of the leaders were neither wise nor capable, notably the Emperor, Bazaine, and Le Bumf. If they saw the right course, they pursued the wrong course, and sacrificed the safety of the State to the interests of the dynasty. General Frossard sums up thus the causes of French misfortunes :—" Numerical inferiority in men and guns, imperfect organization, preparation, foresight, of instruction among some, of application on the part of others, of modesty in all." Could an ineffective army be more effectively described ?
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