Transatlantic 1953
By D. W. BROGAN AFTER twenty years of Democratic Administrations, the Republicans return to office, a novelty for the Americans and for us. The change of political roles has, of course, many aspects of great interest, but there is one that, naturally enough, comes first to our minds. What difference will this change make to the relationship between the United States and Great Britain ? There was I found, among my American friends, a pretty universal belief that everybody in Britain regretted the change, and among those of my friends who are Republicans (as many are) there was some resentment of this automatic British preference for a party which, they held, had been repudiated by the healthiest sections of the American people.
I do not think that this resentment is likely to be a serious factor in Anglo-American relationships, for the issues are too grave, the ties that bind us too strong, for mere resentment to be allowed to play any serious part in the making or adminis- tration of policy. But behind the resentment lies another emotion or another question. Why is it that the victory of General Eisenhower was not more welcome, since so much was known of him—and favourably known—and since his nomination was so warmly welcomed ? Why is the American turn to the right regarded with suspicion in a country that has turned to the right itself ? Why is the accession to power of an old collaborator of Mr. Churchill regarded with such apprehension ?
It will be noticed that these American critics assume that the British public did react in this way to the campaign and the result. Naturally enough, I was unable, six thousand miles away, to follow the British Press with any fidelity, but the American impression was certainly that the Press (which was assumed, rashly, to represent British feeling) was markedly pro-Stevenson, was excessive in admiration for the Democratic candidate and rash in over-estimating his chances. It can be said, as a plea in abatement, that American newspaper-men covering the campaign were nearly as strongly pro-Stevenson as their British colleagues, and that Dr. Gallup over-estimated his chances almost as much as British correspon,dents. And, what was more remarkable, in Vancouver, so close to the border, with all the cool and critical Canadian knowledge of their great neighbour, I found that my belief that General Eisenhower would win was received with astonished scepticism by most people.
That the change will force on us some reconsideration of our policy is certain. For the change means that we have to deal with a new Administration that is not involved (apart from its chief) in the tangled web of precious Anglo-American co-operation. In that Administration many of the most important figures are inclined to test the efficacy of national and international policy by hard, statistical standards. The new Secretary of the Treasury, for example, is known to be a believer in the stimulating effect of insecurity, and will not look with favour, it may be surmised, on American aid to keep British industry ticking along in its accustomed fashion. A good shake-up (e.g., in the textile industries) would not seem to Mr. Humphrey an unmitigated disaster for Britain, or some- thing that the United States should rush in to prevent. If it be true that American aid has really cushioned our social services, we may expect the accounts to be scrutinised with a colder eye.
A traditional ground of British distrust of the Republican Party is its devotion to high tariffs. True, President Eisenhower in his inaugural gave a firm lead in the direction of freer trade. But he - may lead, and the Republican leadership in Congress may not follow. If it does follow, it will expect to be followed, for, in British comment on American tariffs and the administration of them, there is sometimes visible a naive belief that Britain is still a world-leader in the freeing of trade, that- all we want is a fair field and no favour. That may have been what Lancashire thought yesterday, but it doesn't seem to be what it thinks today, and the new Adminis- tration (and the American people) will expect their example, if they give one, to be followed by us, not only here but in the Empire. And we must beware of over-estimating what we can do in the American market, even if we have a free entry. That free entry is desirable buf is no panacea. A very' intelligent young Republican who had served on the Marshall agency in Italy, and who was very internationally-minded, put the question to me :, " Do you think that if we abolished all tariffs tomorrow that would end the dollar gap ? " I was forced to admit that it would not, and I was not quite sure what to reply when he argued that all European countries, Britain included, would be better off, in the long run, if they faced the fact that they had to live by their own efforts.
That, in Italy, might mean a more equal distribution of income and in Britain a restoration of incentives by more inequality of income. But the United States should not under- write the social structure of either Britain or Italy. These views were not hostile, but they do represent a very widespread view—that the European and Asiatic assumption, that the United States owes Britain or Italy or India or Iran adequate means to keep them in the manner and style to which they are accustomed is baseless. The United States may owe charity, but nobody owes any of these countries, or Latin America, a living.
In foreign policy we may expect to have the primacy of Europe questioned, if only to make possible a reahstic assess- ment of American commitments and strength. And if European countries, by preferring butter to guns, show confidence that there is no imminent danger of Russian aggression in arms, there can be no plausible reason why America should not look around and see whether there is not an area, or areas, where Communist aggression is imminent and where American strength might be more profitably deployed. I don't believe that such a survey will result in writing off Europe or in depriving it of its primacy, but the survey will be made, and we had better accept with good temper the necessity for it and the justification for it.
A.more intangible result of the election will be a more critical attitude towards our " Welfare State " activities. It is not only that we may be paying for more welfare than we can afford, but that some forms of that welfare- may account for our comparative stagnation. If we are investing in social services, even in housing, savings that ought to go to capital equipment, can-we expect to compete with the United States— or Germany—in world-trade ? And, as for any suggestion that there is something unsporting in making us compete with countries whose inhabitants are willing to work longer and harder, it had better not be made if a rude answer is not wanted. Still less do I recommend the repetition of the now standard report of the teams who visit America to study the secret of its productive miracles—that the American working man doesn't work harder: he only produces more than the British working man.
The American doesn't think that mere laborious physical effort is an intrinsically good thing. He thinks that the object of work is production. To say that the British working man, producing two-thirds of what his American opposite number produces, works as hard seems to the Americans of the new Administration mere nonsense. It is like saying that a bad runner who does the 100 yards in twelve seconds runs as hard as the man who does it in well under ten. The object is to run the hundred yards fast, not to expend so many foot-pounds of energy in running it slow. And if these Republican critics are told that the American working man has far more capital equipment at his disposal, they reply that he uses it far more skilfully and willingly, and that his Government (especially the new Administration) makes it far easier for business-men to provide the capital equipment.
What the Americans call, ambiguously and inaccurately, the " free enterprise system " is hard to define. But certainly it involves much less , Government control, not to speak of Government operation of industry, than is fashionable here. When the new rulers of America read of the zeal of the Labour Party, or of its most vocal members, for more nationalisation— nationalisation of such highly competitive industries as ship- building and shipping for instance—they think they must have taken leave of their doctrinaire senses. (So do I.) When they are advised how to run their economy by British thinkers or peripatetic missionaries they laugh or swear. When they learn that they are out of step with the progressive movement of the rest of the world, and then look at the rest of the world lining up in Washington for some of the Prodigal Son's bounty, their conviction that they are in an asylum, of which the inmates are the keepers, grows. This view is no doubt wrong, in part anyway. In a year or so certain hard truths about the non- American world will be learned, even by the most naive business-man now triumphant in Washington. A lot will have to be learned by our rulers and representatives too, and now is the time to begin.
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