TOPICS OF THE DAY.
PRINCE BISMARCK'S DESPATCH.
IT was, we believe, necessary for Prince Bismarck to write his masterful despatch to Count Arnim, on the murders of German soldiers by French Enrve's, but the necessity was clearly accepted by him with something of satisfaction. We are all a little apt to forget that the great Chancellor is
not only a European personage, but a German Minister, responsible first of all to an Emperor who is, before all things, a soldier ; and secondly, to a people who are, before all things, sensitive to scorn. Just before the despatch was written, both Emperor and people had been excited to fury by the acquittal of Tonnelet, on the defence put forward for him by Maitre Lachaud. The great advocate, de- spairing apparently of resisting the evidence, which showed that Tonnelet had murdered a German soldier without special provocation, boldly pleaded that the presence of a German in the street visibly as a conqueror was provocation enough, that the accused was guilty mainly of a perfervid rage of patriot- ism. This defence, natural enough in an advocate, but utterly worthless, except as a plea in extenuation, was, we are told, accepted by the judge, and certainly accepted by the jury, who pronounced a verdict of acquittal. They, in fact, held that Tonnelet in killing a German soldier had only killed a danger- ous wild beast, and several journalists openly supported them in that view. No army in the world would bear this, or hear that such an act had remained unavenged without an excitement very dangerous to discipline ; and the German soldier, although no doubt especially well disciplined, is also especially sensitive to wrong. The Emperor, representing as he does Army feeling as well as Army views, was compelled to act, and to act with a vigour and hauteur sufficient to soothe once more the aroused military pride of his vast forces. He was the more compelled, because the sentiment of the Army was shared by the whole people, which writhes to a degree Englishmen cannot understand under French contempt, and which saw in the entire incident one more proof, not of French hatred—that they could allow for—but of French scorn, scorn as of men for wild animals, or of civilized men for savages. The whole people was calling through the Press for satisfaction, the Army was furious, the Emperor was resolved, the French were hopelessly in the wrong—for even granting the French charge of German "atrocities," a charge not proved, there can be no excuse for a Court holding wilful murder to be an innocent act, assassination even in war being a high criminal offence—and Prince Bismarck had to speak out, and being Prince Bismarck spoke out, loudly, haughtily, in the tone of the master he deems himself to be. His despatch may be criticized in detail to any extent, but its essential meaning is that Frenchmen are not yet free, that they must do justice to Germans, and that if they refuse they will be made to do it by undisguised military force. The Generals will secure their men's safety by seizing hostages, " or even more extreme measures ;" and the statesmen will take care, under pretext of securing the treaty, to make the treaty as onerous as possible.
There is no need of any other explanation of the despatch than that we have given, for its incidental expressions of re- sentment at the tone of the French Press, undignified as Englishmen and Americans think them, are natural enough on the Continent, where written denunciation is always accepted as deliberate insult, and especially in Germany, where an edu- cated military brotherhood, elated at once by victory and by a consciousness of having deserved it, feels the language of the French journalists, sometimes merely bitter, sometimes inex- cusably brutal, like a reiterated challenge ; but there is another explanation to be added. A good many symptoms serve to show that Prince Bismarck and the four or five princes and soldiers who form, as it were, his Council, would not be grieved if the despatch did irritate Prance to madness and provoke a premature explosion. Speaking merely as careful observers, and without special information of any kind, we are inclined to suspect that they suspect France, her Government as well as her people, of designing war before the indemnity is fully paid and the six departments evacuated. They hear of course all or nearly all that passes in France, they are informed of the deep passion which animates all classes, and makes them, if they suspect a questioner of want of sympathy, unable to speak upon the subject ; and they see that granted such an idea, M. Thiers is advancing to his end with immense energy and skill. He has cut down the
public works which can wait, and increased the military budget by three millions sterling a year ; has demanded and will receive eight millions sterling under the name of a Sinking Fund, which, whether he intends it or not, can be turned by a single vote into a Campaign Fund ; has refused the universal service which the Assembly desires, because he wants men at once—for the maintenance of internal order, Ile . says—has developed instead of abolishing the substitute system, so as to keep old soldiers in the ranks—he said this himself in his "President's " speech—has set the factories at Bourges and elsewhere energetically in motion, and has issued very strict orders about espionnage. All these acts are natural enough when the facts are considered,—the temper of M. Thiers, his belief in military organization, and his re- ported conviction that the result of the late campaign was partly an accident, the result of unreadiness, and may all be. interpreted as part of a long scheme for rehabilitating France ; but then also they all point to a strong desire that the re- habilitation should be quick. Prince Bismarck, his master, and his colleagues see these things, and see them with eyes very different from those of Englishmen, who remember Sedan and the shocking scenes preceding it, described by Captain Jeannot, with much more vividness than they remember Gravelotte, and the half-hour during which the old soldier who now sits on Charlemagne's throne thought. his Pomeranians might be swept away. Germans remember, for they suffered, and know that if France were rehabilitated in reality, if she found a General—and Macmahon, Chanzy, and Faidherbe can lead armies—the struggle might again be a terrible one. The Germans just now despise the French, but that is not the tone of their great Generals, who have never, we believe, in any pamphlet, or article in the Military Gazette, or proclamation, treated them as other than formid- able foes crippled by indiscipline,—or, as we suspect is the truth, by a discipline inconsistent with the national genius, which desires to level everything but capacities. It is quite possible that men who see every day proof of the marvellous resources. of France, who know how formidable she can be in the field, and who regard their own men—the stakes in so terrible a, game—with hearty affection, may not be reluctant, may half wish to see France commit, out of temper, the terrible error of renewing the struggle soon. That Prince Bismarck plans this we doubt, or rather we disbelieve. He may be unaware of that strange stratum of caution, patience, almost timidity, that underlies the French character, that gives authority so much power, and makes Frenchmen in business the "safest," in a City sense, of all mankind ; but he is too great a statesman to gamble, or to blind himself to the first truth of history, that war with a whole people cannot be reduced to. a certainty except by risking sacrifices at least equivalent to any conceivable gains. An invasion of Germany with Metn untaken would be an enterprise for a Napoleon, and a. Napoleon believed to be infallible in war, and there is no such man in France, and Prince Bismarck is scarcely likely by a new march to Paris to abandon such a vant- age ground. But though he would not plan such a con- tingency, he would encounter it, and he risks it in publishing despatches like these all the more readily because they make his home policy easy and his government virtually uncontroll- able. If France is going to try again, what is the use of worrying or impeding the men who have proved themselves so. competent, or touching the system which has so succeeded Even Englishmen would reason thus, they did so reason under Pitt ; and to England war means expense and not invasion, di- minished comfort and not requisitions. Germans who know what invasion means draw the syllogism instinctively, and on the slightest sign of war suspend alike social reform and political opposition. The political advantage of a state of " tension" between France and• Germany is, we fear, far too. keenly felt in Berlin. -
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